We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by one or more clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to  c  that each voter simply replaces  c  in his vote with the block of  c 's clones. The outcome of the resulting election may then depend on how each voter orders the clones within the block. We formalize what it means for a cloning manipulation to be successful (which turns out to be a surprisingly delicate issue), and, for a number of prominent voting rules, characterize the preference profiles for which a successful cloning manipulation exists. We also consider the model where there is a cost associated with producing each clone, and study the complexity of finding a minimum-cost cloning manipulation. Finally, we compare cloning with the related problem of control via adding candidates.

In some voting situations, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number k of new candidates will be added. Focusing on scoring rules, we give complexity results for the above possible winner problem.

This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in repeated games with discounting. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE payoff profiles. Then the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned on to a set of smaller adjacent hypercubes, while those hypercubes that cannot contain any SPE point are gradually withdrawn. Whether a given hypercube can contain an equilibrium point is verified by an appropriate mixed integer program. A special attention is paid to the question of extracting players' strategies and their representability in form of finite automata.

For many election systems, bribery (and related) attacks have been shown NP-hard using constructions on combinatorially rich structures such as partitions and covers. It is important to learn how robust these hardness protection results are, in order to find whether they can be relied on in practice. This paper shows that for voters who follow the most central political-science model of electorates — single-peaked preferences — those protections vanish. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial covering challenges, we show that NP-hard bribery problems — including those for Kemeny and Llull elections- — fall to polynomial time. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial partition challenges, we show that NP-hard partition-of-voters problems fall to polynomial time. We furthermore show that for single-peaked electorates, the winner problems for Dodgson and Kemeny elections, though Θ 2 p -complete in the general case, fall to polynomial time. And we completely classify the complexity of weighted coalition manipulation for scoring protocols in single-peaked electorates.

Connecting between standard AI planning constructs and a classical cooperative model of transferable-utility coalition games, we introduce the notion of transferable-utility (TU) planning games. The key representational property of these games is that coalitions are valued implicitly based on their ability to carry out efficient joint plans. On the side of the expressiveness, we show that existing succinct representations of monotonic TU games can be efficiently compiled into TU planning games. On the side of computation, TU planning games allow us to provide some of the strongest to date tractability results for core-existence and core-membership queries in succinct TU coalition games.

We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for elections. In the Possible-Winner problem we are given a profile of voters, each with a partial preference order, and ask if there are linear extensions of the votes such that a designated candidate wins. We also analyze a special case of Possible-Winner, the Manipulation problem. We provide polynomial-time algorithms for counting manipulations in a class of scoring protocols and in several other voting rules. We show #P-hardness of the counting variant of Possible-Winner for plurality and veto and give a simple yet general and practically useful randomized algorithm for a variant of Possible-Winner for all voting rules for which a winner can be computed in polynomial time.

Tournament solution concepts, selecting winners based on a pairwise dominance relation are an important structure often used in sports, as well as elections, and argumentation theory. Manipulation of such choice rules by coalitions of agents are a significant problem in most common rules. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of randomized choice rules by coalitions varying from a single agent, to two or more agents. We define two notions of coalitional manipulations of such choice rules based on whether or not utility is transferable. We show useful choice rules satisfying both notions of non-manipulability, and for the transferable utility case provide bounds on the level of Condorcet consistency.

Graph-based semi-supervised learning methods are based on some smoothness assumption about the data. As a discrete approximation of the data manifold, the graph plays a crucial role in the success of such graph-based methods. In most existing methods, graph construction makes use of a predefined weighting function without utilizing label information even when it is available. In this work, by incorporating label information, we seek to enhance the performance of graph-based semi-supervised learning by learning the graph and label inference simultaneously. In particular, we consider a particular setting of semi-supervised learning called transductive learning. Using the LogDet divergence to define the objective function, we propose an iterative algorithm to solve the optimization problem which has closed-form solution in each step. We perform experiments on both synthetic and real data to demonstrate improvement in the graph and in terms of classification accuracy.

Over the past few years, a large family of manifold learning algorithms have been proposed, and applied to various applications. While designing new manifold learning algorithms has attracted much research attention, fewer research efforts have been focused on out-of-sample extrapolation of learned manifold. In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm of manifold learning. The proposed algorithm, namely Local and Global Regressive Mapping (LGRM), employs local regression models to grasp the manifold structure. We additionally impose a global regression term as regularization to learn a model for out-of-sample data extrapolation. Based on the algorithm, we propose a new manifold learning framework. Our framework can be applied to any manifold learning algorithms to simultaneously learn the low dimensional embedding of the training data and a model which provides explicit mapping of the out-of-sample data to the learned manifold. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed framework uncover the manifold structure precisely and can be freely applied to unseen data.

The current methods used to mine and analyze temporal social network data make two assumptions: all edges have the same strength, and all parameters are time-homogeneous. We show that those assumptions may not hold for social networks and propose an alternative model with two novel aspects: (1) the modeling of edges as multi-valued variables that can change in intensity, and (2) the use of a curved exponential family framework to capture time-inhomogeneous properties while retaining a parsimonious and interpretable model. We show that our model outperforms traditional models on two real-world social network data sets.