Since the Turing test was first proposed by Alan Turing in 1950, the primary goal of artificial intelligence has been predicated on the ability for computers to imitate human behavior. However, the majority of uses for the computer can be said to fall outside the domain of human abilities and it is exactly outside of this domain where computers have demonstrated their greatest contribution to intelligence. Another goal for artificial intelligence is one that is not predicated on human mimicry, but instead, on human amplification. This article surveys various systems that contribute to the advancement of human and social intelligence. The alleged shortcut to knowledge, which is faith, is only a short-circuit destroying the mind.

This article explains the benefits of preferences for AI systems and draws a picture of current AI research on preference handling. It thus provides an introduction to the topics covered by this special issue on preference handling.

This article explains the benefits of preferences for AI systems and draws a picture of current AI research on preference handling. It thus provides an introduction to the topics covered by this special issue on preference handling.

The effective tailoring of decisions to the needs and desires of specific users requires automated mechanisms for preference assessment. We provide a brief overview of recent direct preference elicitation methods: these methods ask users to answer (ideally, a small number of) queries regarding their preferences and use this information to recommend a feasible decision that would be (approximately) optimal given those preferences. We argue for the importance of assessing numerical utilities rather than qualitative preferences, and survey several utility elicitation techniques from artificial intelligence, operations research, and conjoint analysis.

Interactive artificial intelligence systems employ preferences in both their reasoning and their interaction with the user. This survey considers preference handling in applications such as recommender systems, personal assistant agents, and personalized user interfaces. We survey the major questions and approaches, present illustrative examples, and give an outlook on potential benefits and challenges.

We give an overview of the multifaceted relationship between nonmonotonic logics and preferences. We discuss how the nonmonotonicity of reasoning itself is closely tied to preferences reasoners have on models of the world or, as we often say here, possible belief sets. Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. We discuss how such conflicts can be resolved based on implicit specificity or on explicit rankings of defaults. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.

In both individual and collective decision making, the space of alternatives from which the agent (or the group of agents) has to choose often has a combinatorial (or multi-attribute) structure. We give an introduction to preference handling in combinatorial domains in the context of collective decision making, and show that the considerable body of work on preference representation and elicitation that AI researchers have been working on for several years is particularly relevant. After giving an overview of languages for compact representation of preferences, we discuss problems in voting in combinatorial domains, and then focus on multiagent resource allocation and fair division. These issues belong to a larger field, known as computational social choice, that brings together ideas from AI and social choice theory, to investigate mechanisms for collective decision making from a computational point of view. We conclude by briefly describing some of the other research topics studied in computational social choice.

Automated Planning is an old area of AI that focuses on the development of techniques for finding a plan that achieves a given goal from a given set of initial states as quickly as possible. In most real-world applications, users of planning systems have preferences over the multitude of plans that achieve a given goal. These preferences allow to distinguish plans that are more desirable from those that are less desirable. Planning systems should therefore be able to construct high-quality plans, or at the very least they should be able to build plans that have a reasonably good quality given the resources available.In the last few years we have seen a significant amount of research that has focused on developing rich and compelling languages for expressing preferences over plans. On the other hand, we have seen the development of planning techniques that aim at finding high-quality plans quickly, exploiting some of the ideas developed for classical planning. In this paper we review the latest developments in automated preference-based planning. We also review various approaches for preference representation, and the main practical approaches developed so far.

The CBA algorithm consists of two components which take advantage of the complimentary abilities of humans and computer agents. The first component, Confident Execution, enables the agent to identify states in which demonstration is required, to request a demonstration from the human teacher and to learn a policy based on the acquired data. The algorithm selects demonstrations based on a measure of action selection confidence, and our results show that using Confident Execution the agent requires fewer demonstrations to learn the policy than when demonstrations are selected by a human teacher. The second algorithmic component, Corrective Demonstration, enables the teacher to correct any mistakes made by the agent through additional demonstrations in order to improve the policy and future task performance. CBA and its individual components are compared and evaluated in a complex simulated driving domain.

We unify f-divergences, Bregman divergences, surrogate loss bounds (regret bounds), proper scoring rules, matching losses, cost curves, ROC-curves and information. We do this by systematically studying integral and variational representations of these objects and in so doing identify their primitives which all are related to cost-sensitive binary classification. As well as clarifying relationships between generative and discriminative views of learning, the new machinery leads to tight and more general surrogate loss bounds and generalised Pinsker inequalities relating f-divergences to variational divergence. The new viewpoint illuminates existing algorithms: it provides a new derivation of Support Vector Machines in terms of divergences and relates Maximum Mean Discrepancy to Fisher Linear Discriminants. It also suggests new techniques for estimating f-divergences.