A Los Angeles man admitted in federal court Thursday that he flew a drone that struck a Los Angeles Police Department helicopter that was responding to a crime scene in Hollywood. Andrew Rene Hernandez, 22, made the admission in pleading guilty to one count of unsafe operation of an unmanned aircraft, a misdemeanor. A spokesman for the U.S. attorney's office in Los Angeles said Hernandez is believed to be the first person in the country to be convicted of that offense, which carries a punishment of up to one year in prison. In his plea agreement, Hernandez admitted that he "recklessly interfered with and disrupted" the operation of the LAPD helicopter, which was responding to a burglary of a pharmacy, and that his actions "posed an imminent safety hazard" to the chopper's occupants. Reached by phone Thursday, Hernandez declined to comment.

As we start to encounter AI systems in various morally and legally salient environments, some have begun to explore how the current responsibility ascription practices might be adapted to meet such new technologies [19, 33]. A critical viewpoint today is that autonomous and self-learning AI systems pose a so-called responsibility gap [27]. These systems' autonomy challenges human control over them [13], while their adaptability leads to unpredictability. Hence, it might infeasible to trace back responsibility to a specific entity if these systems cause any harm. Considering responsibility practices as the adoption of certain attitudes towards an agent [40], scholarly work has also posed the question of whether AI systems are appropriate subjects of such practices [15, 29, 37] -- e.g., they might "have a body to kick," yet they "have no soul to damn" [4].

We introduce optimal energy shaping as an enhancement of classical passivity-based control methods. A promising feature of passivity theory, alongside stability, has traditionally been claimed to be intuitive performance tuning along the execution of a given task. However, a systematic approach to adjust performance within a passive control framework has yet to be developed, as each method relies on few and problem-specific practical insights. Here, we cast the classic energy-shaping control design process in an optimal control framework; once a task-dependent performance metric is defined, an optimal solution is systematically obtained through an iterative procedure relying on neural networks and gradient-based optimization. The proposed method is validated on state-regulation tasks.

Say the word Apple today and we think of Steve Jobs' multi-billion-dollar technology company that spawned the iPhone and the Mac computer. But a decade before the California-based firm was even founded, Apple Electronics, a subsidiary of the Beatles' record label Apple, was working on several pioneering inventions – some of which were precursors of commonly available products today. Apple Electronics was led by Alexis Mardas, a young electronics engineer and inventor originally from Athens in Greece, known to the Beatles as Magic Alex. He died on this day in 2017, aged 74, and was one of the most colourful and mysterious characters in the Beatles' story. Dressed in a white lab coat in his London workshop, Mardas created prototypes of inventions that were set to be marketed and sold. These included the'composing typewriter' – powered by an early example of sound recognition – and a phone with advanced memory capacity.

Although AI holds promise for improving human decision making in societally critical domains, it remains an open question how human-AI teams can reliably outperform AI alone and human alone in challenging prediction tasks (also known as complementary performance). We explore two directions to understand the gaps in achieving complementary performance. First, we argue that the typical experimental setup limits the potential of human-AI teams. To account for lower AI performance out-of-distribution than in-distribution because of distribution shift, we design experiments with different distribution types and investigate human performance for both in-distribution and out-of-distribution examples. Second, we develop novel interfaces to support interactive explanations so that humans can actively engage with AI assistance. Using in-person user study and large-scale randomized experiments across three tasks, we demonstrate a clear difference between in-distribution and out-of-distribution, and observe mixed results for interactive explanations: while interactive explanations improve human perception of AI assistance's usefulness, they may magnify human biases and lead to limited performance improvement. Overall, our work points out critical challenges and future directions towards complementary performance.

