If you are looking for an answer to the question What is Artificial Intelligence? and you only have a minute, then here's the definition the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence offers on its home page: "the scientific understanding of the mechanisms underlying thought and intelligent behavior and their embodiment in machines."
However, if you are fortunate enough to have more than a minute, then please get ready to embark upon an exciting journey exploring AI (but beware, it could last a lifetime) …
The theory of rational choice assumes that when people make decisions they do so in order to maximize their utility. In order to achieve this goal they ought to use all the information available and consider all the choices available to choose an optimal choice. This paper investigates what happens when decisions are made by artificially intelligent machines in the market rather than human beings. Firstly, the expectations of the future are more consistent if they are made by an artificially intelligent machine and the decisions are more rational and thus marketplace becomes more rational.
Daniel John Zizzo Hertford College, Oxford University Economists usually assume preferences as given. I argue that, at least in the case of interdependent preferences, this may be deeply misleading. I review work from framing studies, public goods experiments, attutudes towards risk, happiness measurement, consumption, the labour market and ethics and economics, suggesting that interdependent preferences may depend on cognitive factors. Economists tend to assume preferences as given (Becker and Stigler, 1977). They are the ultimate exogenous variable - the basic and stable block on which economic models are built -. The exogeneity principle has been betrayed at times.
Recent experimental evidence (Damasio 1994), (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio 1997), suggests that emotions, rather than being sand in the machinery of rationality, are a condition of possibility of rational decision. The main goal of this paper is to present a model of the functional role of emotions in decision making. The offered model applies ideas first presented in (Simon 1967) to the problem of rational decision. The model is then used in order to interpret the experimental evidence and in order to suggest possible applications in knowledge representation. It is proposed that three aspects of choice require the kind of'interrupting control' hypothesized by Simon: (a) the specification of a feasible set, (b) the determination of mechanisms for picking, rather than choosing, in ties, and (c) the use and selection of heuristics. The application of normative theories of choice, which are partition-sensitive, like the one presented in (Savage 1972), require at least, the specification of the first two parameters. Emotions seem to play a fundamental role in setting those parameters, and therefore in applying normative theories of choice.
Consider the actions wiggle your finger, walk across the room, make a cup of coffee, vacation in Afghanistan, save the world. Some of these, like make a cup of coffee, are typical of the kinds of actions that a theory of rational choice should concern. For example, classical decision theory is intended to capture reasoning like the following: Should I make a cup of coffee, or work in the garden? I would get more immediate gratification out of having a cup of coffee, but it would make me edgy later. If I work in the garden, I will sleep well tonight.
Conventional praxeologies are built on the paradigm of rational choice, which comprises the two companion premises of totally-ordered preferences and individual rationality. Exclusive self-interest when negotiating, however, engenders a pessimistic and defensive attitude, and limits the ability of a decision maker to accommodate the interests of others, and therefore may unnecessarily constrain the negotiability of a decision maker, particularly in cooperative environments. This paper provides a distinct alternative to the hyperrationality of conventional rational choice by waiving reliance on the individual rationality premise and offering an approach to negotiatory decision making that is based on a well-defined mathematical notion of satisficing, or being good enough, that permits the modeling of complex interrelationships between agents, including cooperation, unselfishness, and altruism.
The economic theory of rationality promises to equal mathematical logic in its importance for the mechaniz* tion of reasoning. We survey the growing literature on how the basic notions of probability, utility, and rational choice, coupled with practical limitations on information and resources, influence the design and analysis of reasoning and representation systems.