This paper examines the concept of a combination rule for belief functions. It is shown that two fairly simple and apparently reasonable assumptions determine Dempster's rule, giving a new justification for it.

In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to revise the system's beliefs. However, if the explicit conditions and the implicit conditions of probability assignments are properly distinguished, it follows that Bayes' theorem is not a generally applicable revision rule. Upon properly distinguishing belief revision from belief updating, we see that Jeffrey's rule and its variations are not revision rules, either. Without these distinctions, the limitation of the Bayesian approach is often ignored or underestimated. Revision, in its general form, cannot be done in the Bayesian approach, because a probability distribution function alone does not contain the information needed by the operation.

In this paper, the concept of possibilistic evidence which is a possibility distribution as well as a body of evidence is proposed over an infinite universe of discourse. The inference with possibilistic evidence is investigated based on a unified inference framework maintaining both the compatibility of concepts and the consistency of the probability logic.

Jeffrey's rule of conditioning has been proposed in order to revise a probability measure by another probability function. We generalize it within the framework of the models based on belief functions. We show that several forms of Jeffrey's conditionings can be defined that correspond to the geometrical rule of conditioning and to Dempster's rule of conditioning, respectively.

The classical propositional assumption-based model is extended to incorporate probabilities for the assumptions. Then it is placed into the framework of evidence theory. Several authors like Laskey, Lehner (1989) and Provan (1990) already proposed a similar point of view, but the first paper is not as much concerned with mathematical foundations, and Provan's paper develops into a different direction. Here we thoroughly develop and present the mathematical foundations of this theory, together with computational methods adapted from Reiter, De Kleer (1987) and Inoue (1992). Finally, recently proposed techniques for computing degrees of support are presented.

Evidential reasoning is now a leading topic in Artificial Intelligence. Evidence is represented by a variety of evidential functions. Evidential reasoning is carried out by certain kinds of fundamental operation on these functions. This paper discusses two of the basic operations on evidential functions, the discount operation and the well-known orthogonal sum operation. We show that the discount operation is not commutative with the orthogonal sum operation, and derive expressions for the two operations applied to the various evidential function.

A key issue in the handling of temporal data is the treatment of persistence; in most approaches it consists in inferring defeasible confusions by extrapolating from the actual knowledge of the history of the world; we propose here a gradual modelling of persistence, following the idea that persistence is decreasing (the further we are from the last time point where a fluent is known to be true, the less certainly true the fluent is); it is based on possibility theory, which has strong relations with other well-known ordering-based approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. We compare our approach with Dean and Kanazawa's probabilistic projection. We give a formal modelling of the decreasing persistence problem. Lastly, we show how to infer nonmonotonic conclusions using the principle of decreasing persistence.

We present a semantics for adding uncertainty to conditional logics for default reasoning and belief revision. We are able to treat conditional sentences as statements of conditional probability, and express rules for revision such as "If A were believed, then B would be believed to degree p." This method of revision extends conditionalization by allowing meaningful revision by sentences whose probability is zero. This is achieved through the use of counterfactual probabilities. Thus, our system accounts for the best properties of qualitative methods of update (in particular, the AGM theory of revision) and probabilistic methods. We also show how our system can be viewed as a unification of probability theory and possibility theory, highlighting their orthogonality and providing a means for expressing the probability of a possibility. We also demonstrate the connection to Lewis's method of imaging.

Shafer's theory of belief and the Bayesian theory of probability are two alternative and mutually inconsistent approaches toward modelling uncertainty in artificial intelligence. To help reduce the conflict between these two approaches, this paper reexamines expected utility theory-from which Bayesian probability theory is derived. Expected utility theory requires the decision maker to assign a utility to each decision conditioned on every possible event that might occur. But frequently the decision maker cannot foresee all the events that might occur, i.e., one of the possible events is the occurrence of an unforeseen event. So once we acknowledge the existence of unforeseen events, we need to develop some way of assigning utilities to decisions conditioned on unforeseen events. The commonsensical solution to this problem is to assign similar utilities to events which are similar. Implementing this commonsensical solution is equivalent to replacing Bayesian subjective probabilities over the space of foreseen and unforeseen events by random set theory probabilities over the space of foreseen events. This leads to an expected utility principle in which normalized variants of Shafer's commonalities play the role of subjective probabilities. Hence allowing for unforeseen events in decision analysis causes Bayesian probability theory to become much more similar to Shaferian theory.

This paper introduces a qualitative measure of ambiguity and analyses its relationship with other measures of uncertainty. Probability measures relative likelihoods, while ambiguity measures vagueness surrounding those judgments. Ambiguity is an important representation of uncertain knowledge. It deals with a different, type of uncertainty modeled by subjective probability or belief.