In this paper, we provide the first practical algorithms with provable guarantees for the problem of inferring the topics assigned to each document in an LDA topic model. This is the primary inference problem for many applications of topic models in social science, data exploration, and causal inference settings. We obtain this result by showing a novel non-gradient-based, combinatorial approach to estimating topic models. This yields algorithms that converge to near-optimal posterior probability in logarithmic parallel computation time (adaptivity) -- exponentially faster than any known LDA algorithm. We also show that our approach can provide interpretability guarantees such that each learned topic is formally associated with a known keyword. Finally, we show that unlike alternatives, our approach can maintain the independence assumptions necessary to use the learned topic model for downstream causal inference methods that allow researchers to study topics as treatments. In terms of practical performance, our approach consistently returns solutions of higher semantic quality than solutions from state-of-the-art LDA algorithms, neural topic models, and LLM-based topic models across a diverse range of text datasets and evaluation parameters.

Existing language model safety evaluations focus on overt attacks and low-stakes tasks. Realistic attackers can subvert current safeguards by requesting help on small, benign-seeming tasks across many independent queries. Because individual queries do not appear harmful, the attack is hard to {detect}. However, when combined, these fragments uplift misuse by helping the attacker complete hard and dangerous tasks. Toward identifying defenses against such strategies, we develop Benchmarks for Stateful Defenses (BSD), a data generation pipeline that automates evaluations of covert attacks and corresponding defenses. Using this pipeline, we curate two new datasets that are consistently refused by frontier models and are too difficult for weaker open-weight models. Our evaluations indicate that decomposition attacks are effective misuse enablers, and highlight stateful defenses as a countermeasure.

The recent emergence of multimodal large language models (LLMs) has introduced new opportunities for improving visual hazard recognition on construction sites. Unlike traditional computer vision models that rely on domain-specific training and extensive datasets, modern LLMs can interpret and describe complex visual scenes using simple natural language prompts. However, despite growing interest in their applications, there has been limited investigation into how different LLMs perform in safety-critical visual tasks within the construction domain. To address this gap, this study conducts a comparative evaluation of five state-of-the-art LLMs: Claude-3 Opus, GPT-4.5, GPT-4o, GPT-o3, and Gemini 2.0 Pro, to assess their ability to identify potential hazards from real-world construction images. Each model was tested under three prompting strategies: zero-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought (CoT). Zero-shot prompting involved minimal instruction, few-shot incorporated basic safety context and a hazard source mnemonic, and CoT provided step-by-step reasoning examples to scaffold model thinking. Quantitative analysis was performed using precision, recall, and F1-score metrics across all conditions. Results reveal that prompting strategy significantly influenced performance, with CoT prompting consistently producing higher accuracy across models. Additionally, LLM performance varied under different conditions, with GPT-4.5 and GPT-o3 outperforming others in most settings. The findings also demonstrate the critical role of prompt design in enhancing the accuracy and consistency of multimodal LLMs for construction safety applications. This study offers actionable insights into the integration of prompt engineering and LLMs for practical hazard recognition, contributing to the development of more reliable AI-assisted safety systems.

The term "diffusion of responsibility'' refers to situations in which multiple agents share responsibility for an outcome, obscuring individual accountability. This paper examines this frequently undesirable phenomenon in the context of collective decision-making mechanisms. The work shows that if a decision is made by two agents, then the only way to avoid diffusion of responsibility is for one agent to act as a "dictator'', making the decision unilaterally. In scenarios with more than two agents, any diffusion-free mechanism is an "elected dictatorship'' where the agents elect a single agent to make a unilateral decision. The technical results are obtained by defining a bisimulation of decision-making mechanisms, proving that bisimulation preserves responsibility-related properties, and establishing the results for a smallest bisimular mechanism.

Nowadays, the Internet of Things (IoT) is widely employed, and its usage is growing exponentially because it facilitates remote monitoring, predictive maintenance, and data-driven decision making, especially in the healthcare and industrial sectors. However, IoT devices remain vulnerable due to their resource constraints and difficulty in applying security patches. Consequently, various cybersecurity attacks are reported daily, such as Denial of Service, particularly in IoT-driven solutions. Most attack detection methodologies are based on Machine Learning (ML) techniques, which can detect attack patterns. However, the focus is more on identification rather than considering the impact of ML algorithms on computational resources. This paper proposes a green methodology to identify IoT malware networking attacks based on flow privacy-preserving statistical features. In particular, the hyperparameters of three tree-based models -- Decision Trees, Random Forest and Extra-Trees -- are optimized based on energy consumption and test-time performance in terms of Matthew's Correlation Coefficient. Our results show that models maintain high performance and detection accuracy while consistently reducing power usage in terms of watt-hours (Wh). This suggests that on-premise ML-based Intrusion Detection Systems are suitable for IoT and other resource-constrained devices.

