We consider the following problem: There is a set of items (e.g., movies) and a group of agents (e.g., passengers on a plane); each agent has some intrinsic utility for each of the items. Our goal is to pick a set of K items that maximize the total derived utility of all the agents (i.e., in our example we are to pick K movies that we put on the plane's entertainment system). However, the actual utility that an agent derives from a given item is only a fraction of its intrinsic one, and this fraction depends on how the agent ranks the item among the chosen, available, ones. We provide a formal specification of the model and provide concrete examples and settings where it is applicable. We show that the problem is hard in general, but we show a number of tractability results for its natural special cases.

We consider the problem of winner determination under Chamberlin--Courant's multiwinner voting rule with approval utilities. This problem is equivalent to the well-known NP-complete MaxCover problem (i.e., a version of the SetCover problem where we aim to cover as many elements as possible) and, so, the best polynomial-time approximation algorithm for it has approximation ratio 1 - 1/e. We show exponential-time/FPT approximation algorithms that, on one hand, achieve arbitrarily good approximation ratios and, on the other hand, have running times much better than known exact algorithms. We focus on the cases where the voters have to approve of at most/at least a given number of candidates.

Within characteristic function games, agents have the option of joining one of many different coalitions, based on the utility value of each candidate coalition. However, determining this utility value can be computationally complex since the number of coalitions increases exponentially with the number of agents available. Various approaches have been proposed that mediate this problem by distributing the computational load so that each agent calculates only a subset of coalition values. However, current approaches are either highly inefficient due to redundant calculations, or make the benevolence assumption (i.e. are not suitable for adversarial environments). We introduce DCG, a novel algorithm that distributes the calculations of coalition utility values across a community of agents, such that: (i) no inter-agent communication is required; (ii) the coalition value calculations are (approximately) equally partitioned into shares, one for each agent; (iii) the utility value is calculated only once for each coalition, thus redundant calculations are eliminated; (iv) there is an equal number of operations for agents with equal sized shares; and (v) an agent is only allocated those coalitions in which it is a potential member. The DCG algorithm is presented and illustrated by means of an example. We formally prove that our approach allocates all of the coalitions to the agents, and that each coalition is assigned once and only once.

We propose an auction algorithm to allocate tasks that have temporal constraints to cooperative robots. Temporal constraints are expressed as time windows, within which a task must be executed. There are no restrictions on the time windows, which are allowed to overlap. Robots model their temporal constraints using a simple temporal network, enabling them to maintain consistent schedules. When bidding on a task, a robot takes into account its own current commitments and an optimization objective, which is to minimize the time of completion of the last task alone or in combination with minimizing the distance traveled. The algorithm works both when all the tasks are known upfront and when tasks arrive dynamically. We show the performance of the algorithm in simulation with different numbers of tasks and robots, and compare it with a baseline greedy algorithm and a state-of-the-art auction algorithm. Our algorithm is computationally frugal and consistently allocates more tasks than the competing algorithms.

Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a recent paper, Meir et al.[EC'14] made another step in this direction, by suggesting a behavioral game-theoretic model for voters under uncertainty. For a specific variation of best-response heuristics, they proved initial existence and convergence results in the Plurality voting system. This paper extends the model in multiple directions, considering voters with different uncertainty levels, simultaneous strategic decisions, and a more permissive notion of best-response. It is proved that a voting equilibrium exists even in the most general case. Further, any society voting in an iterative setting is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. An alternative behavior is analyzed, where voters try to minimize their worst-case regret. As it turns out, the two behaviors coincide in the simple setting of Meir et al.[EC'14], but not in the general case.

Teams of mobile robots often need to divide up subtasks efficiently. In spatial domains, a key criterion for doing so may depend on distances between robots and the subtasks' locations. This paper considers a specific such criterion, namely how to assign interchangeable robots, represented as point masses, to a set of target goal locations within an open two dimensional space such that the makespan (time for all robots to reach their target locations) is minimized while also preventing collisions among robots. We present scaleable (computable in polynomial time) role assignment algorithms that we classify as being SCRAM (Scalable Collision-avoiding Role Assignment with Minimal-makespan). SCRAM role assignment algorithms use a graph theoretic approach to map agents to target goal locations such that our objectives for both minimizing the makespan and avoiding agent collisions are met. A system using SCRAM role assignment was originally designed to allow for decentralized coordination among physically realistic simulated humanoid soccer playing robots in the partially observable, non-deterministic, noisy, dynamic, and limited communication setting of the RoboCup 3D simulation league. In its current form, SCRAM role assignment generalizes well to many realistic and real-world multiagent systems, and scales to thousands of agents.

For Internet applications like sponsored search, cautions need to be taken when using machine learning to optimize their mechanisms (e.g., auction) since self-interested agents in these applications may change their behaviors (and thus the data distribution) in response to the mechanisms. To tackle this problem, a framework called game-theoretic machine learning (GTML) was recently proposed, which first learns a Markov behavior model to characterize agents' behaviors, and then learns the optimal mechanism by simulating agents' behavior changes in response to the mechanism. While GTML has demonstrated practical success, its generalization analysis is challenging because the behavior data are non-i.i.d. and dependent on the mechanism. To address this challenge, first, we decompose the generalization error for GTML into the behavior learning error and the mechanism learning error; second, for the behavior learning error, we obtain novel non-asymptotic error bounds for both parametric and non-parametric behavior learning methods; third, for the mechanism learning error, we derive a uniform convergence bound based on a new concept called \emph{nested covering number} of the mechanism space and the generalization analysis techniques developed for mixing sequences.

We study parameterised verification of robot swarms against temporal-epistemic specifications. We relax some of the significant restrictions assumed in the literature and present a counter abstraction approach that enable us to verify a potentially much smaller abstract model when checking a formula on a swarm of any size. We present an implementation and discuss experimental results obtained for the alpha algorithm for robot swarms.

In this paper, we design a distributed mechanism that is able to create a social convention within a large convention space for multiagent systems (MAS) operating on various topologies. Specifically, we investigate a language coordination problem in which agents in a dynamic MAS construct a common lexicon in a decentralized fashion. Agent interactions are modeled using a language game where every agent repeatedly plays with its neighbors. Each agent stochastically updates its lexicons based on the utility values of the received lexicons from its immediate neighbors. We present a novel topology-aware utility computation mechanism and equip the agents with the ability to reorganize their neighborhood based on this utility estimate to expedite the convention formation process. Extensive simulation results indicate that our proposed mechanism is both effective (able to converge into a large majority convention state with more than 90\% agents sharing a high-quality lexicon) and efficient (faster) as compared to state-of-the-art approaches for social conventions in large convention spaces.

We propose Cupid, a language for specifying commitments that supports their information-centric aspects, and offers crucial benefits. One, Cupid is first-order, enabling a systematic treatment of commitment instances. Two, Cupid supports features needed for real-world scenarios such as deadlines, nested commitments, and complex event expressions for capturing the lifecycle of commitment instances. Three, Cupid maps to relational database queries and thus provides a set-based semantics for retrieving commitment instances in states such as being violated, discharged, and so on. We prove that Cupid queries are safe. Four, to aid commitment modelers, we propose the notion of well-identified commitments, and finitely violable and finitely expirable commitments. We give syntactic restrictions for obtaining such commitments.