The possibility of constructing a personal AI raises many ethical and religious questions that have been dealt with seriously only by imaginative works of fiction; they have largely been ignored by technical experts and by philosophical and theological ethicists. Arguing that a personal AI is possible in principle, and that its accomplishments could be adjudicated by the Turing Test, the article suggests some of the moral issues involved in AI experimentation by comparing them to issues in medical experimentation. Finally, the article asks questions about the capacities and possibilities of such an artifact for making moral decisions. It is suggested that much a priori ethical thinking is necessary and that, that such a project cannot only stimulate our moral imaginations, but can also tell us much about our moral thinking and pedagogy, whether or not it is ever accomplished in fact.

THE AI MAGAZINE Summer, 1986 55 building one of the first stored-program digital computers, AI also had its share of controversy, however, at Rand the JOHNNIAC (see Figure 1) (Gruenberger, 1968);l and elsewhere. Given its quick rise to popularity and its George Dantzig and his associates were inventing linear ambitious predictions (Simon & Newell, 1958), AI soon programming (Dantzig, 1963); Les Ford and Ray Fulkerson had its critics, and one of the most prominent, Hubert were developing techniques for network flow analysis Dreyfus, published his famous critique of AI (Dreyfus, (Ford & Fulkerson, 1962); Richard Bellman was developing 1965) while he was consulting at Rand. In addition, the his ideas on dynamic programming (Bellman, 1953); early promise of automatic machine translation of text Herman Kahn was advancing techniques for Monte Carlo from one language to another (the emphasis at Rand was simulation (Kahn, 1955); Lloyd Shapley was revolutionizing on translation from Russian to English) produced only game theory (Shapley, 1951-1960); Stephen Kleene was modest systems, and the goal of fully automated machine advancing our understanding of finite automata (Kleene, translation was abandoned in the early 1960s.

Research in AI within the Computer Science Department at the University of California, Los Angeles is loosely composed of three interacting and cooperating groups: (1) the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, at 3677 Boelter Hall, which is concerned mainly with natural language processing and cognitive modelling, (2) the Cognitive Systems Laboratory, at 4731 Boelter Hall, which studies the nature of search, logic programming, heuristics, and formal methods, and (3) the Robotics and Vision Laboratory, at 3532 Boelter Hall, where research concentrates on robot control in manufacturing, pattern recognition, and expert systems for real-time processing.

The enterprise of developing knowledge-based systems is currently witnessing great growth in popularity. The central unity of many such programs is that they interpret knowledge that is explicitly encoded as rules. While rule-based programming comes with certain clear pay-offs, further fundamental advances in research are needed to extend the scope of tasks that can be adequately represented in this fashion. This article is a statement of personal perspective by a researcher interested in fundamental issues in the symbolic representation and organization ok knowledge.

Artificial intelligence (AI) will have profound societal effects. It promises potential benefits (and may also pose risks) in education, defense, business, law and science. In this article we explore how AI is likely to affect employment and the distribution of income. We argue that AI will indeed reduce drastically the need of human toil. We also note that some people fear the automation of work by machines and the resulting of unemployment. Yet, since the majority of us probably would rather use our time for activities other than our present jobs, we ought thus to greet the work-eliminating consequences of AI enthusiastically. The paper discusses two reasons, one economic and one psychological, for this paradoxical apprehension. We conclude with discussion of problems of moving toward the kind of economy that will be enabled by developments in AI.

Artificial intelligence, or AI, is largely an experimental science—at least as much progress has been made by building and analyzing programs as by examining theoretical questions. MYCIN is one of several well-known programs that embody some intelligence and provide data on the extent to which intelligent behavior can be programmed. As with other AI programs, its development was slow and not always in a forward direction. But we feel we learned some useful lessons in the course of nearly a decade of work on MYCIN and related programs. In this book we share the results of many experiments performed in that time, and we try to paint a coherent picture of the work. The book is intended to be a critical analysis of several pieces of related research, performed by a large number of scientists. We believe that the whole field of AI will benefit from such attempts to take a detailed retrospective look at experiments, for in this way the scientific foundations of the field will gradually be defined. It is for all these reasons that we have prepared this analysis of the MYCIN experiments.

The complete book in a single file.

Various groups of ascertainable individuals have been granted the status of "persons" under American law, while that status has been denied to other groups. This article examines various analogies that might be drawn by courts in deciding whether to extend "person" status to intelligent machines, and the limitations that might be placed upon such recognition. As an alternative analysis, this article questions the legal status of various human/machine interfaces, and notes the difficulty in establishing an absolute point beyond which legal recognition will not extend.

This article describes a theory of reasoning about uncertainly, based on a representation of states of certainly called endorsements. The theory of endorsements is an alternative to numerical methods for reasoning about uncertainly, such as subjective Bayesian methods (Shortliffe and Buchanan, 1975; Duda hart, and Nilsson, 1976) and Shafer-dempster theory (Shafer, 1976). The fundamental concern with numerical representations of certainty is that they hide the reasoning about uncertainty. While numbers are easy to propagate over inferences, what the numbers mean is unclear. The theory of endorsements provide a richer representation of the factors that affect certainty and supports multiple strategies for dealing with uncertainty.

Various groups of ascertainable individuals have been granted the status of "persons" under American law, while that status has been denied to other groups. This article examines various analogies that might be drawn by courts in deciding whether to extend "person" status to intelligent machines, and the limitations that might be placed upon such recognition. As an alternative analysis, this article questions the legal status of various human/machine interfaces, and notes the difficulty in establishing an absolute point beyond which legal recognition will not extend.

This book describes a theory of memory representation, organization, and processing for understanding complex narrative texts. The theory is implemented as a computer program called BORIS which reads and answers questions about divorce, legal disputes, personal favors, and the like. The system is unique in attempting to understand stories involving emotions and in being able to deduce adages and morals, in addition to answering fact and event based questions about the narratives it has read. BORIS also manages the interaction of many different knowledge sources such as goals, plans, scripts, physical objects, settings, interpersonal relationships, social roles, emotional reactions, and empathetic responses. The book makes several original technical contributions as well.