Mechanisms (especially on the Internet) have begun allowing people or organizations to express richer preferences in order to provide for greater levels of overall satisfaction.  In this paper, we develop an operational methodology for quantifying the expected gains in economic efficiency associated with different forms of expressiveness.  We begin by proving that the sponsored search mechanism (GSP) used by Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc. can be arbitrarily inefficient. We then experimentally compare its efficiency to a slightly more expressive variant (PGSP), which solicits an extra bid for a premium class of positions. We generate random preference distributions based on published industry knowledge.  We determine ideal strategies for the agents using a custom tree search technique, and we also benchmark using straightforward heuristic bidding strategies. The GSP's efficiency loss is greatest in the practical case where some advertisers ("brand advertisers") prefer top positions while others ("value advertisers") prefer middle positions, and that loss can be dramatic. It is also worst when agents have small profit margins. While the PGSP is only slightly more expressive (and thus not much more cumbersome), it removes almost all of the efficiency loss in all of the settings we study.

Open-ended language communication remains an enormous challenge for autonomous robots. This paper argues that the notion of a language strategy is the appropriate vehicle for addressing this challenge. A language strategy packages all the procedures that are necessary for playing a language game. We present a specific example of a language strategy for playing an Action Game  in which one robot asks another robot to take on a body posture (such as stand or sit), and show how it effectively allows a population of agents to self-organise a perceptually grounded ontology and a lexicon from scratch, without any human intervention. Next, we show how a new language strategy can arise by exaptation from an existing one, concretely, how the body posture strategy can be exapted to a strategy for playing language games about the spatial position of objects (as in "the bottle stands on the table").

Ecosystem Informatics brings together mathematical and computational tools to address scientific and policy challenges in the ecosystem sciences. These challenges include novel sensors for collecting data, algorithms for automated data cleaning, learning methods for building statistical models from data and for fitting mechanistic models to data, and algorithms for designing optimal policies for biosphere management. This presentation discusses these challenges and then describes recent work on the first two of these--new methods for automated arthropod population counting and linear Gaussian DBNs for automated cleaning of sensor network data.

Can we devise educational systems that provide individualized instruction tailored to the needs of the individual learners, as many good teachers do? Intelligent Tutoring Systems is the interdisciplinary field that investigates this question by integrating research in Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science and Education. Research in this field has successfully delivered techniques and systems that provide adaptive support for student problem solving in variety of domains. There are, however, other educational activities that can benefit from individualized computer-based support, such as studying examples, exploring interactive simulations and playing educational games. Providing individualized support for these activities rises unique challenges, because it requires that an ITS can model and adapt to student behaviors, skills and mental states often not as structured and well-defined as those involved in traditional problem solving. I will present a variety of projects that illustrate some of these challenges, our proposed solutions, and future opportunities.

We develop a technique for deriving data-dependent error bounds for transductive learning algorithms based on transductive Rademacher complexity. Our technique is based on a novel general error bound for transduction in terms of transductive Rademacher complexity, together with a novel bounding technique for Rademacher averages for particular algorithms, in terms of their "unlabeled-labeled" representation. This technique is relevant to many advanced graph-based transductive algorithms and we demonstrate its effectiveness by deriving error bounds to three well known algorithms. Finally, we present a new PAC-Bayesian bound for mixtures of transductive algorithms based on our Rademacher bounds.

A general framework is proposed for integration of rules and external first order theories. It is based on the well-founded semantics of normal logic programs and inspired by ideas of Constraint Logic Programming (CLP) and constructive negation for logic programs. Hybrid rules are normal clauses extended with constraints in the bodies; constraints are certain formulae in the language of the external theory. A hybrid program is a pair of a set of hybrid rules and an external theory. Instances of the framework are obtained by specifying the class of external theories, and the class of constraints. An example instance is integration of (non-disjunctive) Datalog with ontologies formalized as description logics. The paper defines a declarative semantics of hybrid programs and a goal-driven formal operational semantics. The latter can be seen as a generalization of SLS-resolution. It provides a basis for hybrid implementations combining Prolog with constraint solvers. Soundness of the operational semantics is proven. Sufficient conditions for decidability of the declarative semantics, and for completeness of the operational semantics are given.

