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Hard Label Black-box Adversarial Attacks in Low Query Budget Regimes

arXiv.org Machine Learning

We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to generate adversarial examples for deep learning models solely based on information limited to output labels (hard label) to a queried data input. We use Bayesian optimization (BO) to specifically cater to scenarios involving low query budgets to develop efficient adversarial attacks. Issues with BO's performance in high dimensions are avoided by searching for adversarial examples in structured low-dimensional subspace. Our proposed approach achieves better performance to state of the art black-box adversarial attacks that require orders of magnitude more queries than ours.


RayS: A Ray Searching Method for Hard-label Adversarial Attack

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Among different attack settings, the most challenging yet the most practical one is the hard-label setting where the attacker only has access to the hard-label output (prediction label) of the target model. Previous attempts are neither effective enough in terms of attack success rate nor efficient enough in terms of query complexity under the widely used $L_\infty$ norm threat model. In this paper, we present the Ray Searching attack (RayS), which greatly improves the hard-label attack effectiveness as well as efficiency. Unlike previous works, we reformulate the continuous problem of finding the closest decision boundary into a discrete problem that does not require any zeroth-order gradient estimation. In the meantime, all unnecessary searches are eliminated via a fast check step. This significantly reduces the number of queries needed for our hard-label attack. Moreover, interestingly, we found that the proposed RayS attack can also be used as a sanity check for possible "falsely robust" models. On several recently proposed defenses that claim to achieve the state-of-the-art robust accuracy, our attack method demonstrates that the current white-box/black-box attacks could still give a false sense of security and the robust accuracy drop between the most popular PGD attack and RayS attack could be as large as $28\%$. We believe that our proposed RayS attack could help identify falsely robust models that beat most white-box/black-box attacks.


Spanning Attack: Reinforce Black-box Attacks with Unlabeled Data

arXiv.org Machine Learning

It has been shown that machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, are vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations, i.e., a small carefully crafted perturbation added to the input may significantly change the prediction results (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Biggio and Roli, 2018; Fawzi et al., 2018). Therefore, the problem of finding those perturbations, also known as adversarial attacks, has become an important way to evaluate the model robustness: the more difficult to attack a given model, the more robust it is. Depending on the information an adversary can access, the adversarial attacks can be classified into white-box and black-box settings. In the white-box setting, the target model is completely exposed to the attacker, and adversarial perturbations could be easily crafted by exploiting the first-order information, i.e., gradients with respect to the input (Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018). Despite of its efficiency and effectiveness, the white-box setting is an overly strong and pessimistic threat model, and white-box attacks are usually not practical when attacking real-world machine learning systems due to the invisibility of the gradient information. Instead, we focus on the problem of black-box attacks, where the model structure and parameters (weights) are not available to the attacker.


Black-box Adversarial Attacks with Bayesian Optimization

arXiv.org Machine Learning

October 1, 2019 Abstract We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to generate adversarial examples using information limited to loss function evaluations of input-output pairs. We use Bayesian optimization (BO) to specifically cater to scenarios involving low query budgets to develop query efficient adversarial attacks. We alleviate the issues surrounding BO in regards to optimizing high dimensional deep learning models by effective dimension upsampling techniques. Our proposed approach achieves performance comparable to the state of the art black-box adversarial attacks albeit with a much lower average query count. In particular, in low query budget regimes, our proposed method reduces the query count up to 80% with respect to the state of the art methods. 1 Introduction Neural networks are now well-known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples: additive perturbations that, when applied to the input, change the network's output classification [9]. Work investigating this lack of robustness to adversarial examples often takes the form of a back-and-forth between newly proposed adversarial attacks, methods for quickly and efficiently crafting adversarial examples, and corresponding defenses that modify the classifier at either training or test time to improve robustness. The most successful adversarial attacks use gradient-based optimization methods [9, 17], which require complete knowledge of the architecture and parameters of the target network; this assumption is referred to as the white-box attack setting.


SurFree: a fast surrogate-free black-box attack

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Machine learning classifiers are critically prone to evasion attacks. Adversarial examples are slightly modified inputs that are then misclassified, while remaining perceptively close to their originals. Last couple of years have witnessed a striking decrease in the amount of queries a black box attack submits to the target classifier, in order to forge adversarials. This particularly concerns the black-box score-based setup, where the attacker has access to top predicted probabilites: the amount of queries went from to millions of to less than a thousand. This paper presents SurFree, a geometrical approach that achieves a similar drastic reduction in the amount of queries in the hardest setup: black box decision-based attacks (only the top-1 label is available). We first highlight that the most recent attacks in that setup, HSJA, QEBA and GeoDA all perform costly gradient surrogate estimations. SurFree proposes to bypass these, by instead focusing on careful trials along diverse directions, guided by precise indications of geometrical properties of the classifier decision boundaries. We motivate this geometric approach before performing a head-to-head comparison with previous attacks with the amount of queries as a first class citizen. We exhibit a faster distortion decay under low query amounts (few hundreds to a thousand), while remaining competitive at higher query budgets.