Hallucinations are outputs by Large Language Models (LLMs) that are factually incorrect yet appear plausible [1]. This paper investigates how such hallucinations influence users' trust in LLMs and users' interaction with LLMs. To explore this in everyday use, we conducted a qualitative study with 192 participants. Our findings show that hallucinations do not result in blanket mistrust but instead lead to context-sensitive trust calibration. Building on the calibrated trust model by Lee & See [2] and Afroogh et al.'s trust-related factors [3], we confirm expectancy [3], [4], prior experience [3], [4], [5], and user expertise & domain knowledge [3], [4] as userrelated (human) trust factors, and identify intuition as an additional factor relevant for hallucination detection. Additionally, we found that trust dynamics are further influenced by contextual factors, particularly perceived risk [3] and decision stakes [6]. Consequently, we validate the recursive trust calibration process proposed by Blöbaum [7] and extend it by including intuition as a user-related trust factor. Based on these insights, we propose practical recommendations for responsible and reflective LLM use.

While the possibility of reaching human-like Artificial Intelligence (AI) remains controversial, the likelihood that the future will be characterized by a society with a growing presence of autonomous machines is high. Autonomous AI agents are already deployed and active across several industries and digital environments and alongside human-human and human-machine interactions, machine-machine interactions are poised to become increasingly prevalent. Given these developments, I argue that criminology must begin to address the implications of this transition for crime and social control. Drawing on Actor-Network Theory and Woolgar's decades-old call for a sociology of machines -- frameworks that acquire renewed relevance with the rise of generative AI agents -- I contend that criminologists should move beyond conceiving AI solely as a tool. Instead, AI agents should be recognized as entities with agency encompassing computational, social, and legal dimensions. Building on the literature on AI safety, I thus examine the risks associated with the rise of multi-agent AI systems, proposing a dual taxonomy to characterize the channels through which interactions among AI agents may generate deviant, unlawful, or criminal outcomes. I then advance and discuss four key questions that warrant theoretical and empirical attention: (1) Can we assume that machines will simply mimic humans? (2) Will crime theories developed for humans suffice to explain deviant or criminal behaviors emerging from interactions between autonomous AI agents? (3) What types of criminal behaviors will be affected first? (4) How might this unprecedented societal shift impact policing? These questions underscore the urgent need for criminologists to theoretically and empirically engage with the implications of multi-agent AI systems for the study of crime and play a more active role in debates on AI safety and governance.

We review the historical development and current trends of artificially intelligent agents (agentic AI) in the social and behavioral sciences: from the first programmable computers, and social simulations soon thereafter, to today's experiments with large language models. This overview emphasizes the role of AI in the scientific process and the changes brought about, both through technological advancements and the broader evolution of science from around 1950 to the present. Some of the specific points we cover include: the challenges of presenting the first social simulation studies to a world unaware of computers, the rise of social systems science, intelligent game theoretic agents, the age of big data and the epistemic upheaval in its wake, and the current enthusiasm around applications of generative AI, and many other topics. A pervasive theme is how deeply entwined we are with the technologies we use to understand ourselves.

Language use is shaped by pragmatics -- i.e., reasoning about communicative goals and norms in context. As language models (LMs) are increasingly used as conversational agents, it becomes ever more important to understand their pragmatic reasoning abilities. We propose an evaluation framework derived from Wavelength, a popular communication game where a speaker and a listener communicate about a broad range of concepts in a granular manner. We study a range of LMs on both language comprehension and language production using direct and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, and further explore a Rational Speech Act (RSA) approach to incorporating Bayesian pragmatic reasoning into LM inference. We find that state-of-the-art LMs, but not smaller ones, achieve strong performance on language comprehension, obtaining similar-to-human accuracy and exhibiting high correlations with human judgments even without CoT prompting or RSA. On language production, CoT can outperform direct prompting, and using RSA provides significant improvements over both approaches. Our study helps identify the strengths and limitations in LMs' pragmatic reasoning abilities and demonstrates the potential for improving them with RSA, opening up future avenues for understanding conceptual representation, language understanding, and social reasoning in LMs and humans.

A key step in reverse engineering neural networks is to decompose them into simpler parts that can be studied in relative isolation. Linear parameter decomposition -- a framework that has been proposed to resolve several issues with current decomposition methods -- decomposes neural network parameters into a sum of sparsely used vectors in parameter space. However, the current main method in this framework, Attribution-based Parameter Decomposition (APD), is impractical on account of its computational cost and sensitivity to hyperparameters. In this work, we introduce \textit{Stochastic Parameter Decomposition} (SPD), a method that is more scalable and robust to hyperparameters than APD, which we demonstrate by decomposing models that are slightly larger and more complex than was possible to decompose with APD. We also show that SPD avoids other issues, such as shrinkage of the learned parameters, and better identifies ground truth mechanisms in toy models. By bridging causal mediation analysis and network decomposition methods, this demonstration opens up new research possibilities in mechanistic interpretability by removing barriers to scaling linear parameter decomposition methods to larger models. We release a library for running SPD and reproducing our experiments at https://github.com/goodfire-ai/spd/tree/spd-paper.

