The classic bribery problem is to find a minimal subset of voters who need to change their vote to make some preferred candidate win.We find an approximate solution for this problem for a broad family of scoring rules (which includes Borda and t-approval), in the following sense: if there is a strategy which requires bribing k voters, we efficiently find a strategy which requires bribing at most k + Õ(√ k ) voters. Our algorithm is based on a randomized reduction from bribery to coalitional manipulation (UCM). To solve the UCM problem, we apply the Birkhoff-von Neumann (BvN) decomposition to a fractional manipulation matrix. This allows us to limit the size of the possible ballot search space reducing it from exponential to polynomial, while still obtaining good approximation guarantees. Finding the optimal solution in the truncated search space yields a new algorithm for UCM, which is of independent interest.

We study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm that allows voters to transitively delegate their votes, through an algorithmic lens. In our model, there are two alternatives, one correct and one incorrect, and we are interested in the probability that the majority opinion is correct. Our main question is whether there exist delegation mechanisms that are guaranteed to outperform direct voting, in the sense of being always at least as likely, and sometimes more likely, to make a correct decision. Even though we assume that voters can only delegate their votes to better-informed voters, we show that local delegation mechanisms, which only take the local neighborhood of each voter as input (and, arguably, capture the spirit of liquid democracy), cannot provide the foregoing guarantee. By contrast, we design a non-local delegation mechanism that does provably outperform direct voting under mild assumptions about voters.

If voters' preferences are one-dimensional, many hard problems in computational social choice become tractable. A preference profile can be classified as one-dimensional if it has the single-crossing property, which requires that the voters can be ordered from left to right so that their preferences are consistent with this order. In practice, preferences may exhibit some one-dimensional structure, despite not being single-crossing in the formal sense. Hence, we ask whether one can identify preference profiles that are close to being single-crossing. We consider three distance measures, which are based on partitioning voters or candidates or performing a small number of swaps in each vote. We prove that it can be efficiently decided if voters can be split into two single-crossing groups. Also, for every fixed k >= 1 we can decide in polynomial time if a profile can be made single-crossing by performing at most k candidate swaps per vote. In contrast, for each k >= 3 it is NP-complete to decide whether candidates can be partitioned into k sets so that the restriction of the input profile to each set is single-crossing.

Voting is almost never done in void, as usually there are some relations between the alternatives on which the voters vote on. These relations shall be taken into consideration when selecting a winning committee of some given multiwinner election. As taking into account all possible relations between the alternatives is generally computationally intractable, in this paper we consider classes of alternatives; intuitively, the number of classes is significantly smaller than the number of alternatives, and thus there is some hope in reaching computational tractability. We model both intraclass relations and interclass relations by functions, which we refer to as synergy functions, and study the computational complexity of identifying the best committee, taking into account those synergy functions. Our model accommodates both positive and negative relations between alternatives; further, our efficient algorithms can also deal with a rich class of diversity wishes, which we show how to model using synergy functions.

Voting systems typically treat all voters equally. We argue that perhaps they should not: Voters who have supported good choices in the past should be given higher weight than voters who have supported bad ones. To develop a formal framework for desirable weighting schemes, we draw on no-regret learning. Specifically, given a voting rule, we wish to design a weighting scheme such that applying the voting rule, with voters weighted by the scheme, leads to choices that are almost as good as those endorsed by the best voter in hindsight. We derive possibility and impossibility results for the existence of such weighting schemes, depending on whether the voting rule and the weighting scheme are deterministic or randomized, as well as on the social choice axioms satisfied by the voting rule.

We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score from each ballot based on the ballot's rank order; the candidate with the highest total score wins the election. The cost of a candidate is his sum of distances to all voters, and the distortion of an election is the ratio between the cost of the elected candidate and the cost of the optimum candidate. We consider the case when candidates are representative of the population, in the sense that they are drawn i.i.d. from the population of the voters, and analyze the expected distortion of positional voting rules. Our main result is a clean and tight characterization of positional voting rules that have constant expected distortion (independent of the number of candidates and the metric space). Our characterization result immediately implies constant expected distortion for Borda Count and elections in which each voter approves a constant fraction of all candidates. On the other hand, we obtain super-constant expected distortion for Plurality, Veto, and approving a constant number of candidates.These results contrast with previous results on voting with metric preferences: When the candidates are chosen adversarially, all of the preceding voting rules have distortion linear in the number of candidates or voters. Thus, the model of representative candidates allows us to distinguish voting rules which seem equally bad in the worst case.

