By early July, each paper had been assigned to one supervisor SPC member and one PC member. The algorithm recorded the justifications for each assignment in terms of the specific bid and keyword match. When completed, the reviews were and Its Benefits to Society." The tutorial program was Hyderabad, India, January 6-12, 2007. At the chaired by Cynthia Braezeal. More The theme of the conference was "AI Figure 2 shows the distribution of their course work.

In the process of training Support Vector Machines (SVMs) by decomposition methods, working set selection is an important technique, and some exciting schemes were employed into this field. To improve working set selection, we propose a new model for working set selection in sequential minimal optimization (SMO) decomposition methods. In this model, it selects B as working set without reselection. Some properties are given by simple proof, and experiments demonstrate that the proposed method is in general faster than existing methods.

In anaphora resolution for English, animacy identification can play an integral role in the application of agreement restrictions between pronouns and candidates, and as a result, can improve the accuracy of anaphora resolution systems. In this paper, two methods for animacy identification are proposed and evaluated using intrinsic and extrinsic measures. The first method is a rule-based one which uses information about the unique beginners in WordNet to classify NPs on the basis of their animacy. The second method relies on a machine learning algorithm which exploits a WordNet enriched with animacy information for each sense. The effect of word sense disambiguation on the two methods is also assessed. The intrinsic evaluation reveals that the machine learning method reaches human levels of performance. The extrinsic evaluation demonstrates that animacy identification can be beneficial in anaphora resolution, especially in the cases where animate entities are identified with high precision.

A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are, therefore, computationally infeasible. However, if the optimal outcome is replaced by the results of a sub-optimal algorithm, the resulting mechanism (termed VCG-based) is no longer necessarily truthful. The first part of this paper studies this phenomenon in depth and shows that it is near universal. Specifically, we prove that essentially all reasonable approximations or heuristics for combinatorial auctions as well as a wide class of cost minimization problems yield non-truthful VCG-based mechanisms. We generalize these results for affine maximizers. The second part of this paper proposes a general method for circumventing the above problem. We introduce a modification of VCG-based mechanisms in which the agents are given a chance to improve the output of the underlying algorithm. When the agents behave truthfully, the welfare obtained by the mechanism is at least as good as the one obtained by the algorithm's output. We provide a strong rationale for truth-telling behavior. Our method satisfies individual rationality as well.

In this paper Arabic was investigated from the speech recognition problem point of view. We propose a novel approach to build an Arabic Automated Speech Recognition System (ASR). This system is based on the open source CMU Sphinx-4, from the Carnegie Mellon University. CMU Sphinx is a large-vocabulary; speaker-independent, continuous speech recognition system based on discrete Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). We build a model using utilities from the OpenSource CMU Sphinx. We will demonstrate the possible adaptability of this system to Arabic voice recognition.

In this paper we apply computer-aided theorem discovery technique to discover theorems about strongly equivalent logic programs under the answer set semantics. Our discovered theorems capture new classes of strongly equivalent logic programs that can lead to new program simplification rules that preserve strong equivalence. Specifically, with the help of computers, we discovered exact conditions that capture the strong equivalence between a rule and the empty set, between two rules, between two rules and one of the two rules, between two rules and another rule, and between three rules and two of the three rules.

In this paper we present a general, flexible framework for learning mappings from images to actions by interacting with the environment. The basic idea is to introduce a feature-based image classifier in front of a reinforcement learning algorithm. The classifier partitions the visual space according to the presence or absence of few highly informative local descriptors that are incrementally selected in a sequence of attempts to remove perceptual aliasing. We also address the problem of fighting overfitting in such a greedy algorithm. Finally, we show how high-level visual features can be generated when the power of local descriptors is insufficient for completely disambiguating the aliased states. This is done by building a hierarchy of composite features that consist of recursive spatial combinations of visual features. We demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithms by solving three visual navigation tasks and a visual version of the classical ``Car on the Hill'' control problem.

(MDAI 2007).

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor.

Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Recently, computational complexity has been suggested as a means of precluding strategic behavior. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manipulate, but used NP-hardness as the complexity measure. Such a worst-case analysis may be an insufficient guarantee of resistance to manipulation. Indeed, we demonstrate that NP-hard manipulations may be tractable in the average case. For this purpose, we augment the existing theory of average-case complexity with some new concepts. In particular, we consider elections distributed with respect to junta distributions, which concentrate on hard instances. We use our techniques to prove that scoring protocols are susceptible to manipulation by coalitions, when the number of candidates is constant.