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Conditioning on Disjunctive Knowledge: Defaults and Probabilities
Many writers have observed that default logics appear to contain the "lottery paradox" of probability theory. This arises when a default "proof by contradiction" lets us conclude that a typical X is not a Y where Y is an unusual subclass of X. We show that there is a similar problem with default "proof by cases" and construct a setting where we might draw a different conclusion knowing a disjunction than we would knowing any particular disjunct. Though Reiter's original formalism is capable of representing this distinction, other approaches are not. To represent and reason about this case, default logicians must specify how a "typical" individual is selected. The problem is closely related to Simpson's paradox of probability theory. If we accept a simple probabilistic account of defaults based on the notion that one proposition may favour or increase belief in another, the "multiple extension problem" for both conjunctive and disjunctive knowledge vanishes.
Shootout-89: A Comparative Evaluation of Knowledge-based Systems that Forecast Severe Weather
Moninger, W. R., Flueck, J. A., Lusk, C., Roberts, W. F.
During the summer of 1989, the Forecast Systems Laboratory of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration sponsored an evaluation of artificial intelligence-based systems that forecast severe convective storms. The evaluation experiment, called Shootout-89, took place in Boulder, and focussed on storms over the northeastern Colorado foothills and plains (Moninger, et al., 1990). Six systems participated in Shootout-89. These included traditional expert systems, an analogy-based system, and a system developed using methods from the cognitive science/judgment analysis tradition. Each day of the exercise, the systems generated 2 to 9 hour forecasts of the probabilities of occurrence of: non significant weather, significant weather, and severe weather, in each of four regions in northeastern Colorado. A verification coordinator working at the Denver Weather Service Forecast Office gathered ground-truth data from a network of observers. Systems were evaluated on the basis of several measures of forecast skill, and on other metrics such as timeliness, ease of learning, and ease of use. Systems were generally easy to operate, however the various systems required substantially different levels of meteorological expertise on the part of their users--reflecting the various operational environments for which the systems had been designed. Systems varied in their statistical behavior, but on this difficult forecast problem, the systems generally showed a skill approximately equal to that of persistence forecasts and climatological (historical frequency) forecasts. The two systems that appeared best able to discriminate significant from non significant weather events were traditional expert systems. Both of these systems required the operator to make relatively sophisticated meteorological judgments. We are unable, based on only one summer's worth of data, to determine the extent to which the greater skill of the two systems was due to the content of their knowledge bases, or to the subjective judgments of the operator. A follow-on experiment, Shootout-91, is currently being planned. Interested potential participants are encouraged to contact the author at the address above.
Experiments Using Belief Functions and Weights of Evidence incorporating Statistical Data and Expert Opinions
McLeish, Mary, Yao, P., Cecile, M., Stirtzinger, T.
This paper presents some ideas and results of using uncertainty management methods in the presence of data in preference to other statistical and machine learning methods. A medical domain is used as a test-bed with data available from a large hospital database system which collects symptom and outcome information about patients. Data is often missing, of many variable types and sample sizes for particular outcomes is not large. Uncertainty management methods are useful for such domains and have the added advantage of allowing for expert modification of belief values originally obtained from data. Methodological considerations for using belief functions on statistical data are dealt with in some detail. Expert opinions are Incorporated at various levels of the project development and results are reported on an application to liver disease diagnosis. Recent results contrasting the use of weights of evidence and logistic regression on another medical domain are also presented.
Model-based Influence Diagrams for Machine Vision
Levitt, Tod S., Agosta, John Mark, Binford, Thomas O.
We show an approach to automated control of machine vision systems based on incremental creation and evaluation of a particular family of influence diagrams that represent hypotheses of imagery interpretation and possible subsequent processing decisions. In our approach, model-based machine vision techniques are integrated with hierarchical Bayesian inference to provide a framework for representing and matching instances of objects and relationships in imagery and for accruing probabilities to rank order conflicting scene interpretations. We extend a result of Tatman and Shachter to show that the sequence of processing decisions derived from evaluating the diagrams at each stage is the same as the sequence that would have been derived by evaluating the final influence diagram that contains all random variables created during the run of the vision system.
When Should a Decision Maker Ignore the Advice of a Decision Aid?
Lehner, Paul E., Mullin, Theresa M., Cohen, Marvin S.