As AI-powered systems increasingly mediate consequential decision-making, their explainability is critical for end-users to take informed and accountable actions. Explanations in human-human interactions are socially-situated. AI systems are often socio-organizationally embedded. However, Explainable AI (XAI) approaches have been predominantly algorithm-centered. We take a developmental step towards socially-situated XAI by introducing and exploring Social Transparency (ST), a sociotechnically informed perspective that incorporates the socio-organizational context into explaining AI-mediated decision-making. To explore ST conceptually, we conducted interviews with 29 AI users and practitioners grounded in a speculative design scenario. We suggested constitutive design elements of ST and developed a conceptual framework to unpack ST's effect and implications at the technical, decision-making, and organizational level. The framework showcases how ST can potentially calibrate trust in AI, improve decision-making, facilitate organizational collective actions, and cultivate holistic explainability. Our work contributes to the discourse of Human-Centered XAI by expanding the design space of XAI.

This paper presents a computational evolutionary game model to study and understand fraud dynamics in the consumption tax system. Players are cooperators if they correctly declare their value added tax (VAT), and are defectors otherwise. Each player's payoff is influenced by the amount evaded and the subjective probability of being inspected by tax authorities. Since transactions between companies must be declared by both the buyer and seller, a strategy adopted by one influences the other's payoff. We study the model with a well-mixed population and different scale-free networks. Model parameters were calibrated using real-world data of VAT declarations by businesses registered in the Canary Islands region of Spain. We analyzed several scenarios of audit probabilities for high and low transactions and their prevalence in the population, as well as social rewards and penalties to find the most efficient policy to increase the proportion of cooperators. Two major insights were found. First, increasing the subjective audit probability for low transactions is more efficient than increasing this probability for high transactions. Second, favoring social rewards for cooperators or alternative penalties for defectors can be effective policies, but their success depends on the distribution of the audit probability for low and high transactions.

In the current era, people and society have grown increasingly reliant on Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies. AI has the potential to drive us towards a future in which all of humanity flourishes. It also comes with substantial risks for oppression and calamity. Discussions about whether we should (re)trust AI have repeatedly emerged in recent years and in many quarters, including industry, academia, health care, services, and so on. Technologists and AI researchers have a responsibility to develop trustworthy AI systems. They have responded with great efforts of designing more responsible AI algorithms. However, existing technical solutions are narrow in scope and have been primarily directed towards algorithms for scoring or classification tasks, with an emphasis on fairness and unwanted bias. To build long-lasting trust between AI and human beings, we argue that the key is to think beyond algorithmic fairness and connect major aspects of AI that potentially cause AI's indifferent behavior. In this survey, we provide a systematic framework of Socially Responsible AI Algorithms that aims to examine the subjects of AI indifference and the need for socially responsible AI algorithms, define the objectives, and introduce the means by which we may achieve these objectives. We further discuss how to leverage this framework to improve societal well-being through protection, information, and prevention/mitigation.

Algorithmic risk assessments are increasingly used to make and inform decisions in a wide variety of high-stakes settings. In practice, there is often a multitude of predictive models that deliver similar overall performance, an empirical phenomenon commonly known as the "Rashomon Effect." While many competing models may perform similarly overall, they may have different properties over various subgroups, and therefore have drastically different predictive fairness properties. In this paper, we develop a framework for characterizing predictive fairness properties over the set of models that deliver similar overall performance, or "the set of good models." We provide tractable algorithms to compute the range of attainable group-level predictive disparities and the disparity minimizing model over the set of good models. We extend our framework to address the empirically relevant challenge of selectively labelled data in the setting where the selection decision and outcome are unconfounded given the observed data features. We illustrate our methods in two empirical applications. In a real world credit-scoring task, we build a model with lower predictive disparities than the benchmark model, and demonstrate the benefits of properly accounting for the selective labels problem. In a recidivism risk prediction task, we audit an existing risk score, and find that it generates larger predictive disparities than any model in the set of good models.

Mr. Trump signed an executive order on Tuesday banning transactions with eight Chinese software applications, including Alipay. It was the latest escalation of the president's economic war with China. Details and the start of the ban will fall to Mr. Biden, who could decide not to follow through on the idea. Separately, the Trump administration has also banned the import of some cotton from the Xinjiang region, where China has detained vast numbers of people who are members of ethnic minorities and forced them to work in fields and factories. In another move, the administration prohibited several Chinese companies, including the chip maker SMIC and the drone maker DJI, from buying American products.