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AutoGAN: Robust Classifier Against Adversarial Attacks

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Classifiers fail to classify correctly input images that have been purposefully and imperceptibly perturbed to cause misclassification. This susceptability has been shown to be consistent across classifiers, regardless of their type, architecture or parameters. Common defenses against adversarial attacks modify the classifer boundary by training on additional adversarial examples created in various ways. In this paper, we introduce AutoGAN, which counters adversarial attacks by enhancing the lower-dimensional manifold defined by the training data and by projecting perturbed data points onto it. AutoGAN mitigates the need for knowing the attack type and magnitude as well as the need for having adversarial samples of the attack. Our approach uses a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) with an autoencoder generator and a discriminator that also serves as a classifier. We test AutoGAN against adversarial samples generated with state-of-the-art Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) as well as samples generated with random Gaussian noise, both using the MNIST dataset. For different magnitudes of perturbation in training and testing, AutoGAN can surpass the accuracy of FGSM method by up to 25\% points on samples perturbed using FGSM. Without an augmented training dataset, AutoGAN achieves an accuracy of 89\% compared to 1\% achieved by FGSM method on FGSM testing adversarial samples.


Minimax Defense against Gradient-based Adversarial Attacks

arXiv.org Machine Learning

State-of-the-art adversarial attacks are aimed at neural network classifiers. By default, neural networks use gradient descent to minimize their loss function. The gradient of a classifier's loss function is used by gradient-based adversarial attacks to generate adversarially perturbed images. We pose the question whether another type of optimization could give neural network classifiers an edge. Here, we introduce a novel approach that uses minimax optimization to foil gradient-based adversarial attacks. Our minimax classifier is the discriminator of a generative adversarial network (GAN) that plays a minimax game with the GAN generator. In addition, our GAN generator projects all points onto a manifold that is different from the original manifold since the original manifold might be the cause of adversarial attacks. To measure the performance of our minimax defense, we use adversarial attacks - Carlini Wagner (CW), DeepFool, Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) - on three datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10 and German Traffic Sign (TRAFFIC). Against CW attacks, our minimax defense achieves 98.07% (MNIST-default 98.93%), 73.90% (CIFAR-10-default 83.14%) and 94.54% (TRAFFIC-default 96.97%). Against DeepFool attacks, our minimax defense achieves 98.87% (MNIST), 76.61% (CIFAR-10) and 94.57% (TRAFFIC). Against FGSM attacks, we achieve 97.01% (MNIST), 76.79% (CIFAR-10) and 81.41% (TRAFFIC). Our Minimax adversarial approach presents a significant shift in defense strategy for neural network classifiers.


Enhancing the Robustness of Deep Neural Networks by Boundary Conditional GAN

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Deep neural networks have been widely deployed in various machine learning tasks. However, recent works have demonstrated that they are vulnerable to adversarial examples: carefully crafted small perturbations to cause misclassification by the network. In this work, we propose a novel defense mechanism called Boundary Conditional GAN to enhance the robustness of deep neural networks against adversarial examples. Boundary Conditional GAN, a modified version of Conditional GAN, can generate boundary samples with true labels near the decision boundary of a pre-trained classifier. These boundary samples are fed to the pre-trained classifier as data augmentation to make the decision boundary more robust. We empirically show that the model improved by our approach consistently defenses against various types of adversarial attacks successfully. Further quantitative investigations about the improvement of robustness and visualization of decision boundaries are also provided to justify the effectiveness of our strategy. This new defense mechanism that uses boundary samples to enhance the robustness of networks opens up a new way to defense adversarial attacks consistently.


Fortified Networks: Improving the Robustness of Deep Networks by Modeling the Manifold of Hidden Representations

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Deep networks have achieved impressive results across a variety of important tasks. However a known weakness is a failure to perform well when evaluated on data which differ from the training distribution, even if these differences are very small, as is the case with adversarial examples. We propose Fortified Networks, a simple transformation of existing networks, which fortifies the hidden layers in a deep network by identifying when the hidden states are off of the data manifold, and maps these hidden states back to parts of the data manifold where the network performs well. Our principal contribution is to show that fortifying these hidden states improves the robustness of deep networks and our experiments (i) demonstrate improved robustness to standard adversarial attacks in both black-box and white-box threat models; (ii) suggest that our improvements are not primarily due to the gradient masking problem and (iii) show the advantage of doing this fortification in the hidden layers instead of the input space.


Featurized Bidirectional GAN: Adversarial Defense via Adversarially Learned Semantic Inference

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Deep neural networks have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where small perturbations are intentionally added to the original inputs to fool the classifier. In this paper, we propose a defense method, Featurized Bidirectional Generative Adversarial Networks (FBGAN), to capture the semantic features of the input and filter the non-semantic perturbation. FBGAN is pre-trained on the clean dataset in an unsupervised manner, adversarially learning a bidirectional mapping between the high-dimensional data space and the low-dimensional semantic space, and mutual information is applied to disentangle the semantically meaningful features. After the bidirectional mapping, the adversarial data can be reconstructed to denoised data, which could be fed into the classifier for classification. We empirically show the quality of reconstruction images and the effectiveness of defense.