Suppose an unpredictable evader is free to move around in a polygonal environment of arbitrary complexity that is under full camera surveillance. How many pursuers, each with the same maximum speed as the evader, are necessary and sufficient to guarantee a successful capture of the evader? The pursuers always know the evader's current position through the camera network, but need to physically reach the evader to capture it. We allow the evader the knowledge of the current positions of all the pursuers as well---this accords with the standard worst-case analysis model, but also models a practical situation where the evader has ``hacked'' into the surveillance system. Our main result is to prove that three pursuers are always sufficient and sometimes necessary to capture the evader. The bound is independent of the number of vertices or holes in the polygonal environment.

The paper introduces a novel technique for improving the performance and scalability of best-first progression-based conformant planners. The technique is inspired by different well-known techniques from classical planning, such as landmark and stratification. Its most salient feature is that it is relatively cheap to implement yet quite effective when applicable. The effectiveness of the proposed technique is demonstrated by the development of new conformant planners by integrating the technique in various state-of-the-art conformant planners and an extensive experimental evaluation of the new planners using benchmarks collected from various sources. The result shows that the technique can be applied in several benchmarks and helps improve both performance and scalability of conformant planners.

Various operational control systems (OCS) are naturally modeled as Markov Decision Processes. OCS often enjoy access to predictions of future events that have substantial impact on their operations. For example, reliable forecasts of extreme weather conditions are widely available, and such events can affect typical request patterns for customer response management systems, the flight and service time of airplanes, or the supply and demand patterns for electricity. The space of exogenous events impacting OCS can be very large, prohibiting their modeling within the MDP; moreover, for many of these exogenous events there is no useful predictive, probabilistic model. Realtime predictions, however, possibly with a short lead-time, are often available. In this work we motivate a model which combines offline MDP infinite horizon planning with realtime adjustments given specific predictions of future exogenous events, and suggest a framework in which such predictions are captured and trigger real-time planning problems. We propose a number of variants of existing MDP solution algorithms, adapted to this context, and evaluate them empirically.

A general game player automatically learns to play arbitrary new games solely by being told their rules. For this purpose games are specified in the game description language GDL, a variant of Datalog with function symbols and a few known keywords. In its latest version GDL allows to describe nondeterministic games with any number of players who may have imperfect, asymmetric information. We analyse the epistemic structure and expressiveness of this language in terms of epistemic modal logic and present two main results: The operational semantics of GDL entails that the situation at any stage of a game can be characterised by a multi-agent epistemic (i.e., S5-) model; (2) GDL is sufficiently expressive to model any situation that can be described by a (finite) multi-agent epistemic model.

This paper develops and tests formulas for representing playing strength at chess by the quality of moves played, rather than by the results of games. Intrinsic quality is estimated via evaluations given by computer chess programs run to high depth, ideally so that their playing strength is sufficiently far ahead of the best human players as to be a `relatively omniscient' guide. Several formulas, each having intrinsic skill parameters s for `sensitivity' and c for `consistency', are argued theoretically and tested by regression on large sets of tournament games played by humans of varying strength as measured by the internationally standard Elo rating system. This establishes a correspondence between Elo rating and the parameters. A smooth correspondence is shown between statistical results and the century points on the Elo scale, and ratings are shown to have stayed quite constant over time. That is, there has been little or no `rating inflation'. The theory and empirical results are transferable to other rational-choice settings in which the alternatives have well-defined utilities, but in which complexity and bounded information constrain the perception of the utility values.

We have carefully instrumented a large portion of the population living in a university graduate dormitory by giving participants Android smart phones running our sensing software. In this paper, we propose the novel problem of predicting mobile application (known as “apps”) installation using social networks and explain its challenge. Modern smart phones, like the ones used in our study, are able to collect different social networks using built-in sensors. (e.g. Bluetooth proximity network, call log network, etc) While this information is accessible to app market makers such as the iPhone AppStore, it has not yet been studied how app market makers can use these information for marketing research and strategy development. We develop a simple computational model to better predict app installation by using a composite network computed from the different networks sensed by phones. Our model also captures individual variance and exogenous factors in app adoption. We show the importance of considering all these factors in predicting app installations, and we observe the surprising result that app installation is indeed predictable. We also show that our model achieves the best results compared with generic approaches.

Attacker-defender Stackelberg games have become a popular game-theoretic approach for security with deployments for LAX Police, the FAMS and the TSA. Unfortunately, most of the existing solution approaches do not model two key uncertainties of the real-world: there may be noise in the defender's execution of the suggested mixed strategy and/or the observations made by an attacker can be noisy. In this paper, we provide a framework to model these uncertainties, and demonstrate that previous strategies perform poorly in such uncertain settings. We also provide RECON, a novel algorithm that computes strategies for the defender that are robust to such uncertainties, and provide heuristics that further improve RECON's efficiency.

A key problem in mechanism design is the construction of protocols that reach socially efficient decisions with minimal information revelation. This can reduce agent communication, and further, potentially increase privacy in the sense that agents reveal no more private information than is needed to determine an optimal outcome. This is not always possible: previous work has explored the tradeoff between communication cost and efficiency, and more recently, communication and privacy. We explore a third dimension: the tradeoff between privacy and efficiency. By sacrificing efficiency, we can improve the privacy of a variety of existing mechanisms. We analyze these tradeoffs in both second-price auctions and facility location problems (introducing new incremental mechanisms for facility location along the way). Our results show that sacrifices in efficiency can provide gains in privacy (and communication), in both the average and worst case.

For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and it never incurs a deficit. However, in general, under the VCG mechanism, payments flow out of the system of agents, which reduces the agents' utilities. VCG redistribution mechanisms aim to return as much of the VCG payments as possible back to the agents, without affecting the desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. Most previous research on VCG redistribution mechanisms has focused on settings with homogeneous items and/or settings with unit-demand agents. In this paper, we study VCG redistribution mechanisms in the more general setting of combinatorial auctions. We show that when the gross substitutes condition holds, we are able to design mechanisms that guarantee to redistribute a large fraction of the VCG payments.

Automated agents for electricity markets, social networks, and other distributed networks must repeatedly interact with other intelligent agents, often without observing associates' actions or payoffs (i.e., minimal information). Given this reality, our goal is to create algorithms that learn effectively in repeated games played with minimal information. As in other applications of machine learning, the success of a learning algorithm in repeated games depends on its learning bias. To better understand what learning biases are most successful, we analyze the learning biases of previously published multi-agent learning (MAL) algorithms. We then describe a new algorithm that adapts a successful learning bias from the literature to minimal information environments. Finally, we compare the performance of this algorithm with ten other algorithms in repeated games played with minimal information.