In this paper, we examine the concept of modularity, an often cited advantage of the ruled-based representation methodology. We argue that the notion of modularity consists of two distinct concepts which we call syntactic modularity and semantic modularity. We argue that when reasoning under certainty, it is reasonable to regard the rule-based approach as both syntactically and semantically modular. However, we argue that in the case of plausible reasoning, rules are syntactically modular but are rarely semantically modular. To illustrate this point, we examine a particular approach for managing uncertainty in rule-based systems called the MYCIN certainty factor model. We formally define the concept of semantic modularity with respect to the certainty factor model and discuss logical consequences of the definition. We show that the assumption of semantic modularity imposes strong restrictions on rules in a knowledge base. We argue that such restrictions are rarely valid in practical applications. Finally, we suggest how the concept of semantic modularity can be relaxed in a manner that makes it appropriate for plausible reasoning.

In particular, we are interested here in the nature of the control structure of computer programs that can support multiple interpretation and smooth transitions between them, in real time. Each step of the processing involves the interpretation of one input item and the appropriate re-establishment of the system's confidence of the correctness of its interpretation(s). First, the input to the program may be highly unreliable either due to noise at the input channel or due to excessive irrelevant information. We have developed two computational schemes to deal with uncertainty during interpretation tasks. The most obvious advantage of using this scheme is that it may provide a broader interpretation of the situation and helps reduce biases so that relevant new information is not missed.

The control and integration of distributed, multi-sensor perceptual systems is a complex and challenging problem. The observations or opinions of different sensors are often disparate incomparable and are usually only partial views. Sensor information is inherently uncertain and in addition the individual sensors may themselves be in error with respect to the system as a whole. The successful operation of a multi-sensor system must account for this uncertainty and provide for the aggregation of disparate information in an intelligent and robust manner. We consider the sensors of a multi-sensor system to be members or agents of a team, able to offer opinions and bargain in group decisions. We will analyze the coordination and control of this structure using a theory of team decision-making. We present some new analytic results on multi-sensor aggregation and detail a simulation which we use to investigate our ideas. This simulation provides a basis for the analysis of complex agent structures cooperating in the presence of uncertainty. The results of this study are discussed with reference to multi-sensor robot systems, distributed Al and decision making under uncertainty.

We start by defining an approach to non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning in terms of non-monotonic categorical (true-false) reasoning. We identify a type of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning, akin to default inheritance, that is commonly found in practice, especially in "evidential" and "Bayesian" reasoning. We formulate this in terms of the Maximization of Conditional Independence (MCI), and identify a variety of applications for this sort of default. We propose a formalization using Pointwise Circumscription. We compare MCI to Maximum Entropy, another kind of non-monotonic principle, and conclude by raising a number of open questions

To develop an approach to utilizing continuous statistical information within the Dempster- Shafer framework, we combine methods proposed by Strat and by Shafero We first derive continuous possibility and mass functions from probability-density functions. Then we propose a rule for combining such evidence that is simpler and more efficiently computed than Dempster's rule. We discuss the relationship between Dempster's rule and our proposed rule for combining evidence over continuous frames.

Scheduling in the factory setting is compounded by computational complexity and temporal uncertainty. Together, these two factors guarantee that the process of constructing an optimal schedule will be costly and the chances of executing that schedule will be slight. Temporal uncertainty in the task execution time can be offset by several methods: eliminate uncertainty by careful engineering, restore certainty whenever it is lost, reduce the uncertainty by using more accurate sensors, and quantify and circumscribe the remaining uncertainty. Unfortunately, these methods focus exclusively on the sources of uncertainty and fail to apply knowledge of the tasks which are to be scheduled. A complete solution must adapt the schedule of activities to be performed according to the evolving state of the production world. The example of vision-directed assembly is presented to illustrate that the principle of least commitment, in the creation of a plan, in the representation of a schedule, and in the execution of a schedule, enables a robot to operate intelligently and efficiently, even in the presence of considerable uncertainty in the sequence of future events.

