Uncertainty estimates in machine learning are typically evaluated using generic metrics such as the negative log-likelihood and expected calibration error, yet good performance on such metrics does not necessarily imply high utility in downstream decisions. We introduce decision-alignment, a criterion that reveals which evaluation metrics meaningfully align with downstream utilities. Applying this framework, we show that many widely used uncertainty metrics are either misaligned with common decision problems or encode pathological prior beliefs about the downstream task. We then propose prior-weighted utility metrics, a special class of proper scoring rules that provides decision-aligned uncertainty evaluation. Across benchmark experiments and real-world case studies, our metrics consistently align with realized decision utility, while conventional metrics do not. Our results surface flaws in the current UQ evaluation protocol and offer a principled extension of existing metrics toward decision-relevant UQ evaluation.

We introduce the zero-one censored transformed normal (ZOC-TN) model for proportional responses with potential probability mass at the boundaries 0 and 1. The model combines a censored Gaussian variable with a two-parameter affine-logit transformation on the interior (0,1). We characterize the transformation parameters, establish large-sample properties, and relate the affine-logit specification to broader classes of interior distributions. Theoretical and experimental results demonstrate that the proposed model can capture a wider range of qualitative density shapes than several benchmark models while remaining parsimonious, computationally efficient, and numerically stable. Furthermore, the ZOC-TN model can be extended (i) to account for nonlinearities and interactions in a tree-boosting machine learning framework and (ii) to explicitly model residual spatio-temporal variability. We apply the ZOC-TN model to loss given default (LGD) modeling for a large dataset of U.S. residential mortgages and compare it to multiple benchmark models. We find that a tree-boosted ZOC-TN model with a spatio-temporal frailty Gaussian process delivers the strongest out-of-sample performance, indicating that mortgage losses are shaped by nonlinear covariate effects and by unaccounted-for space-time variation.

Counterfactual explanations play a pivotal role in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) by offering intuitive, human-understandable alternatives that elucidate machine learning model decisions. Despite their significance, existing methods for generating counterfactuals often require constant access to the predictive model, involve computationally intensive optimization for each instance and lack the flexibility to adapt to new user-defined constraints without retraining. In this paper, we propose DiCoFlex, a novel model-agnostic, conditional generative framework that produces multiple diverse counterfactuals in a single forward pass. Leveraging conditional normalizing flows trained solely on labeled data, DiCoFlex addresses key limitations by enabling real-time user-driven customization of constraints such as sparsity and actionability at inference time. Extensive experiments on standard benchmark datasets show that DiCoFlex outperforms existing methods in terms of validity, diversity, proximity, and constraint adherence, making it a practical and scalable solution for counterfactual generation in sensitive decision-making domains.

Algorithmic fairness has emerged as a central issue in ML, and it has become standard practice to adjust ML algorithms so that they will satisfy fairness requirements such as Equal Opportunity. In this paper we consider the effects of adopting such fair classifiers on the overall level of ecosystem fairness. Specifically, we introduce the study of fairness with competing firms, and demonstrate the failure of fair classifiers in yielding fair ecosystems. Our results quantify the loss of fairness in systems, under a variety of conditions, based on classifiers' correlation and the level of their data overlap. We show that even if competing classifiers are individually fair, the ecosystem's outcome may be unfair; and that adjusting biased algorithms to improve their individual fairness may lead to an overall decline in ecosystem fairness. In addition to these theoretical results, we also provide supporting experimental evidence. Together, our model and results provide a novel and essential call for action.

AsInstrategic classification, aninstitution(e.g., a bank) anticipates adaptation from userswe develop better algorithms under varying assumpwho change their features to increase utilitytions about adaptation (Levanon and Rosenfeld, 2022; in a classification task (e.g., loan repayment). Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2018), there are growing Since a key challenge is the distribution shiftconcerns about negative social impact on the agents who adapt to these systems, whether outcomes areinduced by users, we turn to causal models, which have been shown to bound the worst-static (Milli et al., 2019) or dynamic (G ois et al., case out-of-distribution (OOD) risk, and es-2025). When agents adapt, depending on the untablish several new results that link causal-derlying causal model (Horowitz and Rosenfeld, 2018; ity and strategic classification. First, we Miller et al., 2020), some changes improve agent outcomes while others constitute gaming the classifier,show that causal classification leads to optimal classification error after any sufficientlyworsening classification error. In this paper, we study large adaptation, when the noise is boundedwhether classifiers can maintain accuracy without sacin a certain way. Second, when these as-rificing alignment with predicted agent's goals.

The trustworthiness of AI decision-making systems is increasingly important. A key feature of such systems is the ability to provide recommendations for how an individual may reverse a negative decision, a problem known as algorithmic recourse. Existing approaches treat recourse outcomes as counterfactuals of a fixed unit, ignoring that real-world recourse involves repeated decisions on the same individual under possibly different latent conditions. We develop a causal framework that models recourse as a process over pre- and post-intervention outcomes, allowing for partial stability and resampling of latent variables. We introduce post-recourse stability conditions that enable reasoning about recourse from observational data alone, and develop a copula-based algorithm for inferring the effects of recourse under these conditions. For settings where paired observations of the same individual before and after intervention are available (called recourse data), we develop methods for inferring copula parameters and performing goodness-of-fit testing. When the copula model is rejected, we provide a distribution-free algorithm for learning recourse effects directly from recourse data. We demonstrate the value of the proposed methods on real and semi-synthetic datasets.

We study a class of classification problems best exemplified by the bank loan problem, where a lender decides whether or not to issue a loan. The lender only observes whether a customer will repay a loan if the loan is issued to begin with, and thus modeled decisions affect what data is available to the lender for future decisions. As a result, it is possible for the lender's algorithm to "get stuck" with a self-fulfilling model. This model never corrects its false negatives, since it never sees the true label for rejected data, thus accumulating infinite regret. In the case of linear models, this issue can be addressed by adding optimism directly into the model predictions. However, there are few methods that extend to the function approximation case using Deep Neural Networks.

We examine whether these static fairness constraints mitigate or worsen the qualification disparity in the long-run. Our work can be applied to a variety of applications such as recruitment and bank lending. In these applications, aninstitute observesindividuals' features (e.g., credit scores), and makes myopic decisions(e.g., issue loans) by assessing such features against some variables of interest (e.g., ability torepay) which are unknown and unobservable tothe institute when making decisions.