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AI Magazine

The contributions to this workshop indicate substantial advances in the technical foundations of the field. They also show that it is time to evaluate the existing approaches to commonsense reasoning problems. The Second International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning was held from 12-16 June 1988 in Grassau, a small village near Lake Chiemsee in southern Germany. It was jointly organized by Johan de Kleer, Matthew Ginsberg, Erik Sandewall, and myself. Financial support for the workshop came from the American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), The European Communities (Project Cost-13), Linköping University, and SIEMENS AG.


Second International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning

AI Magazine

The contributions to this workshop indicate substantial advances in the technical foundations of the field. They also show that it is time to evaluate the existing approaches to commonsense reasoning problems.


Second International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning

AI Magazine

The contributions to this workshop indicate substantial advances in the technical foundations of the field. They also show that it is time to evaluate the existing approaches to commonsense reasoning problems.


AAAI91-054.pdf

AAAI Conferences

Research on nonmonotonic temporal reasoning in general, and the Yale Shooting Problem in particular, has suffered from the absence of a criterion against which to evaluate solutions. Indeed, researchers in the area disagree not only on the solutions but also on the problems. We propose a formal yet intuitive criterion by which to evaluate theories of actions, define a monotonic class of theories that satisfy this criterion, and then provide their provably-correct nonmonotonic counterpart.


Preferences and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

AI Magazine

Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.