Several companies--such as Google, Microsoft, and OpenAI--have deployed techniques to watermark AI-generated content to enable proactive detection. However, existing literature mainly focuses on user-agnostic detection. Attribution aims to further trace back the user of a generative-AI service who generated a given content detected as AI-generated. Despite its growing importance, attribution is largely unexplored. In this work, we aim to bridge this gap by providing the first systematic study on watermark-based, user-aware detection and attribution of AI-generated content. Specifically, we theoretically study the detection and attribution performance via rigorous probabilistic analysis. Moreover, we develop an efficient algorithm to select watermarks for the users to enhance attribution performance. Both our theoretical and empirical results show that watermark-based detection and attribution inherit the accuracy and (non-)robustness properties of the watermarking method.

Federated Learning (FL) is a collaborative learning paradigm enabling participants to collectively train a shared machine learning model while preserving the privacy of their sensitive data. Nevertheless, the inherent decentralized and data-opaque characteristics of FL render its susceptibility to data poisoning attacks. These attacks introduce malformed or malicious inputs during local model training, subsequently influencing the global model and resulting in erroneous predictions. Current FL defense strategies against data poisoning attacks either involve a trade-off between accuracy and robustness or necessitate the presence of a uniformly distributed root dataset at the server. To overcome these limitations, we present FedZZ, which harnesses a zone-based deviating update (ZBDU) mechanism to effectively counter data poisoning attacks in FL. Further, we introduce a precision-guided methodology that actively characterizes these client clusters (zones), which in turn aids in recognizing and discarding malicious updates at the server. Our evaluation of FedZZ across two widely recognized datasets: CIFAR10 and EMNIST, demonstrate its efficacy in mitigating data poisoning attacks, surpassing the performance of prevailing state-of-the-art methodologies in both single and multi-client attack scenarios and varying attack volumes. Notably, FedZZ also functions as a robust client selection strategy, even in highly non-IID and attack-free scenarios. Moreover, in the face of escalating poisoning rates, the model accuracy attained by FedZZ displays superior resilience compared to existing techniques. For instance, when confronted with a 50% presence of malicious clients, FedZZ sustains an accuracy of 67.43%, while the accuracy of the second-best solution, FL-Defender, diminishes to 43.36%.

For a viewpoint-diverse news recommender, identifying whether two news articles express the same viewpoint is essential. One way to determine "same or different" viewpoint is stance detection. In this paper, we investigate the robustness of operationalization choices for few-shot stance detection, with special attention to modelling stance across different topics. Our experiments test pre-registered hypotheses on stance detection. Specifically, we compare two stance task definitions (Pro/Con versus Same Side Stance), two LLM architectures (bi-encoding versus cross-encoding), and adding Natural Language Inference knowledge, with pre-trained RoBERTa models trained with shots of 100 examples from 7 different stance detection datasets. Some of our hypotheses and claims from earlier work can be confirmed, while others give more inconsistent results. The effect of the Same Side Stance definition on performance differs per dataset and is influenced by other modelling choices. We found no relationship between the number of training topics in the training shots and performance. In general, cross-encoding out-performs bi-encoding, and adding NLI training to our models gives considerable improvement, but these results are not consistent across all datasets. Our results indicate that it is essential to include multiple datasets and systematic modelling experiments when aiming to find robust modelling choices for the concept `stance'.

We present a comprehensive computational study of the under-investigated phenomenon of personal name compounds (PNCs) in German such as Willkommens-Merkel ('Welcome-Merkel'). Prevalent in news, social media, and political discourse, PNCs are hypothesized to exhibit an evaluative function that is reflected in a more positive or negative perception as compared to the respective personal full name (such as Angela Merkel). We model 321 PNCs and their corresponding full names at discourse level, and show that PNCs bear an evaluative nature that can be captured through a variety of computational methods. Specifically, we assess through valence information whether a PNC is more positively or negatively evaluative than the person's name, by applying and comparing two approaches using (i) valence norms and (ii) pretrained language models (PLMs). We further enrich our data with personal, domain-specific, and extra-linguistic information and perform a range of regression analyses revealing that factors including compound and modifier valence, domain, and political party membership influence how a PNC is evaluated.

Enabling robots to understand the world in terms of objects is a critical building block towards higher level autonomy. The success of foundation models in vision has created the ability to segment and identify nearly all objects in the world. However, utilizing such objects to localize the robot and build an open-set semantic map of the world remains an open research question. In this work, a system of identifying, localizing, and encoding objects is tightly coupled with probabilistic graphical models for performing open-set semantic simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM). Results are presented demonstrating that the proposed lightweight object encoding can be used to perform more accurate object-based SLAM than existing open-set methods, closed-set methods, and geometric methods while incurring a lower computational overhead than existing open-set mapping methods.

