Preferences and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

AI Magazine

Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.


The Fourth International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning

AI Magazine

The Fourth International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning brought together active researchers in nonmonotonic reasoning to discuss current research, results, and problems of both theoretical and practical natures. There was lively discussion on a number of issues, including future research directions for the field.


Nonmonotonic Modes of Inference

AAAI Conferences

In this paper we investigate nonmonotonic'modes of inference'. Our approach uses modal (conditional) logic to establish a uniform framework in which to study nonmonotonic consequence. We consider a particular mode of inference which employs a majority-based account of default reasoning--one which differs from the more familiar preferential accounts--and show how modal logic supplies a framework which facilitates analysis of, and comparison with more traditional formulations of nonmonotonic consequence.



Default geasoning, Nonmonotonic Logics, and the Frame Problem

AAAI Conferences

Nonmonotonic formal systems have been proposed as an extension to classical first-order logic that will capture the process of human "default reasoning" or "plausible inference" through their inference mechanisms just