Rumor blocking is a serious problem in large-scale social networks. Malicious rumors could cause chaos in society and hence need to be blocked as soon as possible after being detected. In this paper, we propose a model of dynamic rumor influence minimization with user experience (DRIMUX). Our goal is to minimize the influence of the rumor (i.e., the number of users that have accepted and sent the rumor) by blocking a certain subset of nodes. A dynamic Ising propagation model considering both the global popularity and individual attraction of the rumor is presented based on realistic scenario. In addition, different from existing problems of influence minimization, we take into account the constraint of user experience utility. Specifically, each node is assigned a tolerance time threshold. If the blocking time of each user exceeds that threshold, the utility of the network will decrease. Under this constraint, we then formulate the problem as a network inference problem with survival theory, and propose solutions based on maximum likelihood principle. Experiments are implemented based on large-scale real world networks and validate the effectiveness of our method.

The use of the Monte Carlo playouts as an evaluation function has proved to be a viable, general technique for searching intractable game spaces. This facilitate the use of statistical techniques like Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), but is also known to require significant processing overhead. We seek to improve the quality of information extracted from the Monte Carlo playout in three ways. Firstly, by nesting the evaluation function inside another evaluation function; secondly, by measuring and utilising the depth of the playout; and thirdly, by incorporating pruning strategies that eliminate unnecessary searches and avoid traps. Our experimental data, obtained on a variety of two-player games from past General Game Playing (GGP) competitions and others, demonstrate the usefulness of these techniques in a Nested Player when pitted against a standard, optimised UCT player.

Nowadays, brick-and-mortar stores are finding it extremely difficult to retain their customers due to the ever increasing competition from the online stores. One of the key reasons for this is the lack of personalized shopping experience offered by the brick-and-mortar stores. This work considers the problem of persona based shopping recommendation for such stores to maximize the value for money of the shoppers. For this problem, it proposes a non-polynomial time-complexity optimal dynamic program and a polynomial time-complexity non-optimal heuristic, for making top-k recommendations by taking into account shopper persona and her time and budget constraints. In our empirical evaluations with a mix of real-world data and simulated data, the performance of the heuristic in terms of the persona based recommendations (quantified by similarity scores and items recommended) closely matched (differed by only 8% each with) that of the dynamic program and at the same time heuristic ran at least twice faster compared to the dynamic program.

Over the past two decades, water markets have been successfully fielded in countries such as Australia, the United states, Chile, China, etc. Water users, mainly irrigators, have benefited immensely from water markets. However, the current water market design also faces certain serious barriers. It has been pointed out that transaction costs, which exists in most markets, induce great welfare loss. For example, for water markets in western China discussed in this paper, the influence of transaction costs is significant. Another important barrier is the locality of trades due to geographical constraints. Based on the water market at Xiying Irrigation, one of the most successful water market in western China, we model the water market as a graph with minimum transaction thresholds on edges. Our goal is to maximize the transaction volume or welfare. We prove that the existence of transaction costs results in no polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) to maximize social welfare (MAX SNP-hard). The complexities on special graphs are also presented. From a practical point of view, however, optimal social welfare can be obtained via a well-designed mixed integer linear program and can be approximated near optimally at a large scale via a heuristic algorithm. Both algorithms are tested on data sets generated from real historical trading data. Our study also suggests the importance of reducing transaction costs, for example, institutional costs in water market design. Our work opens a potentially important avenue of market design within the agenda of computational sustainability.

In this paper we expand the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition to a setting where clients do not necessarily choose their closest candidate (retail product or political). Specifically, we consider a setting where clients may disavow all candidates if there is no candidate that is sufficiently close to the client preferences. Moreover, if there are multiple candidates that are sufficiently close, the client may choose amongst them at random. We show the existence of Nash Equilibria for some such models, and study the price of anarchy and stability in such scenarios.

