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A Closed form expressions for the robust risks

Neural Information Processing Systems

In Section A.1 and A.2 we derive closed-form expressions of the standard and robust risks from We first prove Equation (13). We now prove the second part of the statement. In this section we provide additional details on our experiments. B.1 Neural networks on sanitized binary MNIST If not mentioned otherwise, we use noiseless i.i.d. C.1 we give an intuitive explantion for the robust overfitting phenomenon described in C.2 we discuss how inconsistent adversarial training prevents We now shed light on the phenomena revealed by Theorem 3.1 and Figure 2. In particular, we In this section we further discuss robust logistic regression studied in Section 4. As observed in Section 4.4, label noise can prevent interpolation and hence improve the robust risk Hence, inconsistent training perturbations can induce spurious regularization effects.







Adversarial Attacks on Deep Graph Matching

Neural Information Processing Systems

Despite achieving remarkable performance, deep graph learning models, such as node classification and network embedding, suffer from harassment caused by small adversarial perturbations.


On the Limitations of Stochastic Pre-processing Defenses

Neural Information Processing Systems

Defending against adversarial examples remains an open problem. A common belief is that randomness at inference increases the cost of finding adversarial inputs. An example of such a defense is to apply a random transformation to inputs prior to feeding them to the model.