Also see book version (1980), IJCAI-77. Also Rep. No. TR-347, AI Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Artificial Intelligence 6:53-74.

In Schank, 157-288.

Publication 29, Institute of Linguistics, University of Stockholm.

Reprinted in Readings in Uncertain Reasoning, G. Shafer and J. Pearl, eds., pp. 259-273, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1990.See also: Stanford Center for Biomedical Informatics Research (BMIR).… quantifying confirmation and then manipulating the numbers as though they were probabilities quickly leads to apparent inconsistencies or paradoxes. Carl Hempel presented an early analysis of confirmation (Hempel, 1965), pointing out as we have that C[h,e] is a very different concept from P(hle ). His famous Paradox of the Ravens was presented early in his discussion of the logic of confirmation. Let hl be the statement that "all ravens are black" and h2 the statement that "all nonblack things are nonravens." Clearly hi is logically equivalent to h,2. If one were to draw an analogy with conditional probability, it might at first seem valid, therefore, to assert that C[hl,e] = C[h2,e] for all e. However, it appears counterintuitive to state that the observation of a green vase supports hi, even though the observation does seem to support h,2. C[h,e] is therefore different from P(hle) for it seems somehow wrong that an observation of a vase could logically support an assertion about ravens. Another characteristic of a quantitative approach to confirmation that distinguishes the concept from probability was well-recognized by Carnap (1950) and discussed by Barker (1957) and Harrd (1970). They note it is counterintuitive to suggest that the confirmation of the negation of a hypothesis is equal to one minus the confirmation of the hypothesis, i.e., C[h,e] is not 1 - C[-qh,e]. The streptococcal decision rule asserted that a gram-positive coccus growing in chains is a Streptococcus with a measure of support specified as 7 out of 10. This translates to C[h,e]=0.7 where h is "the organism is a Streptococcus" and e is the information that "the organism is a gram-positive coccus growing in chains." As discussed above, an expert does not necessarily believe that C[mh,e] = 0.3. The evidence is said to be supportive of the contention that the organism is a Streptococcus and can therefore hardly also support the contention that the organism is not a Streptococcus. Ch.13 of Mycin Book; revised from Math. Biosci. 23:351-379

Artificial Intelligence 6:361-371

Tech. rep., Groupe d’Intelligence Artificielle, Universit´e d’Aix-Marseille.

"With the objective of making into a science the art of verifying computer programs (debugging), the author addresses both practical and theoretical aspects of the process. A classic of sequential program verification, this volume has been translated into almost a dozen other languages and is much in demand among graduate and advanced undergraduate computer science students. Subjects include computability (with discussions of finite automata and Turing machines); predicate calculus (basic notions, natural deduction, and the resolution method); verification of programs (both flowchart and algol-like programs); flowchart schemas (basic notions, decision problems, formalization in predicate calculus, and translation programs); and the fixpoint theory of programs (functions and functionals, recursive programs, and verification programs). The treatment is self-contained, and each chapter concludes with bibliographic remarks, references, and problems." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.

Rather than provide a general review of Dreyfus critique this article concentrates on certain fundamental criticisms that Dreyfus directs at the information-processing approach to cognitive psychology and points out the unique conception of what it means to understand cognition which separates a phenomenologist from the typical cognitive psychologist.

This is a partial theory of thinking, combining a number of classical and modern concepts from psychology, linguistics, and AI. Whenever one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's viewpoint) he selects from memory a structure called a frame, a remembered framework to be adopted to fit reality by changing details as necessary. A frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame.