The growing Electric Vehicles' (EVs) popularity among commuters creates new challenges for the smart grid. The most important of them is the uncoordinated EV charging that substantially increases the energy demand peaks, putting the smart grid under constant strain. In order to cope with these peaks the grid needs extra infrastructure, a costly solution. We propose an Adaptive Management of EV Storage (AMEVS) algorithm, implemented through a learning agent that acts on behalf of individual EV owners and schedules EV charging over a weekly horizon. It accounts for individual preferences so that mobility service is not violated but also individual benefit is maximized. We observe that it reshapes the energy demand making it less volatile so that fewer resources are needed to cover peaks. It assumes Vehicle-to-Grid discharging when the customer has excess capacity. Our agent uses Reinforcement Learning trained on real world data to learn individual household consumption behavior and to schedule EV charging. Unlike previous work, AMEVS is a fully distributed approach. We show that AMEVS achieves significant reshaping of the energy demand curve and peak reduction, which is correlated with customer preferences regarding perceived utility of energy availability. Additionally, we show that the average and peak energy prices are reduced as a result of smarter energy use.

Compared to conventional cars, electric vehicles still suffer from a considerably shorter cruising range. Combined with the sparsity of battery loading stations, the complete transition to E-mobility still seems a long way to go. In this paper, we consider the problem of placing as few loading stations as possible such that on any shortest path there are enough to guarantee sufficient energy supply. This means, that EV owners no longer have to plan their trips ahead incorporating loading station locations, and are no longer forced to accept long detours to reach their destinations. We show how to model this problem and introduce heuristics which provide close-to-optimal solutions even in large road networks.

An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties--e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences--the majority relation is antisymmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a rich mathematical theory and many formal results for majoritarian functions assume that the majority relation constitutes a tournament. Moreover, most majoritarian functions have only been defined for tournaments and allow for a variety of generalizations to unrestricted preference profiles, none of which can be seen as the unequivocal extension of the original function. In this paper, we argue that restricting attention to tournaments is justified by the existence of a conservative extension, which inherits most of the commonly considered properties from its underlying tournament solution.

In other words, there is no perfect voting rule that one domains may admit efficient algorithms for social choice could always use, independently of the circumstances. However, problems that are hard for general preferences. This observation this result holds under the assumption that there are no has recently led to a new wave of interest in constraints on the voters' preferences. Thus, a common strategy restricted domains within the computational social choice to circumvent Arrow's theorem is to consider restricted community (Conitzer 2009; Walsh 2007; Faliszewski et al. preference domains, i.e., assume that the voters' preferences 2011; Brandt et al. 2010; Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and have additional structure. It may then be possible to show Hemaspaandra 2011; Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlmann 2013; that various negative consequences of Arrow's theorem do Cornaz, Galand, and Spanjaard 2012; 2013; Skowron et al. not hold.

We present and analyze a mechanism for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem asks to select k out of m available items, so as to maximize the social welfare for autonomous agents with combinatorial preferences (valuation functions) over subsets of items. The CPPP constitutes an abstract model for decision making by autonomous agents and has been shown to present severe computational hardness, in the design of truthful approximation mechanisms. We study a non-truthful mechanism that is, however, practically relevant to multi-agent environments, by virtue of its natural simplicity. It employs an Item Bidding interface, wherein every agent issues a separate bid for the inclusion of each distinct item in the outcome; the k items with the highest sums of bids are chosen and agents are charged according to a VCG-based payment rule. For fairly expressive classes of the agents' valuation functions, we establish existence of socially optimal pure Nash and strong equilibria, that are resilient to coordinated deviations of subsets of agents. Subsequently we derive tight worst-case bounds on the approximation of the optimum social welfare achieved in equilibrium. We show that the mechanism's performance improves with the number of agents that can coordinate, and reaches half of the optimum welfare at strong equilibrium.

The Game Description Language GDL is the standard input language for general game-playing systems. While players can gain a lot of traction by an efficient inference algorithm for GDL, state-of-the-art reasoners suffer from a variant of a classical KR problem, the inferential frame problem. We present a method by which general game players can transform any given game description into a representation that solves this problem. Our experimental results demonstrate that with the help of automatically generated domain knowledge, a significant speedup can thus be obtained for the majority of the game descriptions from the AAAI competition.

In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate p, and a budget. The goal is to ensure that p wins by shifting p higher in some voters' preference orders. However, each such shift request comes at a price (depending on the voter and on the extent of the shift) and we must not exceed the given budget. We study the parameterized computational complexity of Shift Bribery with respect to a number of parameters (pertaining to the nature of the solution sought and the size of the election) and several classes of price functions. When we parameterize Shift Bribery by the number of affected voters, then for each of our voting rules (Borda, Maximin, Copeland) the problem is W[2]-hard. If, instead, we parameterize by the number of positions by which p is shifted in total, then the problem is fixed-parameter tractable for Borda and Maximin, and is W[1]-hard for Copeland. If we parameterize by the budget for the cost of shifting, then the results depend on the price function class. We also show that Shift Bribery tends to be tractable when parameterized by the number of voters, but that the results for the number of candidates are more enigmatic.

Mobile geo-location advertising, where mobile ads are targeted based on a user’s location, has been identified as a key growth factor for the mobile market. As with online advertising, a crucial ingredient for their success is the development of effective economic mechanisms. An important difference is that mobile ads are shown sequentially over time and information about the user can be learned based on their movements. Furthermore, ads need to be shown selectively to prevent ad fatigue. To this end, we introduce, for the first time, a user model and suitable economic mechanisms which take these factors into account. Specifically, we design two truthful mechanisms which produce an advertisement plan based on the user’s movements. One mechanism is allocatively efficient, but requires exponential compute time in the worst case. The other requires polynomial time, but is not allocatively efficient. Finally, we experimentally evaluate the trade off between compute time and efficiency of our mechanisms.

Efficiency--no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off--and strategyproofness--no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by misrepresenting his preferences--are two cornerstones of economics and ubiquitous in important areas such as voting, auctions, or matching markets. Within the context of random assignment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin have shown that two particular notions of efficiency and strategyproofness based on stochastic dominance are incompatible. However, there are various other possibilities of lifting preferences over alternatives to preferences over lotteries apart from stochastic dominance. In this paper, we give an overview of common preference extensions, propose two new ones, and show that the above-mentioned incompatibility can be extended to various other notions of strategyproofness and efficiency in randomized social choice.

We introduce Dramatis, a computational model of suspense based on a reformulation of a psychological definition of the suspense phenomenon. In this reformulation, suspense is correlated with the audience’s ability to generate a plan for the protagonist to avoid an impending negative outcome. Dramatis measures the suspense level by generating such a plan and determining its perceived likelihood of success. We report on three evaluations of Dramatis, including a comparison of Dramatis output to the suspense reported by human readers, as well as ablative tests of Dramatis components. In these studies, we found that Dramatis output corresponded to the suspense ratings given by human readers for stories in three separate domains.