Hayes, P. J.

The logic of frames


I will assume, below, that frames were put forward as a (set of ideas for the design of a) formal language for expressing knowledge, to be considered as an alternative to, for example, semantic networks or predicate calculus. That's what makes a formal language into a representational language: its expressions carry meaning. For example, we might have a frame representing a typical house, with slots called kitchen, bathroom, bedrooms, lavatory, room-with- TVin-it, owner, address, etc.. A particular house is then to be represented by an instance of this house frame, obtained by filling in the slots with specifications of the corresponding parts of the particular house, so that, for example, the kitchen slot may be filled by an instance of the frame contemporary-kitchen which has slots cooker, floorcovering, sink, cleanliness, etc., which may contain in turn respectively an instance of the split-level frame, the identifier vinyl, an instance of the double-drainer frame, and the identifier '13' (for "very clean"), say. Thus, if an instance (call it G00097) of the house frame has its slot called kitchen filled with a frame instance called, say G00082, then this means that the relationship kitchen (or, better, is kitchen of) holds between G00097 and G00082.

Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence


We may regard the subject of artificial intelligence as beginning with Turing's article'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' (Turing 1950) and with Shannon's (1950) discussion of how a machine might be programmed to play chess. In this case we have to say that a machine is intelligent if it solves certain classes of problems requiring intelligence in humans, or survives in an intellectually demanding environment. However, we regard the construction of intelligent machines as fact manipulators as being the best bet both for constructing artificial intelligence and understanding natural intelligence. Given this notion of intelligence the following kinds of problems arise in constructing the epistemological part of an artificial intelligence: I.