We derive axiomatically the probability function that should be used to make decisions given any form of underlying uncertainty.

The role of inferencing with uncertainty is becoming more important in rule-based expert systems (ES), since knowledge given by a human expert is often uncertain or imprecise. We have succeeded in designing a VLSI chip which can perform an entire inference process based on fuzzy logic. The design of the VLSI fuzzy inference engine emphasizes simplicity, extensibility, and efficiency (operational speed and layout area). It is fabricated in 2.5 um CMOS technology. The inference engine consists of three major components; a rule set memory, an inference processor, and a controller. In this implementation, a rule set memory is realized by a read only memory (ROM). The controller consists of two counters. In the inference processor, one data path is laid out for each rule. The number of the inference rule can be increased adding more data paths to the inference processor. All rules are executed in parallel, but each rule is processed serially. The logical structure of fuzzy inference proposed in the current paper maps nicely onto the VLSI structure. A two-phase nonoverlapping clocking scheme is used. Timing tests indicate that the inference engine can operate at approximately 20.8 MHz. This translates to an execution speed of approximately 80,000 Fuzzy Logical Inferences Per Second (FLIPS), and indicates that the inference engine is suitable for a demanding real-time application. The potential applications include decision-making in the area of command and control for intelligent robot systems, process control, missile and aircraft guidance, and other high performance machines.

After a brief introduction to causal probabilistic networks and the HUGIN approach, the problem of conflicting data is discussed. A measure of conflict is defined, and it is used in the medical diagnostic system MUNIN. Finally, it is discussed how to distinguish between conflicting data and a rare case.

Unaided human decision making appears to systematically violate consistency constraints imposed by normative theories; these biases in turn appear to justify the application of formal decision-analytic models. It is argued that both claims are wrong. In particular, we will argue that the "confirmation bias" is premised on an overly narrow view of how conflicting evidence is and ought to be handled. Effective decision aiding should focus on supporting the contral processes by means of which knowledge is extended into novel situations and in which assumptions are adopted, utilized, and revised. The Non- Monotonic Probabilist represents initial work toward such an aid.

We define a new notion of conditional belief, which plays the same role for Dempster-Shafer belief functions as conditional probability does for probability functions. Our definition is different from the standard definition given by Dempster, and avoids many of the well-known problems of that definition. Just as the conditional probability Pr (lB) is a probability function which is the result of conditioning on B being true, so too our conditional belief function Bel (lB) is a belief function which is the result of conditioning on B being true. We define the conditional belief as the lower envelope (that is, the inf) of a family of conditional probability functions, and provide a closed form expression for it. An alternate way of understanding our definition of conditional belief is provided by considering ideas from an earlier paper [Fagin and Halpern, 1989], where we connect belief functions with inner measures. In particular, we show here how to extend the definition of conditional probability to non measurable sets, in order to get notions of inner and outer conditional probabilities, which can be viewed as best approximations to the true conditional probability, given our lack of information. Our definition of conditional belief turns out to be an exact analogue of our definition of inner conditional probability.

We propose a norm of consistency for a mixed set of defeasible and strict sentences, based on a probabilistic semantics. This norm establishes a clear distinction between knowledge bases depicting exceptions and those containing outright contradictions. We then define a notion of entailment based also on probabilistic considerations and provide a characterization of the relation between consistency and entailment. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency, and provide a simple decision procedure for testing consistency and deciding whether a sentence is entailed by a database. Finally, it is shown that if al1 sentences are Horn clauses, consistency and entailment can be tested in polynomial time.

In an earlier paper, a new theory of measurefree "conditional" objects was presented. In this paper, emphasis is placed upon the motivation of the theory. The central part of this motivation is established through an example involving a knowledge-based system. In order to evaluate combination of evidence for this system, using observed data, auxiliary at tribute and diagnosis variables, and inference rules connecting them, one must first choose an appropriate algebraic logic description pair (ALDP): a formal language or syntax followed by a compatible logic or semantic evaluation (or model). Three common choices- for this highly non-unique choice - are briefly discussed, the logics being Classical Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Probability Logic. In all three,the key operator representing implication for the inference rules is interpreted as the often-used disjunction of a negation (b => a) = (b'v a), for any events a,b. However, another reasonable interpretation of the implication operator is through the familiar form of probabilistic conditioning. But, it can be shown - quite surprisingly - that the ALDP corresponding to Probability Logic cannot be used as a rigorous basis for this interpretation! To fill this gap, a new ALDP is constructed consisting of "conditional objects", extending ordinary Probability Logic, and compatible with the desired conditional probability interpretation of inference rules. It is shown also that this choice of ALDP leads to feasible computations for the combination of evidence evaluation in the example. In addition, a number of basic properties of conditional objects and the resulting Conditional Probability Logic are given, including a characterization property and a developed calculus of relations.

Much artificial intelligence research focuses on the problem of deducing the validity of unobservable propositions or hypotheses from observable evidence.! Many of the knowledge representation techniques designed for this problem encode the relationship between evidence and hypothesis in a directed manner. Moreover, the direction in which evidence is stored is typically from evidence to hypothesis.

Attribute weighting and differential weighting, two major mechanisms for computing context-dependent similarity or dissimilarity measures are studied and compared. A dissimilarity measure based on subset size in the context is proposed and its metrization and application are given. It is also shown that while all attribute weighting dissimilarity measures are metrics differential weighting dissimilarity measures are usually non-metric.

One purpose -- quite a few thinkers would say the main purpose -- of seeking knowledge about the world is to enhance our ability to make good decisions. An item of knowledge that can make no conceivable difference with regard to anything we might do would strike many as frivolous. Whether or not we want to be philosophical pragmatists in this strong sense with regard to everything we might want to enquire about, it seems a perfectly appropriate attitude to adopt toward artificial knowledge systems. If is granted that we are ultimately concerned with decisions, then some constraints are imposed on our measures of uncertainty at the level of decision making. If our measure of uncertainty is real-valued, then it isn't hard to show that it must satisfy the classical probability axioms. For example, if an act has a real-valued utility U(E) if the event E obtains, and the same real-valued utility if the denial of E obtains, so that U(E) = U(-E), then the expected utility of that act must be U(E), and that must be the same as the uncertainty-weighted average of the returns of the act, p-U(E) + q-U('E), where p and q represent the uncertainty of E and-E respectively. But then we must have p + q = 1.