We consider the classic cake cutting problem where one allocates a divisible cake to n participating agents. Among all valid divisions, fairness and efficiency (a.k.a. ~social welfare) are the most critical criteria to satisfy and optimize, respectively. We study computational complexity of computing an efficiency optimal division given the conditions that the allocation satisfies proportional fairness and assigns each agent a connected piece. For linear valuation functions, we give a polynomial time approximation scheme to compute an efficiency optimal allocation. On the other hand, we show that the problem is NP-hard to approximate within a factor of Ω 1/√ n for general piecewise constant functions, and is NP-hard to compute for normalized functions.

An important difference between traditional AI systems and human intelligence is our ability to harness common sense knowledge gleaned from a lifetime of learning and experiences to inform our decision making and behavior. This allows humans to adapt easily to novel situations where AI fails catastrophically for lack of situation-specific rules and generalization capabilities. Common sense knowledge also provides the background knowledge for humans to successfully operate in social situations where such knowledge is typically assumed. In order for machines to exploit common sense knowledge in reasoning as humans do, moreover, we need to endow them with human-like reasoning strategies. In this work, we propose a two-level affective reasoning framework that concurrently employs multi-dimensionality reduction and graph mining techniques to mimic the integration of conscious and unconscious reasoning, and exploit it for sentiment analysis.

This research proposes the use of imitation based learning to build collaborative strategies for a team of agents. Imitation based learning involves learning from an expert by observing her demonstrating a task and then replicating it. This mechanism makes it extremely easy for a knowledge engineer to transfer knowledge to a software agent via human demonstrations. This research aims to apply imitation to learn not only the strategy of an individual agent but also the collaborative strategy of a team of agents to achieve a common goal. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is being assessed in the domain of RoboCup Soccer Simulation 3D which is a promising platform to address many of the complex real-world problems and offers a truly dynamic, stochastic, and partially-observable environment.

In extensive-form games with a large number of actions, careful abstraction of the action space is critically important to performance. In this paper we extend previous work on action abstraction using no-limit poker games as our test domains. We show that in such games it is no longer necessary to choose, a priori, one specific range of possible bet sizes. We introduce an algorithm that adjusts the range of bet sizes considered for each bet individually in an iterative fashion. This flexibility results in a substantially improved game value in no-limit Leduc poker. When applied to no-limit Texas Hold'em our algorithm produces an action abstraction that is about one third the size of a state of the art hand-crafted action abstraction, yet has a better overall game value.

We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems. (Bhaskar 2000) proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, 1-resource allocation games: Agents start by symmetrically randomizing their actions, and as soon as they each choose different actions, they start to follow a potentially asymmetric "convention" that prescribes their actions from then on. We extend the concept of convention to the general case of infinitely repeated resource allocation games with N agents and C resources. We show that for any convention, there exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium which implements it. We present two conventions: bourgeois, where agents stick to the first allocation; and market, where agents pay for the use of resources, and observe a global coordination signal which allows them to alternate between different allocations. We define price of anonymity of a convention as the ratio between the maximum social payoff of any (asymmetric) strategy profile and the expected social payoff of the convention. We show that while the price of anonymity of the bourgeois convention is infinite, the market convention decreases this price by reducing the conflict between the agents.

Influence maximization is a problem of finding a small set of highly influential users in a social network such that the spread of influence under certain propagation models is maximized. In this paper, we consider time-critical influence maximization, in which one wants to maximize influence spread within a given deadline. Since timing is considered in the optimization, we also extend the Independent Cascade (IC) model to incorporate the time delay aspect of influence diffusion in social networks. We show that time-critical influence maximization under the time-delayed IC model maintains desired properties such as submodularity, which allows a greedy algorithm to achieve an approximation ratio of 1-1/e, to circumvent the NP-hardness of the problem. To overcome the inefficiency of the approximation algorithm, we design two heuristic algorithms: the first one is based on a dynamic programming procedure that computes exact influence in tree structures, while the second one converts the problem to one in the original IC model and then applies existing fast heuristics to it. Our simulation results demonstrate that our heuristics achieve the same level of influence spread as the greedy algorithm while running a few orders of magnitude faster, and they also outperform existing algorithms that disregard the deadline constraint and delays in diffusion.

The presence of non-symmetric evidence has been a barrier for the application of lifted inference since the evidence destroys the symmetry of the first-order probabilistic model. In the extreme case, if distinct soft evidence is obtained about each individual object in the domain then, often, all current exact lifted inference methods reduce to traditional inference at the ground level. However, it is of interest to ask whether the symmetry of the model itself before evidence is obtained can be exploited. We present new results showing that this is, in fact, possible. In particular, we show that both exact maximum a posteriori (MAP) and marginal inference can be lifted for the case of distinct soft evidence on a unary Markov Logic predicate. Our methods result in efficient procedures for MAP and marginal inference for a class of graphical models previously thought to be intractable.

This work presents a new algorithm based on the Bucket Elimination framework that efficiently determines strong controllability of temporal plans formulated as Labeled Simple Temporal Networks with Uncertainty (LSTNU) with controllable and uncontrollable plan branches (choices).

Symmetry is an important problem in many combinatorial problems. One way of dealing with symmetry is to add constraints that eliminate symmetric solutions. We survey recent results in this area, focusing especially on two common and useful cases: symmetry breaking constraints for row and column symmetry, and symmetry breaking constraints for eliminating value symmetry.

General Game Playing (GGP) agents must be capable of playing a wide variety of games skillfully. Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) has proven an effective reasoning mechanism for this challenge, as is reflected by its popularity among designers of GGP agents. Providing GGP agents with the knowledge relevant to the game at hand in real time is, however, a challenging task. In this paper we propose two enhancements for MCTS in the context of GGP, aimed at improving the effectiveness of the simulations in real time based on in-game statistical feedback. The first extension allows early termination of lengthy and uninformative simulations while the second improves the action-selection strategy when both explored and unexplored actions are available. The methods are empirically evaluated in a state-of-the-art GGP agent and shown to yield an overall significant improvement in playing strength.