Cumulative cultural evolution occurs when adaptive innovations are passed down to consecutive generations through social learning. This process has shaped human technological innovation, but also occurs in non-human species. While it is traditionally argued that cumulative culture relies on high-fidelity social transmission and advanced cognitive skills, here I show that a much simpler system suffices. Cumulative culture spontaneously emerged in artificial agents who navigate with a minimal cognitive architecture of goal-direction, social proximity, and route memory. Within each generation, naive individuals benefitted from being paired with experienced navigators because they could follow previously established routes. Crucially, experienced navigators also benefitted from the presence of naive individuals through regression to the goal. As experienced agents followed their memorised path, their naive counterparts (unhindered by route memory) were more likely to err towards than away from the goal, and thus biased the pair in that direction. This improved route efficiency within each generation. In control experiments, cumulative culture was attenuated when agents' social proximity or route memory were lesioned, whereas eliminating goal-direction only reduced efficiency. These results demonstrate that cumulative cultural evolution occurs even in the absence of sophisticated communication or thought. One interpretation of this finding is that current definitions are too loose, and should be narrowed. An alternative conclusion is that rudimentary cumulative culture is an emergent property of systems that seek social proximity and have an imprecise memory capacity, providing a flexible complement to traditional evolutionary mechanisms.

The term architecture has evolved considerably from its original Greek roots and its application to buildings and computers to its more recent manifestation for minds. This article considers lessons from this history, in terms of a set of relevant distinctions introduced at each of these stages and a definition of architecture that spans all three, and a reconsideration of three key issues from cognitive architectures for architectures in general and cognitive architectures more particularly.

Attempts to import dual-system descriptions of System-1 and System-2 into AI have been hindered by a lack of clarity over their distinction. We address this and other issues by situating System-1 and System-2 within the Common Model of Cognition. Results show that what are thought to be distinctive characteristics of System-1 and 2 instead form a spectrum of cognitive properties. The Common Model provides a comprehensive vision of the computational units involved in System-1 and System-2, their underlying mechanisms, and the implications for learning, metacognition, and emotion.

There have been increasing challenges to dual-system descriptions of System-1 and System-2, critiquing them as imprecise and fostering misconceptions. We address these issues here by way of Dennett's appeal to use computational thinking as an analytical tool, specifically we employ the Common Model of Cognition. Results show that the characteristics thought to be distinctive of System-1 and System-2 instead form a spectrum of cognitive properties. By grounding System-1 and System-2 in the Common Model we aim to clarify their underlying mechanisms, persisting misconceptions, and implications for metacognition.

This paper presents a hybrid robot cognitive architecture, CRAM, that enables robot agents to accomplish everyday manipulation tasks. It addresses five key challenges that arise when carrying out everyday activities. These include (i) the underdetermined nature of task specification, (ii) the generation of context-specific behavior, (iii) the ability to make decisions based on knowledge, experience, and prediction, (iv) the ability to reason at the levels of motions and sensor data, and (v) the ability to explain actions and the consequences of these actions. We explore the computational foundations of the CRAM cognitive model: the self-programmability entailed by physical symbol systems, the CRAM plan language, generalized action plans and implicit-to-explicit manipulation, generative models, digital twin knowledge representation & reasoning, and narrative-enabled episodic memories. We describe the structure of the cognitive architecture and explain the process by which CRAM transforms generalized action plans into parameterized motion plans. It does this using knowledge and reasoning to identify the parameter values that maximize the likelihood of successfully accomplishing the action. We demonstrate the ability of a CRAM-controlled robot to carry out everyday activities in a kitchen environment. Finally, we consider future extensions that focus on achieving greater flexibility through transformational learning and metacognition.

How might we use cognitive modeling to consider the ways in which antiblackness, and racism more broadly, impact the design and development of AI systems? We provide a discussion and an example towards an answer to this question. We use the ACT-R/{\Phi} cognitive architecture and an existing knowledge graph system, ConceptNet, to consider this question not only from a cognitive and sociocultural perspective, but also from a physiological perspective. In addition to using a cognitive modeling as a means to explore how antiblackness may manifest in the design and development of AI systems (particularly from a software engineering perspective), we also introduce connections between antiblackness, the Human, and computational cognitive modeling. We argue that the typical eschewing of sociocultural processes and knowledge structures in cognitive architectures and cognitive modeling implicitly furthers a colorblind approach to cognitive modeling and hides sociocultural context that is always present in human behavior and affects cognitive processes.

Misinformation is a global problem in modern social media platforms with few solutions known to be effective. Social media platforms have offered tools to raise awareness of information, but these are closed systems that have not been empirically evaluated. Others have developed novel tools and strategies, but most have been studied out of context using static stimuli, researcher prompts, or low fidelity prototypes. We offer a new anti-misinformation agent grounded in theories of metacognition that was evaluated within Twitter. We report on a pilot study (n=17) and multi-part experimental study (n=57, n=49) where participants experienced three versions of the agent, each deploying a different strategy. We found that no single strategy was superior over the control. We also confirmed the necessity of transparency and clarity about the agent's underlying logic, as well as concerns about repeated exposure to misinformation and lack of user engagement.

Meta-learning is a framework for learning learning algorithms through repeated interactions with an environment as opposed to designing them by hand. In recent years, this framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition. Yet, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We rely on three key pillars to accomplish this goal. We first point out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms. This result not only implies that any behavioral phenomenon that can be explained by a Bayesian model can also be explained by a meta-learned model but also allows us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional Bayesian methods. In particular, we argue that meta-learning can be applied to situations where Bayesian inference is impossible and that it enables us to make rational models of cognition more realistic, either by incorporating limited computational resources or neuroscientific knowledge. Finally, we reexamine prior studies from psychology and neuroscience that have applied meta-learning and put them into the context of these new insights. In summary, our work highlights that meta-learning considerably extends the scope of rational analysis and thereby of cognitive theories more generally.

Human thinking is beyond imagination. Can a computer develop such ability to think and reason without human intervention? This is something programming experts at IBM Watson are trying to achieve. Their goal is to simulate human thought process in a computerized model. The result is cognitive computing – a combination of cognitive science and computer science. Cognitive computing models provide a realistic roadmap to achieve artificial intelligence.

How should we decide among competing explanations of a cognitive process given limited observations? The problem of model selection is at the heart of progress in cognitive science. In this paper, Minimum Description Length (MDL) is introduced as a method for selecting among computational models of cognition. We also show that differential geometry provides an intuitive understanding of what drives model selection in MDL. Finally, adequacy of MDL is demonstrated in two areas of cognitive modeling.