There currently exists a gap between the theories proposed by the probability and uncertainty and the needs of Artificial Intelligence research. These theories primarily address the needs of expert systems, using knowledge structures which must be pre-compiled and remain static in structure during runtime. Many Al systems require the ability to dynamically add and remove parts of the current knowledge structure (e.g., in order to examine what the world would be like for different causal theories). This requires more flexibility than existing uncertainty systems display. In addition, many Al researchers are only interested in using "probabilities" as a means of obtaining an ordering, rather than attempting to derive an accurate probabilistic account of a situation. This indicates the need for systems which stress ease of use and don't require extensive probability information when one cannot (or doesn't wish to) provide such information. This paper attempts to help reconcile the gap between approaches to uncertainty and the needs of many AI systems by examining the control issues which arise, independent of a particular uncertainty calculus. when one tries to satisfy these needs. Truth Maintenance Systems have been used extensively in problem solving tasks to help organize a set of facts and detect inconsistencies in the believed state of the world. These systems maintain a set of true/false propositions and their associated dependencies. However, situations often arise in which we are unsure of certain facts or in which the conclusions we can draw from available information are somewhat uncertain. The non-monotonic TMS 12] was an attempt at reasoning when all the facts are not known, but it fails to take into account degrees of belief and how available evidence can combine to strengthen a particular belief. This paper addresses the problem of probabilistic reasoning as it applies to Truth Maintenance Systems. It describes a belief Maintenance System that manages a current set of beliefs in much the same way that a TMS manages a set of true/false propositions. If the system knows that belief in fact is dependent in some way upon belief in fact2, then it automatically modifies its belief in facts when new information causes a change in belief of fact2. It models the behavior of a TMS, replacing its 3-valued logic (true, false, unknown) with an infinite valued logic, in such a way as to reduce to a standard TMS if all statements are given in absolute true/false terms. Belief Maintenance Systems can, therefore, be thought of as a generalization of Truth Maintenance Systems, whose possible reasoning tasks are a superset of those for a TMS.

Two different approaches to dealing with probabilistic knowledge are examined -models and inductive inference. Examples of the first are: influence diagrams [1], Bayesian networks [2], log-linear models [3, 4]. Examples of the second are: games-against nature [5, 6] varieties of maximum-entropy methods [7, 8, 9], and the author's min-score induction [10]. In the modeling approach, the basic issue is manageability, with respect to data elicitation and computation. Thus, it is assumed that the pertinent set of users in some sense knows the relevant probabilities, and the problem is to format that knowledge in a way that is convenient to input and store and that allows computation of the answers to current questions in an expeditious fashion. The basic issue for the inductive approach appears at first sight to be very different. In this approach it is presumed that the relevant probabilities are only partially known, and the problem is to extend that incomplete information in a reasonable way to answer current questions. Clearly, this approach requires that some form of induction be invoked. Of course, manageability is an important additional concern. Despite their seeming differences, the two approaches have a fair amount in common, especially with respect to the structural framework they employ. Roughly speaking, this framework involves identifying clusters of variables which strongly interact, establishing marginal probability distributions on the clusters, and extending the subdistributions to a more complete distribution, usually via a product formalism. The product extension is justified on the modeling approach in terms of assumed conditional independence; in the inductive approach the product form arises from an inductive rule.

A model of knowledge representation is described in which propositional facts and the relationships among them can be supported by other facts. The set of knowledge which can be supported is called the set of cognitive units, each having associated descriptions of their explicit and implicit support structures, summarizing belief and reliability of belief. This summary is precise enough to be useful in a computational model while remaining descriptive of the underlying symbolic support structure. When a fact supports another supportive relationship between facts we call this meta-support. This facilitates reasoning about both the propositional knowledge. and the support structures underlying it.

The discovery that the minimax decision rule performs poorly in some games has sparked interest in possible alternatives to minimax. Until recently, the only games in which minimax was known to perform poorly were games which were mainly of theoretical interest. However, this paper reports results showing poor performance of minimax in a more common game called kalah. For the kalah games tested, a non-minimax decision rule called the product rule performs significantly better than minimax. This paper also discusses a possible way to predict whether or not minimax will perform well in a game when compared to product. A parameter called the rate of heuristic flaw (rhf) has been found to correlate positively with the. performance of product against minimax. Both analytical and experimental results are given that appear to support the predictive power of rhf.