We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations.We observe that double-peaked preferences capture real-life scenarios and thus complement the well-studied notion of single-peaked preferences. We mainly focus on the case where peaks are equidistant from the agents’ locations and discuss how our results extend to more general settings. We show that most of the results for single-peaked preferences do not directly apply to this setting; this makes the problem essentially more challenging. As our main contribution, we present a simple truthful-in-expectation mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of 1+b/c for both the social and the maximum cost, where b is the distance of the agent from the peak and c is the minimum cost of an agent. For the latter case, we provide a 3/2 lower bound on the approximation ratio of any truthful-in-expectation mechanism. We also study deterministic mechanisms under some natural conditions, proving lower bounds and approximation guarantees. We prove that among a large class of reasonable mechanisms, there is no deterministic mechanism that outpeforms our truthful-in-expectation mechanism.

We study the complexity of deciding if a given profile of incomplete votes (i.e., a profile of partial orders over a given set of alternatives) can be extended to a single-crossing profile of complete votes (total orders). This problem models settings where we have partial knowledge regarding voters' preferences and we would like to understand whether the given preference profile may be single-crossing. We show that this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm when the order of votes is fixed and the input profile consists of top orders, but becomes NP-complete if we are allowed to permute the votes and the input profile consists of weak orders or independent-pairs orders. Also, we identify a number of practical special cases of both problems that admit polynomial-time algorithms.

Computing prices in core-selecting combinatorial auctions is a computationally hard problem. Auctions with many bids can only be solved using a recently proposed core constraint generation (CCG) algorithm, which may still take days on hard instances. In this paper, we present a new algorithm that significantly outperforms the current state of the art. Towards this end, we first provide an alternative definition of the set of core constraints, where each constraint is weakly stronger, and prove that together these constraints define the identical polytope to the previous definition. Using these new theoretical insights we develop two new algorithmic techniques which generate additional constraints in each iteration of the CCG algorithm by 1) exploiting separability in allocative conflicts between participants in the auction, and 2) by leveraging non-optimal solutions. We show experimentally that our new algorithm leads to significant speed-ups on a variety of large combinatorial auction problems. Our work provides new insights into the structure of core constraints and advances the state of the art in fast algorithms for computing core prices in large combinatorial auctions.

We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e., the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agree- ment by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. We then check if this axiom is fulfilled by well-known approval-based voting rules. We show that the answer is negative for most of the rules we consider, with notable exceptions of PAV (Proportional Approval Voting), an extreme version of RAV (Reweighted Approval Voting), and, for a restricted preference domain, MAV (Minimax Approval Voting). We then introduce a stronger version of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules do not. We also consider several other questions related to JR and EJR, including the relationship between JR/EJR and unanimity, and the complexity of the associated algorithmic problems.

Bike sharing systems have been recently adopted by a growing number of cities as a new means of transportation offering citizens a flexible, fast and green alternative for mobility. Users can pick up or drop off the bicycles at a station of their choice without prior notice or time planning. This increased flexibility comes with the challenge of unpredictable and fluctuating demand as well as irregular flow patterns of the bikes. As a result, these systems can incur imbalance problems such as the unavailability of bikes or parking docks at stations. In this light, operators deploy fleets of vehicles which re-distribute the bikes in order to guarantee a desirable service level. Can we engage the users themselves to solve the imbalance problem in bike sharing systems? In this paper, we address this question and present a crowdsourcing mechanism that incentivizes the users in the bike repositioning process by providing them with alternate choices to pick or return bikes in exchange for monetary incentives. We design the complete architecture of the incentives system which employs optimal pricing policies using the approach of regret minimization in online learning. We investigate the incentive compatibility of our mechanism and extensively evaluate it through simulations based on data collected via a survey study. Finally, we deployed the proposed system through a smartphone app among users of a large scale bike sharing system operated by a public transport company, and we provide results from this experimental deployment. To our knowledge, this is the first dynamic incentives system for bikes re-distribution ever deployed in a real-world bike sharing system.

We develop a new approach for a pre-disaster planning problem which consists in computing an optimal investment plan to strengthen a transportation network, given that a future disaster probabilistically destroys links in the network. We show how the problem can be formulated as a non-linear integer program and devise an AI algorithm to solve it. In particular, we introduce a new type of extreme resource constraint and develop a practically efficient propagation algorithm for it. Experiments show several orders of magnitude improvements over existing approaches, allowing us to close an existing real-world benchmark and to solve to optimality other, more challenging benchmarks.

The power output of photovoltaic systems (PVS) increases with the use of effective and efficient solar tracking techniques. However, current techniques suffer from several drawbacks in their tracking policy: (i) they usually do not consider the forecasted or prevailing weather conditions; even when they do, they (ii) rely on complex closed-loop controllers and sophisticated instruments; and (iii) typically, they do not take the energy consumption of the trackers into account. In this paper, we propose a policy iteration method (along with specialized variants), which is able to calculate near-optimal trajectories for effective and efficient day-ahead solar tracking, based on weather forecasts coming from on-line providers. To account for the energy needs of the tracking system, the technique employs a novel and generic consumption model. Our simulations show that the proposed methods can increase the power output of a PVS considerably, when compared to standard solar tracking techniques.

Machine reading is a relatively new field that features computer programs designed to read flowing text and extract fact assertions expressed by the narrative content. This task involves two core technologies: natural language processing (NLP) and information extraction (IE). In this paper we describe a machine reading system that we have developed within a cognitive architecture. We show how we have integrated into the framework several levels of knowledge for a particular domain, ideas from cognitive semantics and construction grammar, plus tools from prior NLP and IE research. The result is a system that is capable of reading and interpreting complex and fairly idiosyncratic texts in the family history domain. We describe the architecture and performance of the system. After presenting the results from several evaluations that we have carried out, we summarize possible future directions.

In recent work, Langley et al. (2014) introduced UMBRA, a systemfor plan and dialogue understanding. The program applies a form of abductive inference to generate explanations incrementally from relational descriptions of observed behavior and knowledge inthe form of rules. Although UMBRA's creators described the systemarchitecture, knowledge, and inferences, along with experimental studies of its operation, they did not provide a formalization of its structures or processes. In this paper, we analyze both aspects  of the architecture in terms of the Situation Calculus — a classicallogic for reasoning about dynamical systems — and give a specification of the inference task the system performs. After this, we state some properties of this formalization thatare desirable for the task of incremental dialogue understanding. We conclude by discussing related work and describing our plans for additional research.

This paper presents an agent-based model of the emergence and transmission of a language system for the expression of logical combinations of propositions. The model assumes the agents have some cognitive capacities for invention, adoption, repair, induction and adaptation, a common vocabulary for basic categories, and the ability to construct complex concepts using recursive combinations of basic categories with logical categories. It also supposes the agents initially do not have a vocabulary for logical categories (i.e. logical connectives), nor grammatical constructions for expressing logical combinations of basic categories through language. The results of the experiments we have performed show that a language system for the expression of logical combinations emerges as a result of a process of self-organisation of the agents' linguistic interactions. Such a language system is concise, because it only uses words and grammatical constructions for three logical categories (i.e. and, or, not). It is also expressive, since it allows the communication of logical combinations of categories of the same complexity as propositional logic formulas, using linguistic devices such as syntactic categories, word order and auxiliary words. Furthermore, it is easy to learn and reliably transmitted across generations, according to the results of our experiments.