Attention over learned object embeddings enables complex visual reasoning.

Digitally reconstructed radiographs (DRRs) are simulated 2D X-ray images generated from 3D CT volumes, widely used in preoperative settings but limited in intraoperative applications due to computational bottlenecks. Physics-based Monte Carlo simulations provide accurate representations but are extremely computationally intensity. Analytical DRR renderers are much more efficient, but at the price of ignoring anisotropic X-ray image formation phenomena such as Compton scattering. We propose a novel approach that balances realistic physics-inspired X-ray simulation with efficient, differentiable DRR generation using 3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS).

The proofs that earned EPFL professor Maryna Viazovska the Fields Medal in 2022 have reached a new milestone: their complete formalization by computer, achieved through a collaboration between mathematicians and artificial intelligence tools. In 2016, Maryna Viazovska solved the sphere packing problem in dimension 8, proving that the E lattice constitutes the densest possible arrangement. Shortly after, together with collaborators, she established an analogous result in dimension 24 using the Leech lattice. Her method provided an elegant solution to a problem studied for centuries, with close ties to applied fields such as error-correcting codes. For this major contribution, Viazovska was awarded the Fields Medal in 2022, the highest distinction in mathematics.

When learning from sensitive data, care must be taken to ensure that training algorithms address privacy concerns. The canonical Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles, or PATE, computes output labels by aggregating the predictions of a (possibly distributed) collection of teacher models via a voting mechanism. The mechanism adds noise to attain a differential privacy guarantee with respect to the teachers' training data. In this work, we observe that this use of noise, which makes PATE predictions stochastic, enables new forms of leakage of sensitive information. For a given input, our adversary exploits this stochasticity to extract high-fidelity histograms of the votes submitted by the underlying teachers. From these histograms, the adversary can learn sensitive attributes of the input such as race, gender, or age. Although this attack does not directly violate the differential privacy guarantee, it clearly violates privacy norms and expectations, and would not be possible at all without the noise inserted to obtain differential privacy. In fact, counter-intuitively, the attack becomes easier as we add more noise to provide stronger differential privacy. We hope this encourages future work to consider privacy holistically rather than treat differential privacy as a panacea.