Linear Logic and Defeasible Logic have been adopted to formalise different features relevant to agents: consumption of resources, and reasoning with exceptions. We propose a framework to combine sub-structural features, corresponding to the consumption of resources, with defeasibility aspects, and we discuss the design choices for the framework.
The paper proposes a fresh look at the concept of goal and advances that motivational attitudes like desire, goal and intention are just facets of the broader notion of (acceptable) outcome. We propose to encode the preferences of an agent as sequences of "alternative acceptable outcomes". We then study how the agent's beliefs and norms can be used to filter the mental attitudes out of the sequences of alternative acceptable outcomes. Finally, we formalise such intuitions in a novel Modal Defeasible Logic and we prove that the resulting formalisation is computationally feasible.
In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent and compute three concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss different types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with, and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator representing ordered sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions. The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have liner computational complexity.
There are several contexts of non-monotonic reasoning where a priority between rules is established whose purpose is preventing conflicts. One formalism that has been widely employed for non-monotonic reasoning is the sceptical one known as Defeasible Logic. In Defeasible Logic the tool used for conflict resolution is a preference relation between rules, that establishes the priority among them. In this paper we investigate how to modify such a preference relation in a defeasible logic theory in order to change the conclusions of the theory itself. We argue that the approach we adopt is applicable to legal reasoning where users, in general, cannot change facts or rules, but can propose their preferences about the relative strength of the rules. We provide a comprehensive study of the possible combinatorial cases and we identify and analyse the cases where the revision process is successful. After this analysis, we identify three revision/update operators and study them against the AGM postulates for belief revision operators, to discover that only a part of these postulates are satisfied by the three operators.
We provide a method of translating theories of Nute's defeasible logic into logic programs, and a corresponding translation in the opposite direction. Under certain natural restrictions, the conclusions of defeasible theories under the ambiguity propagating defeasible logic ADL correspond to those of the well-founded semantics for normal logic programs, and so it turns out that the two formalisms are closely related. Using the same translation of logic programs into defeasible theories, the semantics for the ambiguity blocking defeasible logic NDL can be seen as indirectly providing an ambiguity blocking semantics for logic programs. We also provide antimonotone operators for both ADL and NDL, each based on the Gelfond-Lifschitz (GL) operator for logic programs. For defeasible theories without defeaters or priorities on rules, the operator for ADL corresponds to the GL operator and so can be seen as partially capturing the consequences according to ADL. Similarly, the operator for NDL captures the consequences according to NDL, though in this case no restrictions on theories apply. Both operators can be used to define stable model semantics for defeasible theories.