Evidential reasoning is now a leading topic in Artificial Intelligence. Evidence is represented by a variety of evidential functions. Evidential reasoning is carried out by certain kinds of fundamental operation on these functions. This paper discusses two of the basic operations on evidential functions, the discount operation and the well-known orthogonal sum operation. We show that the discount operation is not commutative with the orthogonal sum operation, and derive expressions for the two operations applied to the various evidential function.

Valuation networks have been proposed as graphical representations of valuation-based systems (VBSs). The VBS framework is able to capture many uncertainty calculi including probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory, Spohn's epistemic belief theory, and Zadeh's possibility theory. In this paper, we show how valuation networks encode conditional independence relations. For the probabilistic case, the class of probability models encoded by valuation networks includes undirected graph models, directed acyclic graph models, directed balloon graph models, and recursive causal graph models.

Concurrent systems identify systems, either software, hardware or even biological systems, that are characterized by sets of independent actions that can be executed in any order or simultaneously. Computer scientists resort to a causal terminology to describe and analyse the relations between the actions in these systems. However, a thorough discussion about the meaning of causality in such a context has not been developed yet. This paper aims to fill the gap. First, the paper analyses the notion of causation in concurrent systems and attempts to build bridges with the existing philosophical literature, highlighting similarities and divergences between them. Second, the paper analyses the use of counterfactual reasoning in ex-post analysis in concurrent systems (i.e. execution trace analysis).

In this paper some initial work towards a new approach to qualitative reasoning under uncertainty is presented. This method is not only applicable to qualitative probabilistic reasoning, as is the case with other methods, but also allows the qualitative propagation within networks of values based upon possibility theory and Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. The method is applied to two simple networks from which a large class of directed graphs may be constructed. The results of this analysis are used to compare the qualitative behaviour of the three major quantitative uncertainty handling formalisms, and to demonstrate that the qualitative integration of the formalisms is possible under certain assumptions.

The classical propositional assumption-based model is extended to incorporate probabilities for the assumptions. Then it is placed into the framework of evidence theory. Several authors like Laskey, Lehner (1989) and Provan (1990) already proposed a similar point of view, but the first paper is not as much concerned with mathematical foundations, and Provan's paper develops into a different direction. Here we thoroughly develop and present the mathematical foundations of this theory, together with computational methods adapted from Reiter, De Kleer (1987) and Inoue (1992). Finally, recently proposed techniques for computing degrees of support are presented.

This paper presents and discusses several methods for reasoning from inconsistent knowledge bases. A so-called argumentative-consequence relation taking into account the existence of consistent arguments in favor of a conclusion and the absence of consistent arguments in favor of its contrary, is particularly investigated. Flat knowledge bases, i.e. without any priority between their elements, as well as prioritized ones where some elements are considered as more strongly entrenched than others are studied under different consequence relations. Lastly a paraconsistent-like treatment of prioritized knowledge bases is proposed, where both the level of entrenchment and the level of paraconsistency attached to a formula are propagated. The priority levels are handled in the framework of possibility theory.

A key issue in the handling of temporal data is the treatment of persistence; in most approaches it consists in inferring defeasible confusions by extrapolating from the actual knowledge of the history of the world; we propose here a gradual modelling of persistence, following the idea that persistence is decreasing (the further we are from the last time point where a fluent is known to be true, the less certainly true the fluent is); it is based on possibility theory, which has strong relations with other well-known ordering-based approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. We compare our approach with Dean and Kanazawa's probabilistic projection. We give a formal modelling of the decreasing persistence problem. Lastly, we show how to infer nonmonotonic conclusions using the principle of decreasing persistence.

Jeffrey's rule of conditioning has been proposed in order to revise a probability measure by another probability function. We generalize it within the framework of the models based on belief functions. We show that several forms of Jeffrey's conditionings can be defined that correspond to the geometrical rule of conditioning and to Dempster's rule of conditioning, respectively.

Shafer's theory of belief and the Bayesian theory of probability are two alternative and mutually inconsistent approaches toward modelling uncertainty in artificial intelligence. To help reduce the conflict between these two approaches, this paper reexamines expected utility theory-from which Bayesian probability theory is derived. Expected utility theory requires the decision maker to assign a utility to each decision conditioned on every possible event that might occur. But frequently the decision maker cannot foresee all the events that might occur, i.e., one of the possible events is the occurrence of an unforeseen event. So once we acknowledge the existence of unforeseen events, we need to develop some way of assigning utilities to decisions conditioned on unforeseen events. The commonsensical solution to this problem is to assign similar utilities to events which are similar. Implementing this commonsensical solution is equivalent to replacing Bayesian subjective probabilities over the space of foreseen and unforeseen events by random set theory probabilities over the space of foreseen events. This leads to an expected utility principle in which normalized variants of Shafer's commonalities play the role of subjective probabilities. Hence allowing for unforeseen events in decision analysis causes Bayesian probability theory to become much more similar to Shaferian theory.

Argumentation is the process of constructing arguments about propositions, and the assignment of statements of confidence to those propositions based on the nature and relative strength of their supporting arguments. The process is modelled as a labelled deductive system, in which propositions are doubly labelled with the grounds on which they are based and a representation of the confidence attached to the argument. Argument construction is captured by a generalized argument consequence relation based on the ^,--fragment of minimal logic. Arguments can be aggregated by a variety of numeric and symbolic flattening functions. This approach appears to shed light on the common logical structure of a variety of quantitative, qualitative and defeasible uncertainty calculi.