Capability planning problems are pervasive throughout many areas of human interest with prominent examples found in defense and security. Planning provides a unique context for optimization that has not been explored in great detail and involves a number of interesting challenges which are distinct from traditional optimization research. Planning problems demand solutions that can satisfy a number of competing objectives on multiple scales related to robustness, adaptiveness, risk, etc. The scenario method is a key approach for planning. Scenarios can be defined for long-term as well as short-term plans. This paper introduces computational scenario-based planning problems and proposes ways to accommodate strategic positioning within the tactical planning domain. We demonstrate the methodology in a resource planning problem that is solved with a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm. Our discussion and results highlight the fact that scenario-based planning is naturally framed within a multi-objective setting. However, the conflicting objectives occur on different system levels rather than within a single system alone. This paper also contends that planning problems are of vital interest in many human endeavors and that Evolutionary Computation may be well positioned for this problem domain.

Scenarios are pen-pictures of plausible futures, used for strategic planning. The aim of this investigation is to expand the horizon of scenario-based planning through computational models that are able to aid the analyst in the planning process. The investigation builds upon the advances of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to create a novel, flexible and customizable computational capability-based planning methodology that is practical and theoretically sound. We will show how evolutionary computation, in particular evolutionary multi-objective optimization, can play a central role - both as an optimizer and as a source for innovation.

Surveillance control and reporting (SCR) system for air threats play an important role in the defense of a country. SCR system corresponds to air and ground situation management/processing along with information fusion, communication, coordination, simulation and other critical defense oriented tasks. Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) sits at the core of SCR system. In such a system, maximal or near maximal utilization of constrained resources is of extreme importance. Manual TEWA systems cannot provide optimality because of different limitations e.g.surface to air missile (SAM) can fire from a distance of 5Km, but manual TEWA systems are constrained by human vision range and other constraints. Current TEWA systems usually work on target-by-target basis using some type of greedy algorithm thus affecting the optimality of the solution and failing in multi-target scenario. his paper relates to a novel two-staged flexible dynamic decision support based optimal threat evaluation and weapon assignment algorithm for multi-target air-borne threats.

This paper presents a novel two-stage flexible dynamic decision support based optimal threat evaluation and defensive resource scheduling algorithm for multi-target air-borne threats. The algorithm provides flexibility and optimality by swapping between two objective functions, i.e. the preferential and subtractive defense strategies as and when required. To further enhance the solution quality, it outlines and divides the critical parameters used in Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) into three broad categories (Triggering, Scheduling and Ranking parameters). Proposed algorithm uses a variant of many-to-many Stable Marriage Algorithm (SMA) to solve Threat Evaluation (TE) and Weapon Assignment (WA) problem. In TE stage, Threat Ranking and Threat-Asset pairing is done. Stage two is based on a new flexible dynamic weapon scheduling algorithm, allowing multiple engagements using shoot-look-shoot strategy, to compute near-optimal solution for a range of scenarios. Analysis part of this paper presents the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed algorithm over an alternative greedy algorithm as applied to different offline scenarios.

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate's victory. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result and it can be determined in polynomial time on which inputs the agent can succeed is said to be vulnerable to the given type of control. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result, yet in which it is NP-hard to recognize the inputs on which the agent can succeed, is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Aside from election systems with an NP-hard winner problem, the only systems previously known to be resistant to all the standard control types were highly artificial election systems created by hybridization. This paper studies a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland^\alpha, where the parameter \alpha is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates. In every previously studied constructive or destructive control scenario, we determine which of resistance or vulnerability holds for Copeland^\alpha for each rational \alpha, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1. In particular, we prove that Copeland^{0.5}, the system commonly referred to as ``Copeland voting,'' provides full resistance to constructive control, and we prove the same for Copeland^\alpha, for all rational \alpha, 0 < \alpha < 1. Among systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland voting is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control. In addition, we prove that both Copeland^0 and Copeland^1 (interestingly, Copeland^1 is an election system developed by the thirteenth-century mystic Llull) are resistant to all standard types of constructive control other than one variant of addition of candidates. Moreover, we show that for each rational \alpha, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1, Copeland^\alpha voting is fully resistant to bribery attacks, and we establish fixed-parameter tractability of bounded-case control for Copeland^\alpha. We also study Copeland^\alpha elections under more flexible models such as microbribery and extended control, we integrate the potential irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results, and we prove our results in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. Our vulnerability results for microbribery are proven via a novel technique involving min-cost network flow.

An exception is which tracks the extent to which material has our Degrees of Grounding model [Roque and Traum, 2008], reached mutual belief in a dialogue, and conduct which provides a more detailed description of the extent to experiments in which the model is used to manage which material has become a part of the common ground during grounding behavior in spoken dialogues with a virtual a dialogue. In this paper we describe experiments in applying human. We show that the model produces improvements that model to handle explicit grounding behavior in in virtual human performance as measured a virtual human. We begin by describing the model and the by post-session questionnaires.

In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick opened the study of control attacks on elections — attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding/deleting candidates or voters. That work has led to many results on how algorithms can be used to find attacks on elections and how complexity-theoretic hardness results can be used as shields against attacks. However, all the work in this line has assumed that the attacker employs just a single type of attack. In this paper, we model and study the case in which the attacker launches a multipronged (i.e., multimode) attack.   We do so to more realistically capture the richness of real-life settings. For example, an attacker might simultaneously try to suppress some voters, attract new voters into the election, and introduce a spoiler candidate. Our model provides a unified framework for such varied attacks, and by constructing polynomial-time multiprong attack algorithms we prove that for various election systems even such concerted, flexible attacks can be perfectly planned in deterministic polynomial time.

In many practical contexts where a number of agents have to find a common decision, the votes do not come all together at the same time. In such situations, we may want to preprocess the information given by the subelectorate (consisting of the voters who have expressed their votes) so as to ``compile'' the known votes for the time when the latecomers have expressed their votes. We study the amount of space necessary for such a compilation, as a function of the voting rule, the number of candidates, and the number of votes already known. We relate our results to existing work, especially on communication complexity.

Understanding the computational complexity of manipulation in elections is arguably the most central agenda in Computational Social Choice. One of the influential variations of the the problem involves a coalition of manipulators trying to make a favorite candidate win the election. Although the complexity of the problem is well-studied under the assumption that the voters are weighted, there were very few successful attempts to abandon this strong assumption. In this paper, we study the complexity of the unweighted coalitional manipulation problem (UCM) under several prominent voting rules. Our main result is that UCM is NP-complete under the maximin rule; this resolves an enigmatic open question. We then show that UCM is NP-complete under the ranked pairs rule, even with respect to a single manipulator. Furthermore, we provide an extreme hardness-of-approximation result for an optimization version of UCM under ranked pairs. Finally, we show that UCM under the Bucklin rule is in P.

Voting theory can provide useful insights for multiagent preference aggregation. However, the standard setting assumes voters with preferences that are total orders, as well as a ballot language that coincides with the preference language. In typical AI scenarios, these assumptions do not hold: certain alternatives may be incomparable for some agents, and others may have their preferences encoded in a format that is different from how the preference aggregation mechanism wants them. We study the consequences of dropping these assumptions. In particular, we investigate the consequences for the important notion of strategy-proofness. While strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed in the classical setting, we are able to show that there are situations in our more general framework where this is possible. We also consider computational aspects of the problem.