Here is the essence of the theory: When one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of the present problem) one selects from memory a structure called a Frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary.
A frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child's birthday party."
– from A Framework for Representing Knowledge. By Marvin Minsky. MIT- AI Laboratory Memo 306, June, 1974. Reprinted in The Psychology of Computer Vision, P. Winston (Ed.), McGraw-Hill, 1975. Shorter versions in J. Haugeland, Ed., Mind Design, MIT Press, 1981, and in Cognitive Science, Collins, Allan and Edward E. Smith (eds.) Morgan-Kaufmann, 1992.
Previously, evidence that animals use episodic memory has been hard to come by, as it's impossible to ask an animal, in this case a dog, what they remember (stock image) Dogs trained using the trick can watch a person perform an action and carry out the action themselves. They then carried out another round of training in which the dogs were trained to lie down after watching the human action, no matter what it was. Dogs trained using the trick can watch a person perform an action and carry out the action themselves. They then carried out another round of training in which the dogs were trained to lie down after watching the human action, no matter what it was.
Conceptual Dependency began to rely more on underlying primitives for the representation of the similarities in meaning that transcend the particular words of a language (Schank, 1975). We built an inference program (Schank and Rieger, 1974) that exploited the properties of the primitive concepts uncovered by the parser and derived new information from them. The end product of such an inference procedure was a connected causal chain of events that represented the implicit and explicit information in a text (Schank, 1974). At this point we began to program a computer understanding system that would attempt to process input texts.
Actors, actions and objects in our conceptual schema must correspond to real world actors, actions, and objects. To treat this sentence conceptually as (actor: Mary; action: hurt; object: John) violates the rule that conceptual actions must correspond to real world actions. 'Hurt' here is a resultant state of 576 SCHANK In conceptual dependency representation, actor-action complexes are indicated by 4), denoting a mutual dependency between actor and action; object-state complexes are indicated by 4.4.