In the past years we developed several design processes (Chella et Perception, also including memory, is one of the most important al. 2006)(Cossentino and Seidita 2004)(Cossentino, Gaglio, features a robotic system must present. In (Chella and Seidita) following the approach based on Situational and Manzotti 2007) it is argued that a perception process can Method Engineering paradigm we fixed in these years be modelled and implemented as a continuous interaction (Cossentino et al. 2007)(Seidita et al. 2009). In the following loop among brain, body and environment; by continuously subsections an overview on the used SME approach, comparing actual and expected "data" coming from the environment the PASSI design process, and the robot perception loop will the robot achieves the ability to gain perceptual be given.

The development of artificial intelligence systems has to date been largely one of manual labor. This Constructionist approach to A.I. has resulted in a diverse set of isolated solutions to relatively small problems. Small success stories of putting these pieces together in robotics, for example, has made people optimistic that continuing on this path would lead to artificial general intelligence. This is unlikely. "The A.I. problem" has been divided up without much guidance from science or theory, resulting in a fragmentation of the research community and a set of grossly incompatible approaches. Standard software development methods come with serious limitations in scaling; in A.I. the Constructionist approach results in systems with limited domain application and severe performance brittleness. Genuine integration, as required for general intelligence, is therefore practically and theoretically precluded. Yet going beyond current A.I. systems requires significantly more complex integration than attempted to date, especially regarding transversal functions such as attention and learning. The only way to address the challenge is replacing top-down architectural design as a major development methodology with methods focusing on self-generated code and self-organizing architectures. I call this Constructivist A.I., in reference to the self-constructive principles on which it must be based. Methodologies employed for Constructivist A.I. will be very different from today's software development methods. In this paper I describe the argument in detail and examine some of the implications of this impending paradigm shift.

In the The use of argumentation for decision support is not new, remainder of the paper, we motivate our approach by using a with a long history of studies such as (Amgoud and Prade group decision making setting in clinical oncology, present a 2009; Amgoud and Vesic 2009; Amgoud, Dimopoulos, and formal framework, and procedural basis for mixed initiative Moraitis 2008; Fox et al. 2007; Amgoud and Prade 2006; argumentation and finally describe a clinical group decision Atkinson, Bench-Capon, and Modgil 2006; Rehg, McBurney, support system that implements this framework.

In discussions about the physical support of conscious experience, a recent trend has been introduced (by Tononi and various colleagues) that measures the capacity of a network to discriminate among different states and integrate the information generated by this discrimination. This capacity to generate and integrate information can be used to understand the information processing in a network and Tononi has claimed that it is also linked to conscious experience. This paper describes experiments in which networks of weightless neurons were used to explore how different connection patterns and architectures affected the effective information generated by a network. The training of these networks using easily recognizable images made it easy to monitor their internal states, and this supports the interpretation of the system using the mental stance, which is described in a companion paper. By applying the same training to different architectures we were also able to study how the informational relationships depended on a combination of training and other dynamic effects.

In this paper, we present a cognitive model of frequency-based decision-making applied to the task of landmine detection. The model is implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture and is strongly constrained by the cognitive primitives of the architecture. We then generalize the model to another task in the domain of macroeconomic decision-making using the same architecture, pursuing theoretical parsimony. We describe each model's representation requirements, assess their fits to the data, and analyze their performance scaling as a function of task and architectural parameters. Efforts to generalize the landmine detection model to macroeconomic decision making showed that reasonable fits to the macro-economic performance data could be achieved by models based either on procedural knowledge or declarative knowledge. This finding underscores the importance of distinguishing between processing strategies employed to execute tasks. Such detail appears needed to understand the neural foundations of frequency-based decision-making.

This paper argues that supervised cognitive growth in artifacts will be very difficult to achieve without detailed knowledge about systems’ internal states. Physical information is too low level to provide a useful understanding of a system’s behavior, and it is more pragmatically useful to take a mental stance towards an artificial system and interpret its actions in terms of mental states. This mental stance is similar to Dennett’s intentional stance, except the ascription of beliefs and rationality in the intentional stance is replaced by the attribution of low level mental states in the mental stance. In some cases it might also be useful to take a conscious stance towards an artificial system that interprets its behavior as the outcome of a conscious decision making process. Since most artifacts lack language, automatic analysis techniques have to be used to identify the contents of their minds, and the second half of this paper suggests how some of the earlier work of Aleksander and Atlas can be applied in this area.

The field of Artificial Intelligence has, for a long time, neglected the role of emotions in human cognition, with few but notable exceptions. This has been motivated in part by the assumption that the emulation of human rationality by a machine is sufficient for attaining general human-level intelligence. This paper reviews neuroscientific results showing empirical evidence, consistently for over a decade, sustaining that emotion mechanisms in the brain play a fundamental role in decision making processes, as well as in cognitive regulation. Moreover, this role takes place regardless of whether the subject is aware of any emotion. These mechanisms are particularly important in social contexts. Lesions in the pathways supporting these mechanisms provoke serious impairments on social behavior. For instance, subjects with lesions in the pathways between the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala are no longer able to sustain an healthy social live, despite their intact intellectual capabilities. Strikingly, these patients are even able to verbally describe what would be the proper social behavior, although are unable to follow it. One important mechanism in social contexts is empathy, fundamental for proper social relations. It has been proposed that empathy is founded on mechanisms analogous to the mirror neurons.

Argumentation is now a very fertile area of research in Artificial Intelligence. Yet, most approaches to reasoning with arguments in AI are based on a normative perspective, relying on intuition as to what constitutes correct reasoning, sometimes aided by purpose-built hypothetical examples. For these models to be useful in agent-human argumentation, they can benefit from an alternative, positivist perspective that takes into account the empirical reality of human reasoning. To give a flavour of the kinds of lessons that this methodology can provide, we report on a psychological study exploring simple reinstatement in argumentation semantics. Empirical results show that while reinstatement is cognitively plausible in principle, it does not yield full recovery of the argument status, a notion not captured in Dung's classical model. This result suggests some possible avenues for research relevant to making formal models of argument more useful.

There are two aspects of practical reasoning which present particular difficulties for current approaches to modelling practical reasoning through argumentation: temporal aspects, and the intrinsic worth of actions. Time is important because actions change the state of the world, we need to consider future states as well as past and present ones. Equally, it is often not what we do but the way that we do it that matters: the same future state may be reachable either through desirable or undesirable actions, and often also actions are done for their own sake rather than for the sake of their consequences. In this paper we will present a semantics for practical reasoning, based on a formalisation developed originally for reasoning about commands, in which actions and states are treated as of equal status. We will show how using these semantics facilitates the handling of the temporal aspects of practical reasoning, and enables, where appropriate, justification of actions without reference to their consequences.

This paper claims for a shift towards "the formal sciences" in the cognitive sciences. In order to explain the phenomenon of cognition, including aspects such as learning and intelligence, it is necessary to explore the concepts and methodologies offered by the formal sciences. In particular, category theory is proposed as the most fitting tool for the building of an unified theory of cognition. This paper proposes a radically new view based in category theory is provided. A cognitive model is informally defined as a mapping between two different structures, while a structure is the set of components of a system and their relationships. Put formally in categorical terms, a model is a functor between categories that reflects the structural invariance between them. In the paper, the theory of categories is presented as the best possible framework to deal with complex system modeling -ie: biologically inspired systems that transcend and offer a much more powerful tool kit to deal with the phenomenon of cognition that other purely verbal tools like the psychological categories that Rosch or Harnad refer.