Babichenko, Yakov, Garber, Dan

We consider the forecast aggregation problem in repeated settings, where the forecasts are done on a binary event. At each period multiple experts provide forecasts about an event. The goal of the aggregator is to aggregate those forecasts into a subjective accurate forecast. We assume that experts are Bayesian; namely they share a common prior, each expert is exposed to some evidence, and each expert applies Bayes rule to deduce his forecast. The aggregator is ignorant with respect to the information structure (i.e., distribution over evidence) according to which experts make their prediction. The aggregator observes the experts' forecasts only. At the end of each period the actual state is realized. We focus on the question whether the aggregator can learn to aggregate optimally the forecasts of the experts, where the optimal aggregation is the Bayesian aggregation that takes into account all the information (evidence) in the system. We consider the class of partial evidence information structures, where each expert is exposed to a different subset of conditionally independent signals. Our main results are positive; We show that optimal aggregation can be learned in polynomial time in a quite wide range of instances of the partial evidence environments. We provide a tight characterization of the instances where learning is possible and impossible.

We introduce a new recursive aggregation procedure called Bernstein Online Aggregation (BOA). The exponential weights include an accuracy term and a second order term that is a proxy of the quadratic variation as in Hazan and Kale (2010). This second term stabilizes the procedure that is optimal in different senses. We first obtain optimal regret bounds in the deterministic context. Then, an adaptive version is the first exponential weights algorithm that exhibits a second order bound with excess losses that appears first in Gaillard et al. (2014). The second order bounds in the deterministic context are extended to a general stochastic context using the cumulative predictive risk. Such conversion provides the main result of the paper, an inequality of a novel type comparing the procedure with any deterministic aggregation procedure for an integrated criteria. Then we obtain an observable estimate of the excess of risk of the BOA procedure. To assert the optimality, we consider finally the iid case for strongly convex and Lipschitz continuous losses and we prove that the optimal rate of aggregation of Tsybakov (2003) is achieved. The batch version of the BOA procedure is then the first adaptive explicit algorithm that satisfies an optimal oracle inequality with high probability.

Awad, Edmond, Caminada, Martin, Pigozzi, Gabriella, Podlaszewski, Mikołaj, Rahwan, Iyad

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the nature of agents' preferences.

Caminada, Martin (University of Luxembourg) | Pigozzi, Gabriella (Université) | Podlaszewski, Mikołaj (Paris Dauphine)

Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needsto reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. Thisproblem has been recently investigated by Caminada and Pigozzi. In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of two of such operators from a socialchoice-theoretic point of view. In particular, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.

Frongillo, Rafael M. (Harvard University) | Chen, Yiling (Harvard University) | Kash, Ian A. (Microsoft Research)

We study the problem of eliciting and aggregating probabilistic information from multiple agents. In order to successfully aggregate the predictions of agents, the principal needs to elicit some notion of confidence from agents, capturing how much experience or knowledge led to their predictions. To formalize this, we consider a principal who wishes to learn the distribution of a random variable. A group of Bayesian agents has each privately observed some independent samples of the random variable. The principal wishes to elicit enough information from each agent, so that her posterior is the same as if she had directly received all of the samples herself. Leveraging techniques from Bayesian statistics, we represent confidence as the number of samples an agent has observed, which is quantified by a hyperparameter from a conjugate family of prior distributions. This then allows us to show that if the principal has access to a few samples, she can achieve her aggregation goal by eliciting predictions from agents using proper scoring rules. In particular, with access to one sample, she can successfully aggregate the agents' predictions if and only if every posterior predictive distribution corresponds to a unique value of the hyperparameter, a property which holds for many common distributions of interest. When this uniqueness property does not hold, we construct a novel and intuitive mechanism where a principal with two samples can elicit and optimally aggregate the agents' predictions.