We present a framework to statistically audit the privacy guarantee conferred by a differentially private machine learner in practice. While previous works have taken steps toward evaluating privacy loss through poisoning attacks or membership inference, they have been tailored to specific models or have demonstrated low statistical power. Our work develops a general methodology to empirically evaluate the privacy of differentially private machine learning implementations, combining improved privacy search and verification methods with a toolkit of influence-based poisoning attacks. We demonstrate significantly improved auditing power over previous approaches on a variety of models including logistic regression, Naive Bayes, and random forest. Our method can be used to detect privacy violations due to implementation errors or misuse. When violations are not present, it can aid in understanding the amount of information that can be leaked from a given dataset, algorithm, and privacy specification.

Recent advances in quantum computing and in particular, the introduction of quantum GANs, have led to increased interest in quantum zero-sum game theory, extending the scope of learning algorithms for classical games into the quantum realm. In this paper, we focus on learning in quantum zero-sum games under Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update (a generalization of the multiplicative weights update method) and its continuous analogue, Quantum Replicator Dynamics. When each player selects their state according to quantum replicator dynamics, we show that the system exhibits conservation laws in a quantum-information theoretic sense. Moreover, we show that the system exhibits Poincaré recurrence, meaning that almost all orbits return arbitrarily close to their initial conditions infinitely often.

Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) is a prevalent model for real-world games involving imperfect information and sequential plays. The Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as a natural solution concept for multi-player general-sum IIEFGs. However, existing algorithms for finding an EFCE require full feedback from the game, and it remains open how to efficiently learn the EFCE in the more challenging bandit feedback setting where the game can only be learned by observations from repeated playing. This paper presents the first sample-efficient algorithm for learning the EFCE from bandit feedback. We begin by proposing K-EFCE--a generalized definition that allows players to observe and deviate from the recommended actions for K times. The K-EFCE includes the EFCE as a special case at K = 1, and is an increasingly stricter notion of equilibrium as K increases.