We consider the problem of playing Minesweeper with a limited number of moves: Given a partially revealed board, a number of available clicks k, and a target probability p, can we win with probability p. We win if we do not click on a mine, and, after our sequence of at most k clicks (which reveal information about the neighboring squares) can correctly identify the placement of all mines. We make the assumption, that, at all times, all placements of mines consistent with the currently revealed squares are equiprobable. Our main results are that the problem is PSPACE-complete, and it remains PSPACE-complete when p is a constant, in particular when p = 1. When k = 0 (i.e., we are not allowed to click anywhere), the problem is PP-complete in general, but co-NP-complete when p is a constant, and in particular when p = 1.

Cascades represent rapid changes in networks. A cascading phenomenon of ecological and economic impact is the spread of invasive species in geographic landscapes. The most promising management strategy is often biocontrol, which entails introducing a natural predator able to control the invading population, a setting that can be treated as two interacting cascades of predator and prey populations. We formulate and study a nonlinear problem of optimal biocontrol: optimally seeding the predator cascade over time to minimize the harmful prey population. Recurring budgets, which typically face conservation organizations, naturally leads to sparse constraints which make the problem amenable to approximation algorithms. Available methods based on continuous relaxations scale poorly, to remedy this we develop a novel and scalable randomized algorithm based on a width relaxation, applicable to a broad class of combinatorial optimization problems. We evaluate our contributions in the context of biocontrol for the insect pest Hemlock Wolly Adelgid (HWA) in eastern North America. Our algorithm outperforms competing methods in terms of scalability and solution quality and finds near-optimal strategies for the control of the HWA for fine-grained networks -- an important problem in computational sustainability.

Some well-known paradoxes in decision making (e.g., the Allais paradox, the St. Peterburg paradox, the Ellsberg paradox, and the Machina paradox) reveal that choices conventional expected utility theory predicts could be inconsistent with empirical observations. So, solutions to these paradoxes can help us better understand humans decision making accurately. This is also highly related to the prediction power of a decision-making model in real-world applications. Thus, various models have been proposed to address these paradoxes. However, most of them can only solve parts of the paradoxes, and for doing so some of them have to rely on the parameter tuning without proper justifications for such bounds of parameters. To this end, this paper proposes a new descriptive decision-making model, expected utility with relative loss reduction, which can exhibit the same qualitative behaviours as those observed in experiments of these paradoxes without any additional parameter setting. In particular, we introduce the concept of relative loss reduction to reflect people's tendency to prefer ensuring a sufficient minimum loss to just a maximum expected utility in decision-making under risk or ambiguity.

Unprecedented human mobility has driven the rapid urbanization around the world. In China, the fraction of population dwelling in cities increased from 17.9% to 52.6% between 1978 and 2012. Such large-scale migration poses challenges for policymakers and important questions for researchers. To investigate the process of migrant integration, we employ a one-month complete dataset of telecommunication metadata in Shanghai with 54 million users and 698 million call logs. We find systematic differences between locals and migrants in their mobile communication networks and geographical locations. For instance, migrants have more diverse contacts and move around the city with a larger radius than locals after they settle down. By distinguishing new migrants (who recently moved to Shanghai) from settled migrants (who have been in Shanghai for a while), we demonstrate the integration process of new migrants in their first three weeks. Moreover, we formulate classification problems to predict whether a person is a migrant. Our classifier is able to achieve an F1-score of 0.82 when distinguishing settled migrants from locals, but it remains challenging to identify new migrants because of class imbalance. This classification setup holds promise for identifying new migrants who will successfully integrate into locals (new migrants that misclassified as locals).