While voting schemes provide an effective means for aggregating preferences, methods for the effective elicitation of voter preferences have received little attention. We address this problem by first considering approximate winner determination when incomplete voter preferences are provided. Exploiting natural scoring metrics, we use max regret to measure the quality or robustness of proposed winners, and develop polynomial time algorithms for computing the alternative with minimax regret for several popular voting rules. We then show how minimax regret can be used to effectively drive incremental preference/vote elicitation and devise several heuristics for this process. Despite worst-case theoretical results showing that most voting protocols require nearly complete voter preferences to determine winners, we demonstrate the practical effectiveness of regret-based elicitation for determining both approximate and exact winners on several real-world data sets.

One fundamental evaluation criteria of an AI technique is its performance in the worst-case. For static strategies in extensive games, this can be computed using a best response computation. Conventionally, this requires a full game tree traversal. For very large games, such as poker, that traversal is infeasible to perform on modern hardware. In this paper, we detail a general technique for best response computations that can often avoid a full game tree traversal. Additionally, our method is specifically well-suited for parallel environments. We apply this approach to computing the worst-case performance of a number of strategies in heads-up limit Texas hold'em, which, prior to this work, was not possible. We explore these results thoroughly as they provide insight into the effects of abstraction on worst-case performance in large imperfect information games. This is a topic that has received much attention, but could not previously be examined outside of toy domains.

Slinko and White, (2008) have recently introduced a new model of coalitional manipulation of voting rules under limited communication, which they call safe strategic voting. The computational aspects of this model were first studied by Hazon and Elkind, (2010), who provide polynomial-time algorithms for finding a safe strategic vote under k-approval and the Bucklin rule. In this paper, we answer an open question of Hazon and Elkind, (2010) by presenting a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a safe strategic vote under the Borda rule. Our results for Borda generalize to several interesting classes of scoring rules.

We study the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent notion termed partition equilibrium. We assume that players in a strategic game are embedded in a social (or, communication) network, and there are coordination constraints defining the set of coalitions that can jointly deviate in the game. A main feature of our approach is that players act in a "considerate" fashion to ignore potentially profitable (group) deviations if the change in their strategy may cause a decrease of utility to their neighbors in the network. We explore the properties of such considerate equilibria in application to the celebrated class of resource selection games (RSGs). Our main result proves existence of a super-strong considerate equilibrium in all symmetric RSGs with strictly increasing delays, for any social network among the players and feasible coalitions represented by the set of cliques. The existence proof is constructive and yields an efficient algorithm. In fact, the computed considerate equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for a standard RSG, thus showing that there exists a state that is stable against selfish and considerate behavior simultaneously. Furthermore, we provide results on convergence of considerate dynamics.

We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the candidates via soft constraints. We consider a sequential procedure that chooses one candidate by asking the agents to vote on one variable at a time. While some properties of this procedure have been already studied, here we focus on independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-dictatorship, and strategy-proofness. Also, we perform an experimental study that shows that the proposed sequential procedure yields a considerable saving in time with respect to a non-sequential approach, while the winners satisfy the agents just as well, independently of the variable ordering and of the presence of coalitions of agents.

Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Nicolaisen et al., 2001] and a market selection strategy which is mainly based on the history This paper describes the strategies used by of the trader's profit made with each specialist. AstonCAT-Plus, the post-tournament version of A CAT game lasts a number of days (500 days in CATthe specialist designed for the TAC Market Design 2010). Each day consists of a number of trading rounds, Tournament 2010. It details how AstonCATwhich each lasts for a known constant length of time. The Plus accepts shouts, clears market, sets transaction daily evaluation of the specialists is based on three metrics: prices and charges fees. Through empirical evaluation, (1) market share, which is the percentage of the total traders' we show that AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms population registered in the market; (2) profit share, which is AstonCAT (tournament version) significantly the ratio of the daily profit a specialist obtains to the profit of but also achieves the second best overall all specialists and (3) transaction success rate (TSR), which score against some top entrants of the competition.

Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needsto reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. Thisproblem has been recently investigated by Caminada and Pigozzi. In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of two of such operators from a socialchoice-theoretic point of view. In particular, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.

Trust is crucial in dynamic multi-agent systems, where agents may frequently join and leave, and the structure of the society may often change. In these environments, it may be difficult for agents to form stable trust relationships necessary for confident interactions. Societies may break down when trust between agents is too low to motivate interactions. In such settings, agents should make decisions about who to interact with, given their degree of trust in the available partners. We propose a decision-theoretic model of trust decision making allows controls to be used, as well as trust, to increase confidence in initial interactions. We consider explicit incentives, monitoring and reputation as examples of such controls. We evaluate our approach within a simulated, highly-dynamic multi-agent environment, and show how this model supports the making of delegation decisions when trust is low.

The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule where, for m candidates, for every vote the first candidate receives m-1 points, the second m-2 points and so on. A Borda winner is a candidate with highest total score. It has been a prominent open problem to determine the computational complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Borda: Can one add a certain number of additional votes (called manipulators) to an election such that a distinguished candidate becomes a winner? We settle this open problem by showing NP-hardness even for two manipulators and three input votes. Moreover, we discuss extensions and limitations of this hardness result.

We present a novel methodology for decision-making by computer agents that leverages a computational concept of emotions. It is believed that emotions help living organisms perform well in complex environments. Can we use them to improve the decision-making performance of computer agents? We explore this possibility by formulating emotions as mathematical operators that serve to update the relative priorities of the agent's goals. The agent uses rudimentary domain knowledge to monitor the expectation that its goals are going to be accomplished in the future, and reacts to changes in this expectation by "experiencing emotions." The end result is a projection of the agent's long-run utility function, which might be too complex to optimize or even represent, to a time-varying valuation function that is being myopically maximized by selecting appropriate actions. Our methodology provides a systematic way to incorporate emotion into a decision-theoretic framework, and also provides a principled, domain-independent methodology for generating heuristics in novel situations. We test our agents in simulation in two domains: restless bandits and a simple foraging environment. Our results indicate that emotion-based agents outperform other reasonable heuristics for such difficult domains, and closely approach computationally expensive near-optimal solutions, whenever these are computable, yet requiring only a fraction of the cost.