### Learning From What You Don't Observe

The process of diagnosis involves learning about the state of a system from various observations of symptoms or findings about the system. Sophisticated Bayesian (and other) algorithms have been developed to revise and maintain beliefs about the system as observations are made. Nonetheless, diagnostic models have tended to ignore some common sense reasoning exploited by human diagnosticians; In particular, one can learn from which observations have not been made, in the spirit of conversational implicature. There are two concepts that we describe to extract information from the observations not made. First, some symptoms, if present, are more likely to be reported before others. Second, most human diagnosticians and expert systems are economical in their data-gathering, searching first where they are more likely to find symptoms present. Thus, there is a desirable bias toward reporting symptoms that are present. We develop a simple model for these concepts that can significantly improve diagnostic inference.

### Integrating Probabilistic, Taxonomic and Causal Knowledge in Abductive Diagnosis

We propose an abductive diagnosis theory that integrates probabilistic, causal and taxonomic knowledge. Probabilistic knowledge allows us to select the most likely explanation; causal knowledge allows us to make reasonable independence assumptions; taxonomic knowledge allows causation to be modeled at different levels of detail, and allows observations be described in different levels of precision. Unlike most other approaches where a causal explanation is a hypothesis that one or more causative events occurred, we define an explanation of a set of observations to be an occurrence of a chain of causation events. These causation events constitute a scenario where all the observations are true. We show that the probabilities of the scenarios can be computed from the conditional probabilities of the causation events. Abductive reasoning is inherently complex even if only modest expressive power is allowed. However, our abduction algorithm is exponential only in the number of observations to be explained, and is polynomial in the size of the knowledge base. This contrasts with many other abduction procedures that are exponential in the size of the knowledge base.

### A Measure-Free Approach to Conditioning

In an earlier paper, a new theory of measurefree "conditional" objects was presented. In this paper, emphasis is placed upon the motivation of the theory. The central part of this motivation is established through an example involving a knowledge-based system. In order to evaluate combination of evidence for this system, using observed data, auxiliary at tribute and diagnosis variables, and inference rules connecting them, one must first choose an appropriate algebraic logic description pair (ALDP): a formal language or syntax followed by a compatible logic or semantic evaluation (or model). Three common choices- for this highly non-unique choice - are briefly discussed, the logics being Classical Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Probability Logic. In all three,the key operator representing implication for the inference rules is interpreted as the often-used disjunction of a negation (b => a) = (b'v a), for any events a,b. However, another reasonable interpretation of the implication operator is through the familiar form of probabilistic conditioning. But, it can be shown - quite surprisingly - that the ALDP corresponding to Probability Logic cannot be used as a rigorous basis for this interpretation! To fill this gap, a new ALDP is constructed consisting of "conditional objects", extending ordinary Probability Logic, and compatible with the desired conditional probability interpretation of inference rules. It is shown also that this choice of ALDP leads to feasible computations for the combination of evidence evaluation in the example. In addition, a number of basic properties of conditional objects and the resulting Conditional Probability Logic are given, including a characterization property and a developed calculus of relations.

### SAT Solvers and Computer Algebra Systems: A Powerful Combination for Mathematics

Over the last few decades, many distinct lines of research aimed at automating mathematics have been developed, including computer algebra systems (CASs) for mathematical modelling, automated theorem provers for first-order logic, SAT/SMT solvers aimed at program verification, and higher-order proof assistants for checking mathematical proofs. More recently, some of these lines of research have started to converge in complementary ways. One success story is the combination of SAT solvers and CASs (SAT+CAS) aimed at resolving mathematical conjectures. Many conjectures in pure and applied mathematics are not amenable to traditional proof methods. Instead, they are best addressed via computational methods that involve very large combinatorial search spaces. SAT solvers are powerful methods to search through such large combinatorial spaces---consequently, many problems from a variety of mathematical domains have been reduced to SAT in an attempt to resolve them. However, solvers traditionally lack deep repositories of mathematical domain knowledge that can be crucial to pruning such large search spaces. By contrast, CASs are deep repositories of mathematical knowledge but lack efficient general search capabilities. By combining the search power of SAT with the deep mathematical knowledge in CASs we can solve many problems in mathematics that no other known methods seem capable of solving. We demonstrate the success of the SAT+CAS paradigm by highlighting many conjectures that have been disproven, verified, or partially verified using our tool MathCheck. These successes indicate that the paradigm is positioned to become a standard method for solving problems requiring both a significant amount of search and deep mathematical reasoning. For example, the SAT+CAS paradigm has recently been used by Heule, Kauers, and Seidl to find many new algorithms for $3\times3$ matrix multiplication.

### Plan Recognition in Stories and in Life

Plan recognition does not work the same way in stories and in "real life" (people tend to jump to conclusions more in stories). We present a theory of this, for the particular case of how objects in stories (or in life) influence plan recognition decisions. We provide a Bayesian network formalization of a simple first-order theory of plans, and show how a particular network parameter seems to govern the difference between "life-like" and "story-like" response. We then show why this parameter would be influenced (in the desired way) by a model of speaker (or author) topic selection which assumes that facts in stories are typically "relevant".