The award will be presented at the Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, to be held in Karlsruhe, West Germany, from 8 to 12 August, 1983. The IJCAI Distinguished Service Award was established in 1979 by the IJCAI Trustees to honor senior scientists in artificial intelligence for contributions and service to the field during their careers. The Award carries a stipend of $1,000 and covers expenses of the recipient's attendance at IJCAI. This will be the second IJCAI Distinguished Service Award; the first was presented to Bernard Meltzer in 1979. Arthur Samuel is one of the pioneeers in AI.

In Memoriam: John G. Gaschnig

John was best known lately for his work on expert systems, for conversations that helped calibrate my mental compass. He was enthusiastic about and welcomed the added strength that he gave me. Without John, our laboratory is noticeably less than it achieve something truly important. We are proud to have been his colleagues and fortunate John's attitude about my counterarguments was that they I wish he were still here to overcome them.

This paper presents the view that artificial intelligence (AI) is primarily concerned with propositional languages for representing knowledge and with techniques for manipulating these representations. In this respect, AI is analogous to applied in a variety of other subject areas. Typically, AI research (or should be) more concerned with the general form and properties of representational languages and methods than it is with the context being described by these languages. Notable exceptions involve "commonsense" knowledge about the everyday would ( no other specialty claims this subject area as its own ), and metaknowledge (or knowledge about the properties itself). In these areas AI is concerned with content as well as form. We also observe that the technology that seems to underly peripheral sensory and motor activities (analogous to low-level animal or human vision and muscle control) seems to be quite different from the technology that seems to underly cognitive reasoning and problem solving. Some definitions of AI would include peripheral as well as cognitive processes; here we argue against including the peripheral processes.

The Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Herbert Simon in 1978. At Carnegie-Mellon University he holds the title of Professor of Computer Science and Psychology. These two facts together delineate the range and uniqueness of his contributions in creating meaningful interactions among fields that developed in isolation but that are all concerned with human decision-making and problem-solving processes. In particular, Simon has brought the insights of decision theory, organization theory (especially as it applies to the business firm), behavior modeling, cognitive psychology, and the study of artificial intelligence to bear on economic questions. This has led not only to new conceptual dimensions for theoretical constructions, but also to a new humanizing realism in economics, a way of taking into account and dealing with human behavior and interactions that lie at the root of all economic activity.

"Computing can change our ways of thinking about many things, mathematics, biology, engineering, administrative procedures, and many more. But my main concern is that it can change our thinking about ourselves: giving us new models, metaphors, and other thinking tools to aid our efforts to fathom the mysteries of the human mind and heart. The new discipline of Artificial Intelligence is the branch of computing most directly concerned with this revolution. By giving us new, deeper, insights into some of our inner processes, it changes our thinking about ourselves. It therefore changes some of our inner processes, and so changes what we are, like all social, technological and intellectual revolutions." This book, published in 1978 by Harvester Press and Humanities Press, has been out of print for many years, and is now online, produced from a scanned in copy of the original, digitised by OCR software and made available in September 2001. Since then a number of notes and corrections have been added. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

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Kenneth Mark Colby, 1920 - 2001 Kenneth Colby was born in Waterbury, Connecticut and graduated from Yale in 1941. Two years later he graduated from Yale's School of Medicine. Colby started his career as a professor of computer science at Stanford, and also did some research for the National Institute of Mental Health. It was there that he created Parry in the university's Artificial Intelligence Library. Parry was a chatterbot, and able to have conversations with people.

Kenneth Mark Colby, 1920 - 2001 Kenneth Colby was born in Waterbury, Connecticut and graduated from Yale in 1941. Two years later he graduated from Yale's School of Medicine. Colby started his career as a professor of computer science at Stanford, and also did some research for the National Institute of Mental Health. It was there that he created Parry in the university's Artificial Intelligence Library. Parry was a chatterbot, and able to have conversations with people.

Some of the world's most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems, at least the ones the public hear about, are famous for beating human players at chess or poker. Other algorithms are known for their ability to learn how to recognize cats or their inability to recognize people with darker skin. But are current AI systems anything more than toys? Sure, their ability to play games or identify animals is impressive, but does this help toward creating useful AI systems? To answer this, we need to take a step back and question what the goals of AI are.