We present GaRAGe, a large RAG benchmark with human-curated long-form answers and annotations of each grounding passage, allowing a fine-grained evaluation of whether LLMs can identify relevant grounding when generating RAG answers. Our benchmark contains 2366 questions of diverse complexity, dynamism, and topics, and includes over 35K annotated passages retrieved from both private document sets and the Web, to reflect real-world RAG use cases. This makes it an ideal test bed to evaluate an LLM's ability to identify only the relevant information necessary to compose a response, or provide a deflective response when there is insufficient information. Evaluations of multiple state-of-the-art LLMs on GaRAGe show that the models tend to over-summarise rather than (a) ground their answers strictly on the annotated relevant passages (reaching at most a Relevance-Aware Factuality Score of 60%), or (b) deflect when no relevant grounding is available (reaching at most 31% true positive rate in deflections). The F1 in attribution to relevant sources is at most 58.9%, and we show that performance is particularly reduced when answering time-sensitive questions and when having to draw knowledge from sparser private grounding sources.

Current robotic agents, such as autonomous vehicles (AVs) and drones, need to deal with uncertain real-world environments with appropriate situational awareness (SA), risk awareness, coordination, and decision-making. The SymAware project strives to address this issue by designing an architecture for artificial awareness in multi-agent systems, enabling safe collaboration of autonomous vehicles and drones. However, these agents will also need to interact with human users (drivers, pedestrians, drone operators), which in turn requires an understanding of how to model the human in the interaction scenario, and how to foster trust and transparency between the agent and the human. In this work, we aim to create a data-driven model of a human driver to be integrated into our SA architecture, grounding our research in the principles of trustworthy human-agent interaction. To collect the data necessary for creating the model, we conducted a large-scale user-centered study on human-AV interaction, in which we investigate the interaction between the AV's transparency and the users' behavior. The contributions of this paper are twofold: First, we illustrate in detail our human-AV study and its findings, and second we present the resulting Markov chain models of the human driver computed from the study's data. Our results show that depending on the AV's transparency, the scenario's environment, and the users' demographics, we can obtain significant differences in the model's transitions.

Stance detection identifies the viewpoint expressed in text toward a specific target, such as a political figure. While previous datasets have focused primarily on tweet-level stances from established platforms, user-level stance resources, especially on emerging platforms like Bluesky remain scarce. User-level stance detection provides a more holistic view by considering a user's complete posting history rather than isolated posts. We present the first stance detection dataset for the 2024 U.S. presidential election, collected from Bluesky and centered on Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. The dataset comprises 16,044 user-target stance pairs enriched with engagement metadata, interaction graphs, and user posting histories. PolitiSky24 was created using a carefully evaluated pipeline combining advanced information retrieval and large language models, which generates stance labels with supporting rationales and text spans for transparency. The labeling approach achieves 81\% accuracy with scalable LLMs. This resource addresses gaps in political stance analysis through its timeliness, open-data nature, and user-level perspective. The dataset is available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15616911

For question-answering (QA) tasks, in-context learning (ICL) enables language models to generate responses without modifying their parameters by leveraging examples provided in the input. However, the effectiveness of ICL heavily depends on the availability of high-quality examples, which are often scarce due to data privacy constraints, annotation costs, and distribution disparities. A natural solution is to utilize examples stored on client devices, but existing approaches either require transmitting model parameters - incurring significant communication overhead - or fail to fully exploit local datasets, limiting their effectiveness. To address these challenges, we propose Federated In-Context Learning (Fed-ICL), a general framework that enhances ICL through an iterative, collaborative process. Fed-ICL progressively refines responses by leveraging multi-round interactions between clients and a central server, improving answer quality without the need to transmit model parameters. We establish theoretical guarantees for the convergence of Fed-ICL and conduct extensive experiments on standard QA benchmarks, demonstrating that our proposed approach achieves strong performance while maintaining low communication costs.

Heterogeneous Graph Neural Networks (HGNNs) are vulnerable, highlighting the need for tailored attacks to assess their robustness and ensure security. However, existing HGNN attacks often require complex retraining of parameters to generate specific perturbations for new scenarios. Recently, foundation models have opened new horizons for the generalization of graph neural networks by capturing shared semantics across various graph distributions. This leads us to ask:Can we design a foundation attack model for HGNNs that enables generalizable perturbations across different HGNNs, and quickly adapts to new heterogeneous graphs (HGs)? Empirical findings reveal that, despite significant differences in model design and parameter space, different HGNNs surprisingly share common vulnerability patterns from a relation-aware perspective. Therefore, we explore how to design foundation HGNN attack criteria by mining shared attack units. In this paper, we propose a novel relation-wise heterogeneous graph foundation attack model, HeTa. We introduce a foundation surrogate model to align heterogeneity and identify the importance of shared relation-aware attack units. Building on this, we implement a serialized relation-by-relation attack based on the identified relational weights. In this way, the perturbation can be transferred to various target HGNNs and easily fine-tuned for new HGs. Extensive experiments exhibit powerful attack performances and generalizability of our method.