One purpose -- quite a few thinkers would say the main purpose -- of seeking knowledge about the world is to enhance our ability to make good decisions. An item of knowledge that can make no conceivable difference with regard to anything we might do would strike many as frivolous. Whether or not we want to be philosophical pragmatists in this strong sense with regard to everything we might want to enquire about, it seems a perfectly appropriate attitude to adopt toward artificial knowledge systems. If is granted that we are ultimately concerned with decisions, then some constraints are imposed on our measures of uncertainty at the level of decision making. If our measure of uncertainty is real-valued, then it isn't hard to show that it must satisfy the classical probability axioms. For example, if an act has a real-valued utility U(E) if the event E obtains, and the same real-valued utility if the denial of E obtains, so that U(E) = U(-E), then the expected utility of that act must be U(E), and that must be the same as the uncertainty-weighted average of the returns of the act, p-U(E) + q-U('E), where p and q represent the uncertainty of E and-E respectively. But then we must have p + q = 1.

This paper describes the incorporation of uncertainty in diagnostic reasoning based on the set covering model of Reggia et. al. extended to what in the Artificial Intelligence dichotomy between deep and compiled (shallow, surface) knowledge based diagnosis may be viewed as the generic form at the compiled end of the spectrum. A major undercurrent in this is advocating the need for a strong underlying model and an integrated set of support tools for carrying such a model in order to deal with uncertainty.

We describe a viewpoint on the Dempster/Shafer 'Theory of Evidence', and provide an interpretation which regards the combination formulas as statistics of the opinions of "experts". This is done by introducing spaces with binary operations that are simpler to interpret or simpler to implement than the standard combination formula, and showing that these spaces can be mapped homomorphically onto the Dempster/Shafer theory of evidence space. The experts in the space of "opinions of experts" combine information in a Bayesian fashion. We present alternative spaces for the combination of evidence suggested by this viewpoint.

There has been a considerable amount of work on uncertainty in knowledge-based systems. This work has generally been concerned with uncertainty arising from the strength of inferences and the weight of evidence. In this paper we discuss another type of uncertainty: that which is due to imprecision in the underlying primitives used to represent the knowledge of the system. In particular, a given word may denote many similar but not identical entities. Such words are said to be lexically imprecise. Lexical imprecision has caused widespread problems in many areas. Unless this phenomenon is recognized and appropriately handled, it can degrade the performance of knowledge-based systems. In particular, it can lead to difficulties with the user interface, and with the inferencing processes of these systems. Some techniques are suggested for coping with this phenomenon.

In the 1940's, a physicist named Cox provided the first formal justification for the axioms of probability based on the subjective or Bayesian interpretation. He showed that if a measure of belief satisfies several fundamental properties, then the measure must be some monotonic transformation of a probability. In this paper, measures of change in belief or belief updates are examined. In the spirit of Cox, properties for a measure of change in belief are enumerated. It is shown that if a measure satisfies these properties, it must satisfy other restrictive conditions. For example, it is shown that belief updates in a probabilistic context must be equal to some monotonic transformation of a likelihood ratio. It is hoped that this formal explication of the belief update paradigm will facilitate critical discussion and useful extensions of the approach.

In this paper, we examine the concept of modularity, an often cited advantage of the ruled-based representation methodology. We argue that the notion of modularity consists of two distinct concepts which we call syntactic modularity and semantic modularity. We argue that when reasoning under certainty, it is reasonable to regard the rule-based approach as both syntactically and semantically modular. However, we argue that in the case of plausible reasoning, rules are syntactically modular but are rarely semantically modular. To illustrate this point, we examine a particular approach for managing uncertainty in rule-based systems called the MYCIN certainty factor model. We formally define the concept of semantic modularity with respect to the certainty factor model and discuss logical consequences of the definition. We show that the assumption of semantic modularity imposes strong restrictions on rules in a knowledge base. We argue that such restrictions are rarely valid in practical applications. Finally, we suggest how the concept of semantic modularity can be relaxed in a manner that makes it appropriate for plausible reasoning.

In particular, we are interested here in the nature of the control structure of computer programs that can support multiple interpretation and smooth transitions between them, in real time. Each step of the processing involves the interpretation of one input item and the appropriate re-establishment of the system's confidence of the correctness of its interpretation(s). First, the input to the program may be highly unreliable either due to noise at the input channel or due to excessive irrelevant information. We have developed two computational schemes to deal with uncertainty during interpretation tasks. The most obvious advantage of using this scheme is that it may provide a broader interpretation of the situation and helps reduce biases so that relevant new information is not missed.

The control and integration of distributed, multi-sensor perceptual systems is a complex and challenging problem. The observations or opinions of different sensors are often disparate incomparable and are usually only partial views. Sensor information is inherently uncertain and in addition the individual sensors may themselves be in error with respect to the system as a whole. The successful operation of a multi-sensor system must account for this uncertainty and provide for the aggregation of disparate information in an intelligent and robust manner. We consider the sensors of a multi-sensor system to be members or agents of a team, able to offer opinions and bargain in group decisions. We will analyze the coordination and control of this structure using a theory of team decision-making. We present some new analytic results on multi-sensor aggregation and detail a simulation which we use to investigate our ideas. This simulation provides a basis for the analysis of complex agent structures cooperating in the presence of uncertainty. The results of this study are discussed with reference to multi-sensor robot systems, distributed Al and decision making under uncertainty.

We start by defining an approach to non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning in terms of non-monotonic categorical (true-false) reasoning. We identify a type of non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning, akin to default inheritance, that is commonly found in practice, especially in "evidential" and "Bayesian" reasoning. We formulate this in terms of the Maximization of Conditional Independence (MCI), and identify a variety of applications for this sort of default. We propose a formalization using Pointwise Circumscription. We compare MCI to Maximum Entropy, another kind of non-monotonic principle, and conclude by raising a number of open questions

To develop an approach to utilizing continuous statistical information within the Dempster- Shafer framework, we combine methods proposed by Strat and by Shafero We first derive continuous possibility and mass functions from probability-density functions. Then we propose a rule for combining such evidence that is simpler and more efficiently computed than Dempster's rule. We discuss the relationship between Dempster's rule and our proposed rule for combining evidence over continuous frames.