Collaborating Authors

Strong Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Unsupervised Machine Learning Models Machine Learning

Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) models have achieved state-of-the-art performance on multiple learning tasks, from vision to natural language modelling. With the growing adoption of ML and DL to many areas of computer science, recent research has also started focusing on the security properties of these models. There has been a lot of work undertaken to understand if (deep) neural network architectures are resilient to black-box adversarial attacks which craft perturbed input samples that fool the classifier without knowing the architecture used. Recent work has also focused on the transferability of adversarial attacks and found that adversarial attacks are generally easily transferable between models, datasets, and techniques. However, such attacks and their analysis have not been covered from the perspective of unsupervised machine learning algorithms. In this paper, we seek to bridge this gap through multiple contributions. We first provide a strong (iterative) black-box adversarial attack that can craft adversarial samples which will be incorrectly clustered irrespective of the choice of clustering algorithm. We choose 4 prominent clustering algorithms, and a real-world dataset to show the working of the proposed adversarial algorithm. Using these clustering algorithms we also carry out a simple study of cross-technique adversarial attack transferability.

Patternless Adversarial Attacks on Video Recognition Networks Machine Learning

Deep neural networks for classification of videos, just like image classification networks, may be subjected to adversarial manipulation. The main difference between image classifiers and video classifiers is that the latter usually use temporal information contained within the video in the form of optical flow or implicitly by various differences between adjacent frames. In this work we present a manipulation scheme for fooling video classifiers by introducing a spatial patternless temporal perturbation that is practically unnoticed by human observers and undetectable by leading image adversarial pattern detection algorithms. After demonstrating the manipulation of action classification of single videos, we generalize the procedure to make adversarial patterns with temporal invariance that generalizes across different classes for both targeted and untargeted attacks.



This package implements the experiments described in the paper Countering Adversarial Images Using Input Transformations. It contains implementations for adversarial attacks, defenses based image transformations, training, and testing convolutional networks under adversarial attacks using our defenses. We also provide pre-trained models.

Image-scaling attacks highlight dangers of adversarial machine learning


This article is part of our reviews of AI research papers, a series of posts that explore the latest findings in artificial intelligence. We usually don't expect the image of a teacup to turn into a cat when we zoom out. But in the world of artificial intelligence research, strange things can happen. Researchers at Germany's Technische Universität Braunschweig have shown that carefully modifying the pixel values of digital photos can turn them into a completely different image when they are downscaled. What's concerning is the implications these modifications can have for AI algorithms.

Fast Geometrically-Perturbed Adversarial Faces Machine Learning

The state-of-the-art performance of deep learning algorithms has led to a considerable increase in the utilization of machine learning in security-sensitive and critical applications. However, it has recently been shown that a small and carefully crafted perturbation in the input space can completely fool a deep model. In this study, we explore the extent to which face recognition systems are vulnerable to geometrically-perturbed adversarial faces. We propose a fast landmark manipulation method for generating adversarial faces, which is approximately 200 times faster than the previous geometric attacks and obtains 99.86% success rate on the state-of-the-art face recognition models. To further force the generated samples to be natural, we introduce a second attack constrained on the semantic structure of the face which has the half speed of the first attack with the success rate of 99.96%. Both attacks are extremely robust against the state-of-the-art defense methods with the success rate of equal or greater than 53.59%. Code is available at