Eliciting Categorical Data for Optimal Aggregation

Models for collecting and aggregating categorical data on crowdsourcing platforms typically fall into two broad categories: those assuming agents honest and consistent but with heterogeneous error rates, and those assuming agents strategic and seek to maximize their expected reward. The former often leads to tractable aggregation of elicited data, while the latter usually focuses on optimal elicitation and does not consider aggregation. In this paper, we develop a Bayesian model, wherein agents have differing quality of information, but also respond to incentives. Our model generalizes both categories and enables the joint exploration of optimal elicitation and aggregation. This model enables our exploration, both analytically and experimentally, of optimal aggregation of categorical data and optimal multiple-choice interface design.

Exact Exponent in Optimal Rates for Crowdsourcing

In many machine learning applications, crowdsourcing has become the primary means for label collection. In this paper, we study the optimal error rate for aggregating labels provided by a set of non-expert workers. Under the classic Dawid-Skene model, we establish matching upper and lower bounds with an exact exponent $mI(\pi)$ in which $m$ is the number of workers and $I(\pi)$ the average Chernoff information that characterizes the workers' collective ability. Such an exact characterization of the error exponent allows us to state a precise sample size requirement $m>\frac{1}{I(\pi)}\log\frac{1}{\epsilon}$ in order to achieve an $\epsilon$ misclassification error. In addition, our results imply the optimality of various EM algorithms for crowdsourcing initialized by consistent estimators.