While deep learning models have shown remarkable performance in various tasks, they are susceptible to learning non-generalizable spurious features rather than the core features that are genuinely correlated to the true label. In this paper, beyond existing analyses of linear models, we theoretically examine the learning process of a two-layer nonlinear convolutional neural network in the presence of spurious features. Our analysis suggests that imbalanced data groups and easily learnable spurious features can lead to the dominance of spurious features during the learning process. In light of this, we propose a new training algorithm called PDE that efficiently enhances the model's robustness for a better worst-group performance. PDE begins with a group-balanced subset of training data and progressively expands it to facilitate the learning of the core features. Experiments on synthetic and real-world benchmark datasets confirm the superior performance of our method on models such as ResNets and Transformers. On average, our method achieves a 2.8%improvement in worst-group accuracy compared with the state-of-the-art method, while enjoying up to 10 faster training efficiency. Codes are available at https://github.com/uclaml/PDE.

Graph neural architecture search (GraphNAS) has recently aroused considerable attention in both academia and industry. However, two key challenges seriously hinder the further research of GraphNAS. First, since there is no consensus for the experimental setting, the empirical results in different research papers are often not comparable and even not reproducible, leading to unfair comparisons. Secondly, GraphNAS often needs extensive computations, which makes it highly inefficient and inaccessible to researchers without access to large-scale computation. To solve these challenges, we propose NAS-Bench-Graph, a tailored benchmark that supports unified, reproducible, and efficient evaluations for GraphNAS.

What are Russia's gains from the Iran war? 'We are not losers; we are winners' A Ukrainian married couple, both aged 75, were killed in a Russian attack on Odesa, Ukrainian officials said. Russia launched a series of drone attacks on and near Ukraine's southern port city. The assault destroyed residential buildings and hit a foreign merchant ship, according to Ukrainian authorities. A separate attack killed the married couple and wounded another, reported Ukraine's State Emergency Service. Serhiy Lysak, head of the local military administration, shared images of a building engulfed in flames and another torn open along one side, as emergency crews worked inside.

What can be learned about causality and experimentation from passive data? This question is salient given recent successes of passively-trained language models in interactive domains such as tool use. Passive learning is inherently limited. However, we show that purely passive learning can in fact allow an agent to learn generalizable strategies for determining and using causal structures, as long as the agent can intervene at test time. We formally illustrate that, under certain assumptions, learning a strategy of first experimenting, then seeking goals, can allow generalization from passive learning in principle.

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.