Variable selection for high-dimensional linear models has received a lot of attention lately, mostly in the context of l1-regularization. Part of the attraction is the variable selection effect: parsimonious models are obtained, which are very suitable for interpretation. In terms of predictive power, however, these regularized linear models are often slightly inferior to machine learning procedures like tree ensembles. Tree ensembles, on the other hand, lack usually a formal way of variable selection and are difficult to visualize. A Garrote-style convex penalty for trees ensembles, in particular Random Forests, is proposed. The penalty selects functional groups of nodes in the trees. These could be as simple as monotone functions of individual predictor variables. This yields a parsimonious function fit, which lends itself easily to visualization and interpretation. The predictive power is maintained at least at the same level as the original tree ensemble. A key feature of the method is that, once a tree ensemble is fitted, no further tuning parameter needs to be selected. The empirical performance is demonstrated on a wide array of datasets.

Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the alternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is produced. However, when there are many alternatives, it is impractical to simply ask agents to report their complete preferences. Rather, the agents' preferences, or at least the relevant parts thereof, need to be elicited. This is done by asking the agents a (hopefully small) number of simple queries about their preferences, such as comparison queries, which ask an agent to compare two of the alternatives. Prior work on preference elicitation in voting has focused on the case of unrestricted preferences. It has been shown that in this setting, it is sometimes necessary to ask each agent (almost) as many queries as would be required to determine an arbitrary ranking of the alternatives. In contrast, in this paper, we focus on single-peaked preferences. We show that such preferences can be elicited using only a linear number of comparison queries, if either the order with respect to which preferences are single-peaked is known, or at least one other agent's complete preferences are known. We show that using a sublinear number of queries does not suffice. We also consider the case of cardinally single-peaked preferences. For this case, we show that if the alternatives' cardinal positions are known, then an agent's preferences can be elicited using only a logarithmic number of queries; however, we also show that if the cardinal positions are not known, then a sublinear number of queries does not suffice. We present experimental results for all elicitation algorithms. We also consider the problem of only eliciting enough information to determine the aggregate ranking, and show that even for this more modest objective, a sublinear number of queries per agent does not suffice for known ordinal or unknown cardinal positions. Finally, we discuss whether and how these techniques can be applied when preferences are almost single-peaked.

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e., maximise social utility) and individually rational (i.e., agents prefer to join rather than opt out). However, an important assumption of these mechanisms is that the agents will "always" successfully complete their allocated tasks. Clearly, this assumption is unrealistic in many real-world applications, where agents can, and often do, fail in their endeavours. Moreover, whether an agent is deemed to have failed may be perceived differently by different agents. Such subjective perceptions about an agent's probability of succeeding at a given task are often captured and reasoned about using the notion of "trust". Given this background, in this paper we investigate the design of novel mechanisms that take into account the trust between agents when allocating tasks. Specifically, we develop a new class of mechanisms, called "trust-based mechanisms", that can take into account multiple subjective measures of the probability of an agent succeeding at a given task and produce allocations that maximise social utility, whilst ensuring that no agent obtains a negative utility. We then show that such mechanisms pose a challenging new combinatorial optimisation problem (that is NP-complete), devise a novel representation for solving the problem, and develop an effective integer programming solution (that can solve instances with about 2x10^5 possible allocations in 40 seconds).

Every evil leaves a sorrow in the memory, until the supreme evil, death, wipes out all memories together with all life. In particular: Much of current ethics is based on the sanctity of human life. Research in articial life will affect our understanding of life and death (...) This, like the theory of evolution, will have major social consequences for human cultural practices such as religion. Throughout history there have been several explanations to both life and death, and it seems unfeasible that a consensus will be reached. Thus, we are faced with multiple notions of life, which imply different notions of death.