In a Fisher market game, a market equilibrium is computed in terms of the utility functions and money endowments that agents reported. As a consequence, an individual buyer may misreport his private information to obtain a utility gain. We investigate the extent to which an agent's utility can be increased by unilateral strategic plays and prove that the percentage of this improvement is at most 2 for markets with weak gross substitute utilities. Equivalently, we show that truthfully reporting is a 0.5-approximate Nash equilibrium in this game. To identify sufficient conditions for truthfully reporting being close to Nash equilibrium, we conduct a parameterized study on strategic behaviors and further show that the ratio of utility gain decreases linearly as buyer's initial endowment increases or his maximum share of an item decreases. Finally, we consider collusive behavior of a coalition and prove that the utility gain is bounded by 1/(1 - maximum share of the collusion). Our findings justify the truthful reporting assumption in Fisher markets by a quantitative study on participants incentive, and imply that under large market assumption, the utility gain of a buyer from manipulations diminishes to 0.

We introduce a roommate market model, in which 2n people need to be assigned to n rooms, with two people in each room. Each person has a valuation to each room, as well as a valuation to each of other people as a roommate. Each room has a rent shared by the two people living in the room, and we need to decide who live together in which room and how much each should pay. Various solution concepts on stability and envy-freeness are proposed, with their existence studied and the computational complexity of the corresponding search problems analyzed. In particular, we show that maximizing the social welfare is NP-hard, and we give a polynomial time algorithm that achieves at least 2/3 of the maximum social welfare. Finally, we demonstrate a pricing scheme that can achieve envy-freeness for each room.

We study efficient algorithms for a natural learning problem in markets. There is one seller with m divisible goods and n buyers with unknown individual utility functions and budgets of money. The seller can repeatedly announce prices and observe aggregate demand bundles requested by the buyers. The goal of the seller is to learn the utility functions and budgets of the buyers. Our scenario falls into the classic domain of ''revealed preference'' analysis. Problems with revealed preference have recently started to attract increased interest in computer science due to their fundamental nature in understanding customer behavior in electronic markets. The goal of revealed preference analysis is to observe rational agent behavior, to explain it using a suitable model for the utility functions, and to predict future agent behavior. Our results are the first polynomial-time algorithms to learn utility and budget parameters via revealed preference queries in classic Fisher markets with multiple buyers. Our analysis concentrates on linear, CES, and Leontief markets, which are the most prominent classes studied in the literature. Some of our results extend to general Arrow-Debreu exchange markets.

We study an important crowdsourcing setting where agents evaluate one another and, based on these evaluations, a subset of agents are selected. This setting is ubiquitous when peer review is used for distributing awards in a team, allocating funding to scientists, and selecting publications for conferences. The fundamental challenge when applying crowdsourcing in these settings is that agents may misreport their reviews of others to increase their chances of being selected. We propose a new strategyproof (impartial) mechanism called Dollar Partition that satisfies desirable axiomatic properties. We then show, using a detailed experiment with parameter values derived from target real world domains, that our mechanism performs better on average, and in the worst case, than other strategyproof mechanisms in the literature.

With the rapid development of urbanization and public transportation system, the number of traffic accidents have significantly increased globally over the past decades and become a big problem for human society. Facing these possible and unexpected traffic accidents, understanding what causes traffic accident and early alarms for some possible ones will play a critical role on planning effective traffic management. However, due to the lack of supported sensing data, research is very limited on the field of updating traffic accident risk in real-time. Therefore, in this paper, we collect big and heterogeneous data (7 months traffic accident data and 1.6 million users' GPS records) to understand how human mobility will affect traffic accident risk. By mining these data, we develop a deep model of Stack denoise Autoencoder to learn hierarchical feature representation of human mobility. And these features are used for efficient prediction of traffic accident risk level. Once the model has been trained, our model can simulate corresponding traffic accident risk map with given real-time input of human mobility. The experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of our model and suggest that traffic accident risk can be significantly more predictable through human mobility.