This paper argues that the principal difference between decision aids and most other types of information systems is the greater reliance of decision aids on fallible algorithms--algorithms that sometimes generate incorrect advice. It is shown that interactive problem solving with a decision aid that is based on a fallible algorithm can easily result in aided performance which is poorer than unaided performance, even if the algorithm, by itself, performs significantly better than the unaided decision maker. This suggests that unless certain conditions are satisfied, using a decision aid as an aid is counterproductive. Some conditions under which a decision aid is best used as an aid are derived.
A Decision-Theoretic Model for Using Scientific Data
Many Artificial Intelligence systems depend on the agent's updating its beliefs about the world on the basis of experience. Experiments constitute one type of experience, so scientific methodology offers a natural environment for examining the issues attendant to using this class of evidence. This paper presents a framework which structures the process of using scientific data from research reports for the purpose of making decisions, using decision analysis as the basis for the structure and using medical research as the general scientific domain. The structure extends the basic influence diagram for updating belief in an object domain parameter of interest by expanding the parameter into four parts: those of the patient, the population, the study sample, and the effective study sample. The structure uses biases to perform the transformation of one parameter into another, so that, for instance, selection biases, in concert with the population parameter, yield the study sample parameter. The influence diagram structure provides decision theoretic justification for practices of good clinical research such as randomized assignment and blindfolding of care providers. The model covers most research designs used in medicine: case-control studies, cohort studies, and controlled clinical trials, and provides an architecture to separate clearly between statistical knowledge and domain knowledge. The proposed general model can be the basis for clinical epidemiological advisory systems, when coupled with heuristic pruning of irrelevant biases; of statistical workstations, when the computational machinery for calculation of posterior distributions is added; and of meta-analytic reviews, when multiple studies may impact on a single population parameter.
A Tractable Inference Algorithm for Diagnosing Multiple Diseases
We examine a probabilistic model for the diagnosis of multiple diseases. In the model, diseases and findings are represented as binary variables. Also, diseases are marginally independent, features are conditionally independent given disease instances, and diseases interact to produce findings via a noisy OR-gate. An algorithm for computing the posterior probability of each disease, given a set of observed findings, called quickscore, is presented. The time complexity of the algorithm is O(nm-2m+), where n is the number of diseases, m+ is the number of positive findings and m- is the number of negative findings. Although the time complexity of quickscore i5 exponential in the number of positive findings, the algorithm is useful in practice because the number of observed positive findings is usually far less than the number of diseases under consideration. Performance results for quickscore applied to a probabilistic version of Quick Medical Reference (QMR) are provided.
The Compilation of Decision Models
Heckerman, David, Breese, John S., Horvitz, Eric J.
We introduce and analyze the problem of the compilation of decision models from a decision-theoretic perspective. The techniques described allow us to evaluate various configurations of compiled knowledge given the nature of evidential relationships in a domain, the utilities associated with alternative actions, the costs of run-time delays, and the costs of memory. We describe procedures for selecting a subset of the total observations available to be incorporated into a compiled situation-action mapping, in the context of a binary decision with conditional independence of evidence. The methods allow us to incrementally select the best pieces of evidence to add to the set of compiled knowledge in an engineering setting. After presenting several approaches to compilation, we exercise one of the methods to provide insight into the relationship between the distribution over weights of evidence and the preferred degree of compilation.
Heuristic Search as Evidential Reasoning
BPS, the Bayesian Problem Solver, applies probabilistic inference and decision-theoretic control to flexible, resource-constrained problem-solving. This paper focuses on the Bayesian inference mechanism in BPS, and contrasts it with those of traditional heuristic search techniques. By performing sound inference, BPS can outperform traditional techniques with significantly less computational effort. Empirical tests on the Eight Puzzle show that after only a few hundred node expansions, BPS makes better decisions than does the best existing algorithm after several million node expansions
Weighing and Integrating Evidence for Stochastic Simulation in Bayesian Networks
Stochastic simulation approaches perform probabilistic inference in Bayesian networks by estimating the probability of an event based on the frequency that the event occurs in a set of simulation trials. This paper describes the evidence weighting mechanism, for augmenting the logic sampling stochastic simulation algorithm [Henrion, 1986]. Evidence weighting modifies the logic sampling algorithm by weighting each simulation trial by the likelihood of a network's evidence given the sampled state node values for that trial. We also describe an enhancement to the basic algorithm which uses the evidential integration technique [Chin and Cooper, 1987]. A comparison of the basic evidence weighting mechanism with the Markov blanket algorithm [Pearl, 1987], the logic sampling algorithm, and the evidence integration algorithm is presented. The comparison is aided by analyzing the performance of the algorithms in a simple example network.