Unlike other forms of spamming, it is difficult to collect a large amount of gold-standard labels for reviews Many existing methods on review spam detection by means of manual effort. Thus, most of these methods considering text content merely utilize simple text [Mukherjee et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013a; Sun et al., features such as content similarity. We explore a 2013] just rely on the ad-hoc or pseudo fake or non-fake novel idea of exploiting text generality for improving labels for model training, such as the labels annotated by spam detection. Besides, apart from the task the Amazon anonymous online workers [Ott et al., 2011; of review spam detection, although there have also Li et al., 2014]. On the other hand, some unsupervised been some works on identifying the review spammers methods have been proposed to detect the individual review (users) and the manipulated offerings (items), spammer [Mukherjee et al., 2013; Lim et al., 2010; no previous works have attempted to solve these Wang et al., 2011] and review spammer groups [Mukherjee et three tasks in a unified model. We have proposed al., 2012]. In addition, time series pattern [Xie et al., 2012], a unified probabilistic graphical model to detect rating distribution [Feng et al., 2012], reviewer graph [Wang et the suspicious review spams, the review spammers al., 2011], and reviewing burstiness [Fei et al., 2013] have also and the manipulated offerings in an unsupervised been applied to identify the review spams in an unsupervised manner.

We propose a new Bayesian model for reliable aggregatio of crowdsourced estimates of real-valued quantities in participatory sensing applications. Existing approaches focus on probabilistic modelling of user’s reliability as the key to accurate aggregation. However, these are either limited to estimating discrete quantities, or require a significant number of reports from each user to accurately model their reliability. To mitigate these issues, we adopt a community-based approach, which reduces the data required to reliably aggregate real-valued estimates, by leveraging correlations between the reporting behaviour of users belonging to different communities. As a result, our method is up to 16.6% more accurate than existing state-of-the-art methods and is up to 49% more effective under data sparsity when used to estimate Wi-Fi hotspot locations in a real-world crowdsourcing application.

Differentiation is an important inference method in Bayesian networks and intervention is a basic notion in causal Bayesian networks. In this paper, we reveal the connection between differentiation and intervention in Bayesian networks. We first encode an intervention as changing a conditional probabilistic table into a partial intervention table. We next introduce a jointree algorithm to compute the full atomic interventions of all nodes with respect to evidence in a Bayesian network. We further discover that an intervention has differential semantics if the intervention variables can reach the evidence in Bayesian networks and the output of the state-of-the-art algorithm is not the differentiation but the intervention of a Bayesian network if the differential nodes cannot reach any one of the evidence nodes. Finally, we present experimental results to demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithm to infer the causal effect in Bayesian networks.

The recent surge of interest in reasoning about probabilistic graphical models has led to the development of various techniques for probabilistic reasoning. Of these, techniques based on weighted model counting are particularly interesting since they can potentially leverage recent advances in unweighted model counting and in propositional satisfiability solving. In this paper, we present a new approach to weighted model counting via reduction to unweighted model counting. Our reduction, which is polynomial-time and preserves the normal form (CNF/DNF) of the input formula, allows us to exploit advances in unweighted model counting to solve weighted model counting instances. Experiments with weighted model counters built using our reduction indicate that these counters performs much better than a state-of-the-art weighted model counter

Weighted voting games allow for studying the distribution of power between agents in situations of collective decision making. While the conventional version of these games assumes that any agent is always ready to cooperate with all others, recently, more involved models have been proposed, where cooperation is subject to restrictions. Following Myerson [1977], such restrictions are typically represented by a graph that expresses available communication links among agents. In this paper, we study the time complexity of computing two well-known power indices - the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index - in the graph-restricted weighted voting games. We show that both are #P-complete and propose a dedicated dynamic-programming algorithm that runs in pseudo-polynomial time for graphs with the bounded treewidth.

We study truthful mechanisms in the context of cake cutting when agents not only value their own pieces of cake but also care for the pieces assigned to other agents. In particular, agents derive benefits or costs from the pieces of cake assigned to other agents. This phenomenon is often referred to as positive or negative externalities. We propose and study the following model: given an allocation, externalities of agents are modeled as percentages of the reported values that other agents have for their pieces. We show that even in this restricted class of externalities, under some natural assumptions, no truthful cake cutting mechanisms exist when externalities are either positive or negative. However, when the percentages agents get from each other are small, we show that there exists a truthful cake cutting mechanism with other desired properties.

Motivated by a radically new peer review system that the National Science Foundation recently experimented with, we study peer review systems in which proposals are reviewed by PIs who have submitted proposals themselves. An (m,k)-selection mechanism asks each PI to review m proposals, and uses these reviews to select (at most) k proposals. We are interested in impartial mechanisms, which guarantee that the ratings given by a PI to others' proposals do not affect the likelihood of the PI's own proposal being selected. We design an impartial mechanism that selects a k-subset of proposals that is nearly as highly rated as the one selected by the non-impartial (abstract version of) the NSF pilot mechanism, even when the latter mechanism has the "unfair" advantage of eliciting honest reviews.

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators — voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard–Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.

Preventing attacks in a computer network is the core problem in network security. We introduce a new game-theoretic model of the interaction between a network administrator who uses limited resource to harden a network and an attacker who follows a multi-stage plan to attack the network. The possible plans of the attacker are compactly represented using attack graphs, while the defender adds fake targets (honeypots) to the network to deceive the attacker. The compact representation of the attacker's strategies presents a computational challenge and finding the best response of the attacker is NP-hard. We present a solution method that first translates an attack graph into an MDP and solves it using policy search with a set of pruning techniques. We present an empirical evaluation of the model and solution algorithms, evaluating scalability, the types of solutions that are generated for realistic cases, and sensitivity analysis.

We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol for two agents in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. For n > 2 agents, a similar impossibility holds, namely there always exists an agent that gets the empty piece (i.e. no cake). In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.