Aggregative deontic detachment is a new form of deontic detachment that keeps track of previously detached obligations. We argue that it handles iteration of successive detachments in a more principled manner than the traditional systems do. To study this new form of deontic detachment, we introduce a 'minimal' logic for aggregative deontic detachment, and we discuss various properties of the logic.
The area of formal ethics is experiencing a shift from a unique or standard approach to normative reasoning, as exemplified by so-called standard deontic logic, to a variety of application-specific theories. However, the adequate handling of normative concepts such as obligation, permission, prohibition, and moral commitment is challenging, as illustrated by the notorious paradoxes of deontic logic. In this article we introduce an approach to design and evaluate theories of normative reasoning. In particular, we present a formal framework based on higher-order logic, a design methodology, and we discuss tool support. Moreover, we illustrate the approach using an example of an implementation, we demonstrate different ways of using it, and we discuss how the design of normative theories is now made accessible to non-specialist users and developers.
A significant part of the literature in deontic logic revolves around the discussions of puzzles and paradoxes which show that certain logical systems are not acceptable--typically, this happens with deontic KD, i.e., Standard Deontic Logic (SDL)--or which suggest that obligations and permissions should enjoy some desirable properties. One well-known puzzle is the the so-called Free Choice Permission paradox, which was originated by the following remark by von Wright in [23, p. 21]: "On an ordinary understanding of the phrase'it is permitted that', the formula'P(p q)' seems to entail'Pp Pq'. If I say to somebody'you may work or relax' I normally mean that the person addressed has my permission to work and also my permission to relax. It is up to him to choose between the two alternatives." Usually, this intuition is formalised by the following schema: P(p q) (Pp Pq) (FCP) Many problems have been discussed in the literature around FCP: for a comprehensive overview, discussion, and some solutions, see [11, 14, 20]. Three basic difficulties can be identified, among the others [11, p. 43]: - Problem 1: Permission Explosion Problem - "That if anything is permissible, then everything is, and thus it would also be a theorem that nothing is obligatory," , for example "If you may order a soup, then it is not true that you ought to pay the bill" ;
Electronic contracts are the cornerstone of this framework and contractual agents manipulate these abstractions to specify business relationships and to automate their execution. We first define the concepts and the formalism used to model electronic contracts. Based on the dynamic nature of these concepts, we introduce a collaborative protocol used by contractual agents to synchronize their views on contractual commitments. Lastly, we present the conceptual architecture and the high-level reasoning process of contractual agents.
Deontic logic is shown to be applicable for modelling human reasoning. For this the Wason selection task and the suppression task are discussed in detail. Different versions of modelling norms with deontic logic are introduced and in the case of the Wason selection task it is demonstrated how differences in the performance of humans in the abstract and in the social contract case can be explained. Furthermore it is shown that an automated theorem prover can be used as a reasoning tool for deontic logic.