This paper evaluates the capabilities of 28 large language models (LLMs) to reason with 20 defeasible reasoning patterns involving generic generalizations (e.g., 'Birds fly', 'Ravens are black') central to non-monotonic logic. Generics are of special interest to linguists, philosophers, logicians, and cognitive scientists because of their complex exception-permitting behaviour and their centrality to default reasoning, cognition, and concept acquisition. We find that while several frontier models handle many default reasoning problems well, performance varies widely across models and prompting styles. Few-shot prompting modestly improves performance for some models, but chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting often leads to serious performance degradation (mean accuracy drop -11.14%, SD 15.74% in models performing above 75% accuracy in zero-shot condition, temperature 0). Most models either struggle to distinguish between defeasible and deductive inference or misinterpret generics as universal statements. These findings underscore both the promise and limits of current LLMs for default reasoning.

This paper introduces a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating how Large Language Models (LLMs) respond to linguistic shibboleths: subtle linguistic markers that can inadvertently reveal demographic attributes such as gender, social class, or regional background. Through carefully constructed interview simulations using 100 validated question-response pairs, we demonstrate how LLMs systematically penalize certain linguistic patterns, particularly hedging language, despite equivalent content quality. Our benchmark generates controlled linguistic variations that isolate specific phenomena while maintaining semantic equivalence, which enables the precise measurement of demographic bias in automated evaluation systems. We validate our approach along multiple linguistic dimensions, showing that hedged responses receive 25.6% lower ratings on average, and demonstrate the benchmark's effectiveness in identifying model-specific biases. This work establishes a foundational framework for detecting and measuring linguistic discrimination in AI systems, with broad applications to fairness in automated decision-making contexts.

Historically, these systems included purely statistical models, but modern LLMs are deep artificial neural network s trained via machine learning . Once trained, an LLM may be implemented for various purposes, such as in chatbot s and personal assistants, or for translation, sentiment analysis and document review. 2 T he indisputably impressive performance of LLMs on a wide variety of task raises pressing questions about their capacities, and the mechanisms underlying those capacities . For instance, authors have grapple d with the questions of whether LLMs understand language (Bender & Koller, 2020; Mitchell & Krakauer, 2022) whether they possess concepts (Butlin, 2023) or to what extent they possess a theory of mind (Kosinski, 2024; Ullman 2023) . This paper focuses on the representational capacities of LLMs . D o LLMs rely on representations? If so, what do those representations represent? Much r esearch in AI -- for instance, studies using p robing classifiers (Belinkov, 2022), and methods for " e diting " models' representations (Hernandez et al., 202 4; Meng et al., 2022) -- assume s that a representational lens is appropriate . But a key question is whether LLMs can represent real world entities, or only "shallow" linguistic contents that don't reach into extra - linguistic reality (Butlin, 2021; Coelho Mollo & Millière, 2023; Yildirim & Paul, 2024) .

Conversational agents that mimic people have raised questions about the ethics of anthropomorphizing machines with human social identity cues. Critics have also questioned assumptions of identity neutrality in humanlike agents. Recent work has revealed that intersectional Japanese pronouns can elicit complex and sometimes evasive impressions of agent identity. Yet, the role of other "neutral" non-pronominal self-referents (NPSR) and voice as a socially expressive medium remains unexplored. In a crowdsourcing study, Japanese participants (N = 204) evaluated three ChatGPT voices (Juniper, Breeze, and Ember) using seven self-referents. We found strong evidence of voice gendering alongside the potential of intersectional self-referents to evade gendering, i.e., ambiguity through neutrality and elusiveness. Notably, perceptions of age and formality intersected with gendering as per sociolinguistic theories, especially boku and watakushi. This work provides a nuanced take on agent identity perceptions and champions intersectional and culturally-sensitive work on voice agents.

Under the slogan of trustworthy AI, much of contemporary AI research is focused on designing AI systems and usage practices that inspire human trust and, thus, enhance adoption of AI systems. However, a person affected by an AI system may not be convinced by AI system design alone -- neither should they, if the AI system is embedded in a social context that gives good reason to believe that it is used in tension with a person's interest. In such cases, distrust in the system may be justified and necessary to build meaningful trust in the first place. We propose the term "healthy distrust" to describe such a justified, careful stance towards certain AI usage practices. We investigate prior notions of trust and distrust in computer science, sociology, history, psychology, and philosophy, outline a remaining gap that healthy distrust might fill and conceptualize healthy distrust as a crucial part for AI usage that respects human autonomy.