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Using a Recursive Neural Network to Learn an Agent's Decision Model for Plan Recognition

AAAI Conferences

Plan recognition, the problem of inferring the goals or plans of an observed agent, is a key element of situation awareness in human-machine and machine-machine interactions for many applications. Some plan recognition algorithms require knowledge about the potential behaviours of the observed agent in the form of a plan library, together with a decision model about how the observed agent uses the plan library to make decisions. It is however difficult to elicit and specify the decision model a priori . In this paper, we present a recursive neural network model that learns such a decision model automatically. We discuss promising experimental results of the approach with comparisons to selected state-of-the-art plan recognition algorithms on three benchmark domains.


Intersecting Manifolds: Detection, Segmentation, and Labeling

AAAI Conferences

Solving multi-manifolds clustering problems that include delineating and resolving multiple intersections is a very challenging problem. In this paper we propose a novel procedure for clustering intersecting multi-manifolds and delineating junctions in high dimensional spaces. We propose to explicitly and directly resolve ambiguities near the intersections by using 2 properties: One is the position of the data points in the vicinity of the detected intersection; the other is the reliable estimation of the tangent spaces away from the intersections. We experiment with our method on a wide range of geometrically complex settings of convoluted intersecting manifolds, on which we demon- strate higher clustering performance than the state of the art. This includes tackling challenging geometric structures such as when the tangent spaces at the intersections points are not orthogonal.


Efficient, Private, and eps-Strategyproof Elicitation of Tournament Voting Rules

AAAI Conferences

Voting is commonly used as a method for aggregating information in crowdsourcing and human computation. In many settings, one would like to use voting rules which can be efficiently elicited, preserve voter privacy, and are robust to strategic manipulation. In this paper, we give algorithms which elicit approximate winners in a way which provably satisfies all three of these requirements simultaneously. Our results hold for tournament voting rules, which we define to be the voting rules which can be expressed solely as a function of the table of pairwise comparisons containing the number of voters preferring one candidate to another. Tournament voting rules include many common voting rules such as the Borda, Copeland, Maximin, Nanson, Baldwin, Kemeny-Young, Ranked Pairs, Cup, and Schulze voting rules. Our results significantly expand the set of voting rules for which efficient elicitation was known to be possible and improve the known approximation factors for epsilon-strategyproof voting in the regime where the number of candidates is large.


Convergence to Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy

AAAI Conferences

We study equilibrium dynamics in candidacy games, in which candidates may strategically decide to enter the election or withdraw their candidacy, following their own preferences over possible outcomes. Focusing on games under Plurality, we extend the standard model to allow for situations where voters may refuse to return their votes to those candidates who had previously left the election, should they decide to run again. We show that if at the time when a candidate withdraws his candidacy, with some positive probability each voter takes this candidate out of his future consideration, the process converges with probability 1. This is in sharp contrast with the original model where the very existence of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. We then consider the two extreme cases of this setting, where voters may block a withdrawn candidate with probabilities 0 or 1. In these scenarios, we study the complexity of reaching equilibria from a given initial point, converging to an equilibrium with a predermined winner or to an equilibrium with a given set of running candidates. Except for one easy case, we show that these problems are NP-complete, even when the initial point is fixed to a natural---truthful---state where all potential candidates stand for election.


Semantic Concept Discovery for Large-Scale Zero-Shot Event Detection

AAAI Conferences

We focus on detecting complex events in unconstrained Internet videos. While most existing works rely on the abundance of labeled training data, we consider a more difficult zero-shot setting where no training data is supplied. We first pre-train a number of concept classifiers using data from other sources. Then we evaluate the semantic correlation of each concept w.r.t. the event of interest. After further refinement to take prediction inaccuracy and discriminative power into account, we apply the discovered concept classifiers on all test videos and obtain multiple score vectors. These distinct score vectors are converted into pairwise comparison matrices and the nuclear norm rank aggregation framework is adopted to seek consensus. To address the challenging optimization formulation, we propose an efficient, highly scalable algorithm that is an order of magnitude faster than existing alternatives. Experiments on recent TRECVID datasets verify the superiority of the proposed approach. We focus on detecting complex events in unconstrained Internet videos. While most existing works rely on the abundance of labeled training data, we consider a more difficult zero-shot setting where no training data is supplied.We first pre-train a number of concept classifiers using data from other sources. Then we evaluate the semantic correlation of each concept w.r.t. the event of interest. After further refinement to take prediction inaccuracy and discriminative power into account, we apply the discovered concept classifiers on all test videos and obtain multiple score vectors. These distinct score vectors are converted into pairwise comparison matrices and the nuclear norm rank aggregation framework is adopted to seek consensus. To address the challenging optimization formulation, we propose an efficient, highly scalable algorithm that is an order of magnitude faster than existing alternatives. Experiments on recent TRECVID datasets verify the superiority of the proposed approach


Tracking Political Elections on Social Media: Applications and Experience

AAAI Conferences

In recent times, social media has become a popular medium for many election campaigns. It not only allows candidates to reach out to a large section of the electorate, it is also a potent medium for people to express their opinion on the proposed policies and promises of candidates. Analyzing social media data is challenging as the text can be noisy, sparse and even multilingual. In addition, the information may not be completely trustworthy, particularly in the presence of propaganda, promotions and rumors. In this paper we describe our work for analyzing election campaigns using social media data. Using data from the 2012 US presidential elections and the 2013 Philippines General elections, we provide detailed experiments on our methods that use granger causality to identify topics that were most “causal” for public opinion and which in turn, give an interpretable insight into “elections topics” that were most important. Our system was deployed by the largest media organization in the Philippines during the 2013 General elections and using our work, the media house able to identify and report news stories much faster than competitors and reported higher TRP ratings during the election.



What Do We Elect Committees For? A Voting Committee Model for Multi-Winner Rules

AAAI Conferences

We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of ballots to make final decisions regarding various issues. The satisfaction of voters comes from the final decisions made by the elected committee. Our results suggest that depending on a single-winner election system used by the committee to make these final decisions, different multi-winner election rules are most suitable for electing the committee. Furthermore, we show that if we allow not only a committee, but also an election rule used to make final decisions, to depend on the voters' preferences, we can obtain an even better representation of the voters.


Interplanetary Trajectory Planning with Monte Carlo Tree Search

AAAI Conferences

Planning an interplanetary trajectory is a very complex task, traditionally accomplished by domain experts using computer-aided design tools. Recent advances in trajectory optimization allow automation of part of the trajectory design but have yet to provide an efficient way to select promising planetary encounter sequences. In this work, we present a heuristic-free approach to automated trajectory planning (including the encounter sequence planning) based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). We discuss a number of modifications to traditional MCTS unique to the domain of interplanetary trajectory planning and provide results on the Rosetta and Cassini-Huygens interplanetary mission design problems. The resulting heuristic-free method is found to be orders of magnitude more efficient with respect to a standard tree search with heuristic-based pruning which is the current state-of-the art in this domain.


Gibbard–Satterthwaite Games

AAAI Conferences

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators — voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard–Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.