Building upon previous security applications of computational game theory, this paper presents PROTECT, a game-theoretic system deployed by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in the port of Boston for scheduling their patrols. USCG has termed the deployment of PROTECT in Boston a success, and efforts are underway to test it in the port of New York, with the potential for nationwide deployment. PROTECT is premised on an attacker-defender Stackelberg game model and offers five key innovations. First, this system is a departure from the assumption of perfect adversary rationality noted in previous work, relying instead on a quantal response (QR) model of the adversary's behavior - to the best of our knowledge, this is the first real-world deployment of the QR model. Second, to improve PROTECT's efficiency, we generate a compact representation of the defender's strategy space, exploiting equivalence and dominance. Third, we show how to practically model a real maritime patrolling problem as a Stackelberg game. Fourth, our experimental results illustrate that PROTECT's QR model more robustly handles real-world uncertainties than a perfect rationality model. Finally, in evaluating PROTECT, this paper provides real-world data: (i) comparison of human-generated vs PROTECT security schedules, and (ii) results from an Adversarial Perspective Team's (human mock attackers) analysis.

In this paper, we consider the problem of feasibly integrating new pick-up and delivery requests into existing vehicle itineraries in a dynamic, dial-a-ride problem (DARP) setting. Generalizing from previous work in oversubscribed task scheduling, we define a controlled iterative repair search procedure for finding an alternative set of vehicle itineraries in which the overall solution has been feasibly extended to include newly received requests. We first evaluate the performance of this technique on a set of DARP feasibility benchmark problems from the literature. We then consider its use on a real-world DARP problem, where it is necessary to accommodate all requests and constraints must be relaxed when a request cannot be feasibly integrated. For this latter analysis, we introduce a constraint relaxation post processing step and consider the performance impact of using our controlled iterative search over the current greedy search approach.

Extractive style query oriented multi document summariza tion generates the summary by extracting a proper set of sentences from multiple documents based on the pre given query. This paper proposes a novel multi document summa rization framework via deep learning model. This uniform framework consists of three parts: concepts extraction, summary generation, and reconstruction validation, which work together to achieve the largest coverage of the docu ments content. A new query oriented extraction technique is proposed to concentrate distributed information to hidden units layer by layer. Then, the whole deep architecture is fi ne tuned by minimizing the information loss of reconstruc tion validation. According to the concentrated information, dynamic programming is used to seek most informative set of sentences as the summary. Experiments on three bench mark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework and algorithms.

Event extraction systems typically locate the role fillers for an event by analyzing sentences in isolation and identifying each role filler independently of the others. We argue that more accurate event extraction requires a view of the larger context to decide whether an entity is related to a relevant event. We propose a bottom-up approach to event extraction that initially identifies candidate role fillers independently and then uses that information as well as discourse properties to model textual cohesion. The novel component of the architecture is a sequentially structured sentence classifier that identifies event-related story contexts. The sentence classifier uses lexical associations and discourse relations across sentences, as well as domain-specific distributions of candidate role fillers within and across sentences. This approach yields state-of-the-art performance on the MUC-4 data set, achieving substantially higher precision than previous systems.

We introduce a new task-independent framework to model top-down overt visual attention based on graph-ical models for probabilistic inference and reasoning. We describe a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) that infers probability distributions over attended objects and spatial locations directly from observed data. Probabilistic inference in our model is performed over object-related functions which are fed from manual annotations of objects in video scenes or by state-of-the-art object detection models. Evaluating over ∼3 hours (appx. 315,000 eye fixations and 12,600 saccades) of observers playing 3 video games (time-scheduling, driving, and flight combat), we show that our approach is significantly more predictive of eye fixations compared to: 1) simpler classifier-based models also developed here that map a signature of a scene (multi-modal information from gist, bottom-up saliency, physical actions, and events) to eye positions, 2) 14 state-of-the-art bottom-up saliency models, and 3) brute-force algorithms such as mean eye position. Our results show that the proposed model is more effective in employing and reasoning over spatio-temporal visual data.

We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together with their preferences), but in the case where it is uncertain either which candidates exactly register for the election or which voters cast their votes. Under reasonable assumptions our problems reduce to counting variants of election control problems. We either give polynomial-time algorithms or prove #P-completeness results for counting variants of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters for Plurality, k -Approval, Approval, Condorcet, and Maximin voting rules.

In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a high probability of obtaining the “correct” outcome, and second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a number of identities from a distribution that may be influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method. We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of these distributions. Then, given the results of an election in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the outcome.

Stackelberg games increasingly influence security policies deployed in real-world settings. Much of the work to date focuses on devising a fixed randomized strategy for the defender, accounting for an attacker who optimally responds to it. In practice, defense policies are often subject to constraints and vary over time, allowing an attacker to infer characteristics of future policies based on current observations. A defender must therefore account for an attacker's observation capabilities in devising a security policy. We show that this general modeling framework can be captured using stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where a defender commits to a dynamic policy to which the attacker devises an optimal dynamic response. We then offer the following contributions. 1) We show that Markov stationary policies suffice in SSGs, 2) present a finite-time mixed-integer non-linear program for computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in SSGs, and 3) present a mixed-integer linear program to approximate it. 4) We illustrate our algorithms on a simple SSG representing an adversarial patrolling scenario, where we study the impact of attacker patience and risk aversion on optimal defense policies.

Many strategic actions carry a ‘contagious’ component beyond the immediate locale of the effort itself. Viral marketing and peacekeeping operations have both been observed to have a spreading effect. In this work, we use counterinsurgency as our illustrative domain. Defined as the effort to block the spread of support for an insurgency, such operations lack the manpower to defend the entire population and must focus onthe opinions of a subset of local leaders. As past researchers of security resource allocation have done, we propose using game theory to develop such policies and model the interconnected network of leaders as a graph. Unlike this past work in security games, actions in these domains possess a probabilistic, non-local impact. To address this new class of security games, we combine recent research in influence blocking maximization with a double oracle approach and create novel heuristic oracles to generate mixed strategies for a real-world leadership network from Afghanistan, synthetic leadership networks, and a real social network. We find that leadership networks that exhibit highly interconnected clusters can be solved equally well by our heuristic methods, but our more sophisticated heuristics outperform simpler ones in less interconnected social networks.

Schulze's rule and ranked pairs are two Condorcet methods that both satisfy many natural axiomatic properties. Schulze's rule is used in the elections of many organizations, including the Wikimedia Foundation, the Pirate Party of Sweden and Germany, the Debian project, and the Gento Project. Both rules are immune to control by cloning alternatives, but little is otherwise known about their strategic robustness, including resistance to manipulation by one or more voters, control by adding or deleting alternatives, adding or deleting votes, and bribery. Considering computational barriers, we show that these types of strategic behavior are NP-hard for ranked pairs (both constructive, in making an alternative a winner, and destructive, in precluding an alternative from being a winner). Schulze's rule, in comparison, remains vulnerable at least to constructive manipulation by a single voter and destructive manipulation by a coalition. As the first such polynomial-time rule known to resist all such manipulations, and considering also the broad axiomatic support, ranked pairs seems worthwhile to consider for practical applications.