Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

While progress has been made in understanding the robustness of machine learning classifiers to test-time adversaries (evasion attacks), fundamental questions remain unresolved. In this paper, we use optimal transport to characterize the minimum possible loss in an adversarial classification scenario. In this setting, an adversary receives a random labeled example from one of two classes, perturbs the example subject to a neighborhood constraint, and presents the modified example to the classifier. We define an appropriate cost function such that the minimum transportation cost between the distributions of the two classes determines the minimum 0 1 loss for any classifier. When the classifier comes from a restricted hypothesis class, the optimal transportation cost provides a lower bound. We apply our framework to the case of Gaussian data with norm-bounded adversaries and explicitly show matching bounds for the classification and transport problems as well as the optimality of linear classifiers. We also characterize the sample complexity of learning in this setting, deriving and extending previously known results as a special case. Finally, we use our framework to study the gap between the optimal classification performance possible and that currently achieved by state-of-the-art robustly trained neural networks for datasets of interest, namely, MNIST, Fashion MNIST and CIFAR-10.

Progress in the field of machine learning has been fueled by the introduction of benchmark datasets pushing the limits of existing algorithms. Enabling the design of datasets to test specific properties and failure modes of learning algorithms is thus a problem of high interest, as it has a direct impact on innovation in the field. In this sense, we introduce Synbols -- Synthetic Symbols -- a tool for rapidly generating new datasets with a rich composition of latent features rendered in low resolution images. Synbols leverages the large amount of symbols available in the Unicode standard and the wide range of artistic font provided by the open font community. Our tool's high-level interface provides a language for rapidly generating new distributions on the latent features, including various types of textures and occlusions. To showcase the versatility of Synbols, we use it to dissect the limitations and flaws in standard learning algorithms in various learning setups including supervised learning, active learning, out of distribution generalization, unsupervised representation learning, and object counting.

The vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs) to adversarial examples has drawn great attention from the community. In this paper, we study the transferability of such examples, which lays the foundation of many black-box attacks on DNNs. We revisit a not so new but definitely noteworthy hypothesis of Goodfellow et al.'s and disclose that the transferability can be enhanced by improving the linearity of DNNs in an appropriate manner. We introduce linear backpropagation (LinBP), a method that performs backpropagation in a more linear fashion using off-the-shelf attacks that exploit gradients. More specifically, it calculates forward as normal but backpropagates loss as if some nonlinear activations are not encountered in the forward pass. Experimental results demonstrate that this simple yet effective method obviously outperforms current state-of-the-arts in crafting transferable adversarial examples on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, leading to more effective attacks on a variety of DNNs.

Although the performance over time is the main performance that we want to benchmark, as pointed out by [3] the posterior matching is another metric to measure how good the inverse models are. Below we show the posterior matching score using Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) as a measurement of how close the inferred posterior density is comparing with the ground truth (rejection sampled) distribution. Note that for a real-life problem (D4: meta-material) with higher dimensionality, the rejection sampling becomes intractable. The 3 MMD kernel used was 0.05, 0.2 and 0.9. The code is also available on the repository.