Current Deep Neural Networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which alter their predictions by adding carefully crafted noise. Since human eyes are robust to such inputs, it is possible that the vulnerability stems from the standard way of processing inputs in one shot by processing every pixel with the same importance. In contrast, neuroscience suggests that the human vision system can differentiate salient features by (1) switching between multiple fixation points (saccades) and (2) processing the surrounding with a non-uniform external resolution (foveation). In this work, we advocate that the integration of such active vision mechanisms into current deep learning systems can offer robustness benefits. Specifically, we empirically demonstrate the inherent robustness of two active vision methods - GFNet and FALcon - under a black box threat model. By learning and inferencing based on downsampled glimpses obtained from multiple distinct fixation points within an input, we show that these active methods achieve (2-3) times greater robustness compared to a standard passive convolutional network under state-of-the-art adversarial attacks. More importantly, we provide illustrative and interpretable visualization analysis that demonstrates how performing inference from distinct fixation points makes active vision methods less vulnerable to malicious inputs.

Launched by Elon Musk and its Optimus, we are witnessing a new race in which many companies have already engaged. The objective it to put at work a new generation of humanoid robots in demanding industrial environments within 2 or 3 years. Is this objective realistic ? The aim of this document and its main contributions is to provide some hints by covering the following topics: First an analysis of 12 companies based on eight criteria that will help us to distinguish companies based on their maturity and approach to the market; second as these humanoids are very complex systems we will provide an overview of the technological challenges to be addressed; third when humanoids are deployed at scale, Operation and Maintenance become critical and the we will explore what is new with these complex machines; Finally Pilots are the last step to test the feasibility of a new system before mass deployment. This is an important step to test the maturity of a product and the strategy of the humanoid supplier to address a market and two pragmatic approaches will be discussed.

Smart meters, devices measuring the electricity and gas consumption of a household, are currently being deployed at a fast rate throughout the world. The data they collect are extremely useful, including in the fight against climate change. However, these data and the information that can be inferred from them are highly sensitive. Re-pseudonymization, i.e., the frequent replacement of random identifiers over time, is widely used to share smart meter data while mitigating the risk of re-identification. We here show how, in spite of re-pseudonymization, households' consumption records can be pieced together with high accuracy in large-scale datasets. We propose the first deep learning-based profiling attack against re-pseudonymized smart meter data. Our attack combines neural network embeddings, which are used to extract features from weekly consumption records and are tailored to the smart meter identification task, with a nearest neighbor classifier. We evaluate six neural networks architectures as the embedding model. Our results suggest that the Transformer and CNN-LSTM architectures vastly outperform previous methods as well as other architectures, successfully identifying the correct household 73.4% of the time among 5139 households based on electricity and gas consumption records (54.5% for electricity only). We further show that the features extracted by the embedding model maintain their effectiveness when transferred to a set of users disjoint from the one used to train the model. Finally, we extensively evaluate the robustness of our results. Taken together, our results strongly suggest that even frequent re-pseudonymization strategies can be reversed, strongly limiting their ability to prevent re-identification in practice.

The Israeli army has been using an AI system to populate its'kill list' of alleged Hamas terrorists, leading to the deaths of women and children, a new report claims. The report cited six Israeli intelligence officers, who admitted to using an AI called'Lavender' to classify as many as 37,000 Palestinians as suspected militants -- marking these people and their homes as acceptable targets for air strikes. Israel has vehemently denied the AI's role with an army spokesperson describing the system as'auxiliary tools that assist officers in the process of incrimination.' Lavender was trained on data from Israeli intelligence's decades-long surveillance of Palestinian populations, using the digital footprints of known militants as a model for what signal to look for in the noise, according to the report. The intel sources noted that human officers scanned each AI-chosen target for about '20 seconds' before giving their'stamp' of approval, despite an internal study that had determined Lavender AI misidentified people 10 percent of the time. Israel quietly delegated the identification of Hamas terrorists, Palestinian civilians and aide workers to an artificial intelligence, 'Lavender,' a new report revealed.

Fox News White House correspondent Peter Doocy has more on President Biden's latest polling and his stance on immigration on'Special Report.' The federal judge presiding over former President Trump's classified records case has denied his motion to dismiss the charges based on the Presidential Records Act. U.S. District Court Judge Aileen Cannon, last month, also dismissed Trump's motion to dismiss charges of retaining classified documents on the grounds of "unconstitutional vagueness." In a filing Thursday, Cannon denied the former president's motion to dismiss, saying that the charges against Trump "make no reference to the Presidential Records Act, nor do they rely on that statute for purposes of stating an offense." Cannon said the Presidential Records Act "does not provide a pre-trial basis to dismiss" the case, saying "all of which state cognizable offenses."